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3Introduction
“The Washington Post reported that US Special Operations forces are actually in 
various parts of Iraq, with some already hunting for weapons sites.”1 Ambiguous lines 
like this are oftentimes seen in newspapers and magazines, or read on the news, 
especially in the post-9-11 world.  Images of burly men painted in green, outfitted in 
camouflage and a Rambo-esque bandana, donning  night-vision goggles, and armed with 
the newest weaponry are drawn forth when thinking of the phrase “Special Operations.”  
There is a certain myth surrounding the community: Special Operators are the greatest 
warriors in the world.  The use of these warriors is usually only thought of in a tactical 
context. This thesis, in looking beyond the battlefield adventures of Special Operators, 
asks the question: “How do these warriors do this job, and what ends do they serve in 
greater US security strategy?”
That question can be answered in different ways at varying points in history.  
Special operations forces (SOF) were brought into the military in support of World War 
II, then the capability was destroyed; then SOF were re-activated for conflicts in 
Southeast Asia in the 1960s and 1970s, but were again largely deactivated following the 
Vietnam Conflict.  Events in the early 1980s would finally make a standing SOF 
capability essential to U.S. security strategy; from then to the present, SOF have 
undergone a vast growth.
This thesis analyzes the evolution of the SOF capability vis-à-vis U.S. security 
strategy in six chapters.  Chapter one establishes a framework for this analysis by 
1
 Tom Gjelten, reporting for National Public Radio, February 13, 2003.
4offering a modern definition for special operations in contrasting them with conventional 
forces and answering the question: “What makes special operations so special?”  
The next three chapters are quite historical in focus.  Chapter two leaps back in 
time, asking why SOF were originally brought into the U.S. military pantheon in the 
early 1940s.  Chapter three looks at the role of SOF in supporting a total war via a study 
of their use in World War II.  Chapter four describes the role of SOF in the late-1950s 
through the end of the Vietnam Conflict. 
The final two chapters leave much more room for an analysis of SOF in U.S. 
security strategy.  Chapter five describes the events that led to the final indoctrination of 
the SOF capability.  Building on this discussion, chapter six analyzes the role of SOF in 
U.S. security strategy from the early 1990s through the present.  The closing chapter also 
includes a conclusion to the entire thesis that offers suggestions for the proper use of SOF 
in U.S. strategy. 
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6-1- 
What Makes them so “Special” and “Limited” Strategic 
Implications
To answer the question: What role do special operations play in U.S. security 
strategy?, the first chapter of this thesis will give a basic definition of special operations 
as they are understood today and will move on to provide an explanation of the classic 
theories, and more specifically the shortcomings and problems, surrounding conventional 
forces in the areas of military doctrine, general organization (as it deals with 
organization, professionalism, and education), innovation, and limited war; then, the 
heart of the chapter will further define special operations forces (SOF) by analyzing what 
is so “special” about them: what do doctrine, general organization, innovation, and 
limited war mean in the context of special operations?  Furthermore, how do SOF answer 
the problems that conventional forces have in these four areas and what are the 
shortcomings of SOF?  By answering these questions, SOF will be contrasted with 
conventional forces, and a framework will be set up through which it will eventually be 
possible to analyze when, why, and how special operations should be used as a tool of 
U.S. policy as opposed to conventional forces.  It must be recognized that chapters 2-6 of 
this thesis will serve to show the growth of SOF to the understanding explained here.
Special Operations Defined
SOF is an all-encompassing acronym that can be substituted for two terms: 
special forces (SF) and other forces that conduct special operations.  Special forces mean 
only Green Beret units of the U.S. Army.  Other forces included in U.S. SOF are Navy 
7SEALs, Air Force Combat Control and Pararescue teams, Army Rangers, and Marine 
Corps Reconnaissance commandos, as well as other classified teams, some affiliated with 
the military, others associated with the CIA.  
Special Operations are conducted by specially trained, equipped, and organized DOD forces 
against strategic or tactical targets in pursuit of national military, political, economic, or 
psychological objectives.  These operations may be conducted during periods of peace or 
hostilities.  The may support conventional operations, or they may be prosecuted independently.2
SOF, then, are any forces, such as those mentioned above, that conduct such missions.  
Covert Action (CA) and Covert Operations (CO) are terms often mistaken to 
mean Special Operations.  CA or CO are defined as “Activities conducted in support of 
national foreign policy objectives abroad which are planned and executed so that the role 
of the United States Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly.”  These types 
of activities are not necessarily military; they may include secret diplomacy, propaganda, 
and misinformation.3  To dispel any myths: special operations do not always deal with 
war and they may be covert or overt action.  
It is easier to define SOF in the terms that they contrast the tool of classical 
military analysis: conventional forces.  Tables 1 and 2 show a basic divide between the 
two types of forces.  Table 1 shows the difference in general characteristics, while table 2 
shows the difference in how the two types of forces are typically utilized.  The following 
divisions will be analyzed in greater depth whenever it is appropriate throughout.
2
 David Isenberg, “Special Forces: Shock Troops for the New Order,” Middle East Report, No. 177 (July-
August 1992), p. 24.  
3
 Lori Fisler Damrosch, “Covert Operations,” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 83., No. 4 
(October 1989), p. 796 from Executive Order No. 12,333, §3.4h, 1981.
8TABLE 1-CHARACTERISTICS4
SOF Conventional
Personnel Exceptional motivation and 
ability
National average
Equipment Highly modified, uniquely 
procured
Standardized
Training Joint; often with foreign 
forces
Service; usually with 
national forces
Size Smaller: groups, regiments, 
wings
Larger: armies, numbered 
air forces, fleets
TABLE 2-UTILIZATION5
SOF Conventional
Maneuver Break contact with friendly 
forces
Maintain contact with 
friendly forces
Combat Plan for brief, selective 
combat
Plan for protracted, 
inclusive combat
Risk Accept high risk of failure, 
loss to force
Hedge, circumvent, 
reinforce
Intent Exert leverage, use
indirection, attack 
opponent’s key capabilities
Attain decisive success
To summarize, then, SOF, in comparison to conventional forces, are smaller units 
with better equipment, having more motivated and better trained soldiers, that work with 
other forces, and use the best technology available.  When at war, as opposed to 
conventional forces, SOF may act independently, quickly, and at a high risk in order to 
destroy an opponent’s key capabilities.  This is a general statement, and a better 
understanding of it will be had after the Doctrine portion of the chapter, where the 
missions that SOF are capable of are discussed.
4
 Bruce Pirnie, Analysis of Special Operations Forces in Decision Aids (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), 
p.10, Figure 2.2.
5 Ibid, p. 7, Figure 2.1.
9Doctrine
Conventional 
Conventional military doctrine is a topic that can be analyzed on almost 
innumerable levels.  To start, there is air, land, sea, and space doctrine.  Within each area 
of operation, there is different doctrine for each situation.  In other words, the doctrine the 
Marine Corps would use in attacking a well-defended island in the Pacific is different 
from the doctrine it would prescribe to in attacking a building in Baghdad.  The United 
States Army would use one set of doctrine to defend a nuclear plant and another set of 
doctrine to defend a convoy.  Any situation can essentially be thrown in there, and if it 
has ever happened before, or if there is a possibility of it ever happening, the US military 
has doctrine for it.  
Doctrine springs from many sources: it is situational, economic, and geo-political.  
It can be forced by the civilian sector and can be influenced by innovation.6  All doctrine 
can somehow be traced to the nine principles of war (Mass, Objective, Offense, 
Maneuver, Economy of Force, Security, Surprise, Unity of Command, Simplicity).  
There is so much doctrine, in other words, that to describe all of it would be a book in 
itself.  As such, the greater analysis will be of special operations doctrine.
Special Operations
As can be inferred from the above explanation, to generally explain large-scale 
military doctrine is a task that usually ends in obscurity.  To contrive explicit analysis, it 
is necessary to specialize the area of analysis.  As such, an analysis of Special Operations 
doctrine can be quite succinct.  This will be a three-fold analysis.  First, I will describe 
6
 Barry R. Posen, “Explaining Military Doctrine,” The Use of Force, 5th Edition, edited by Robert J. Art 
and Kenneth N. Waltz (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999), pp. 23-43.
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the types of missions that SOF are usually tasked with.  Second, I will describe actual 
special operations doctrine.  Third, I will explain the shortcomings of special operations 
doctrine.
It is difficult to determine which to explain first: the missions inform the doctrine 
and the doctrine informs the missions in a symbiotic relationship.  As a result of the small 
size of the special operations community, there is less to get in the way of the channel of 
communication between mission and doctrine.  From a military standpoint, then, this is 
an organizational advantage in special operations doctrine: fewer and better-trained 
soldiers come between mission and doctrine; there is a practicality and an adherence to 
reality in this fact that contributes to much of the success of SOF on the field of battle.
First, then, a discussion of the actual missions that SOF have been tasked with.  
The missions they are tasked with are a result of their certain qualities and doctrine.  It is 
not that these missions are “better” than those of conventional forces; they are simply 
better suited to the characteristics and doctrine of SOF.  There are several missions that 
SOF are capable of. The first is abstract and the rest succinct.  
1-SOF can take on any imperceptible mission.  In a situation that has never been 
faced, SOF can readily be called in.  While hostage rescue is a mission that SOF train for, 
there was no succinct doctrine for rescuing hostages from an airplane.  In 1977, German 
GSG-9 Commandos rescued 78 hostages from an airplane in Mogadishu, Somalia by 
climbing up ladders at the back of the plane, plotting a diversionary attack at the main 
entrance, and then shooting expertly once inside the aircraft.7  Because they are trained to 
be self-sufficient thinkers and experts in war (both to be discussed in a later section), SOF 
soldiers have the ability to adapt to a new security threat.
7
 Ross S. Kelly, Special Operations and National Purpose (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), p. 56.
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2-In addition to this abstract mission, SOF have seven “doctrinal,” or succinctly 
published missions, and ten “collateral” missions.  The seven doctrinal missions are: 
counterterrorism, special reconnaissance, direct action, unconventional warfare, foreign 
internal defense, psychological operations, and civil affairs.  The ten collateral missions 
are: security assistance, humanitarian aid, antiterrorism, counterdrug operations, search 
and rescue, civic action, noncombatant evacuation, counterproliferation, peacekeeping, 
and show of force.8  It should be noted that all of these roles are limited; all special 
operations deal, to some extent, in limited warfare, which is why a section of the chapter 
will be devoted to an analysis of that subject.
The doctrine that both provides for and comes from these missions can best be 
summarized in four “SOF Truths” and nine principles.  The fours SOF Truths are: 
Humans are more important than hardware; Quality is better than quantity; Special operations 
forces cannot be mass produced; Competent special operations forces cannot be created after 
emergencies occur.9
These truths are quite self-evident, and will be synthesized when necessary through the 
thesis.  The principles are not official in the military, but only inferred from case studies 
as nine principles key to effective Special Operations warfare.  These nine principles are 
Simplicity, Security, Repetition, Surprise, Speed, Purpose10, Innovation, Flexibility, and 
Malleability or Precision.  Most of these words are self-explanatory.  A few key parts will 
be explained.
8
 Pirnie, Analysis of Special Operations Forces in Decision Aids, pp. 4-6.
   Congressional Research Service for the Special Operations Panel of the Readiness Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Armed Services, United States and Soviet Special Operations (US Government Printing 
Office: April 28, 1987), pp. 73-80.
9
 United States Special Operations Command, Posture Statement 2000: Providing Unique Solutions for a 
Changing World (USSOCOM, 2000), p. 1.
10
 First six from William H. McRaven, SPEC OPS: Case Studies in Special Operaitons Warfare (Novato, 
CA: Presidio, 1995), pp. 8-22.
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  Innovation as part of special operations will be discussed in the section on 
innovation.  It must be noted here only that innovation is part of the principles because 
SOF use the newest and best weapons in any situation.  Flexibility deals with the ability 
of SOF to adapt within the context of a specific mission, as was exhibited by the GSG-9 
rescue of the hostages in Somalia.  Malleability or Precision deals with the fact that SOF, 
as a weapons system in a larger conventional schema, can be precisely tailored to meet 
many strategic objectives.  Because they are capable of so many missions, SOF are 
malleable.  Because of the high-risk nature of most Special Operations, speed is a 
necessity.  Repetition only needs to be clarified as meaning heavy repetitions while 
training, not repeating actual missions several times.  
There are three perceived problems and/or shortfalls that follow SOF doctrine.  
1-There seems to be a perception that such a small force cannot have a larger strategic 
role in a war.  This is entirely untrue.  In the Gulf War, for example, SOF located and 
called air strikes on the twenty-nine scud missiles Iraq was prepared to send into Israel in 
order to draw Israelis into the war, certainly escalating the conflict beyond US 
intention.11  2-With so many missions, it may be difficult for SOF to perfect any one.  
This problem is first solved by training Special Operations troops to be flexible.  On an 
organizational level, SOF are broken up into specialized groups.  Navy SEALs, for 
instance, specialize in direct action; Delta Force specializes in rescue; Green Berets 
specialize in unconventional warfare, and all SOF receive some training in most SOF 
missions outside of their defined ones.12  3-The final problem is one that will confront 
special operations in many areas.  The cost to create a force that is capable of so much is 
11
 Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of US Foreign Policy
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 5.
12
 Kelly, Special Operations and National Purpose, pp. 20-22.
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great; in terms of equipment and training, some argue that SOF, a very limited 
community in numbers, are given an undue amount of resources.  This can only be 
disproved once the entire thesis is complete.
General Organization
Conventional
Conventional forces will be explained in three ways here: first, in terms of their 
organization: the size they operate with and how orders are carried out.  Second, in terms 
of professionalism, or how officers are considered professionals, and enlisted soldiers are 
not.  Third, conventional forces will be explained in terms of their training, and, in terms 
of officers, their professional military education (PME).
On deployment, divisions of conventional forces are sent; in other words, thinking 
is done in terms of tens of thousands.  When deployed, the commander of a certain 
theatre is given five-star general rank.  So, not even including civilians that must begin 
thinking about military strategy and political objectives, there are eleven officer ranks; 
with more and more officers the lower the rank goes.  Commands must pass from 
civilians to officers, then from officers down to enlisted soldiers.  Obviously, there are 
situations such as air strikes where the bureaucracy of command is smaller due to the 
necessity of acting quickly on intelligence; the point of this is simply to say that 
conventional doctrine does three things: first, it leaves a lot of room for error.  A mistake 
in judgment is generally more likely to be caught when there is a lot of time in between 
the idea itself and the action behind the idea.  Second, because of this structure, there is a 
long wait to plan a large conventional action.  Third, once the action does begin, there is 
less room to change it: because one unit can be vital to the success of a larger operation, 
14
if a single unit does not perform its task, even if things do not go as planned, it can hurt 
the operation if that unit improvises on what it is told.  Fourth: because of their size, 
larger conventional actions usually look to have a very large, war-changing effect. 
In the conventional military, it is classically assumed that there is a large schism 
in between what an officer is and what an enlisted soldier is.  The conventional officer is 
thought of as a professional.  His central skill is the “management of violence.”13
The duties of the military officer include: (1) the organization, equipping, and training of this 
force; (2) the planning of its activities; and (3) the direction of its operation in and out of combat.  
The direction, operation, and control of a human organization whose primary organization is the 
application of violence is the peculiar skill of the officer...It distinguishes the military officer qua 
military officer from the other specialists which exist in the modern armed services.  The skills of 
these experts may be necessary to the achievement of the objectives of military force.  But they 
are basically auxiliary vocations…It must be remembered that the peculiar skill of the officer is 
the management of violence, not the act of violence itself. Firing a rifle, for instance, is basically a 
mechanical craft.14
That is to say, enlisted men do not generally manage violence, and simply do as they are 
told.  This is not always true, as some leaders of smaller groups are indeed non-
commissioned officers (NCOs).  I draw two conclusions from this: first, this structure of 
professional or order-giver commanding the enlisted member or order-taker is necessary 
on a large-scale conventional level; to not have this structure would hurt the ability of the 
conventional military to succeed.  Second, because of this structure in a complex and 
multi-layered battlefield, it is very difficult for soldiers to adapt to a battle that may 
change course at any moment.  There is no sense of the individual, which is necessary, 
but may, in some cases, be detrimental.  This is why large-scale conventional operations 
generally only take place in the closest to ideal conditions possible.  The delay of D-Day 
13
 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 11.
14 Ibid, pp. 11-13.
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until June 6, 1944 is an example of this, as the planned date of invasion was postponed 
due to weather. 
Training is given to the conventional military in light of this command structure.  
Officers are taught about leadership, while enlisted members are taught to follow orders, 
and only adapt when necessary.  Also, it should be noted that, due to the size of the 
conventional military, it is difficult to give men a lot of time to train.  While both officers 
and enlisted men train in general tactics quite sufficiently, it is a large logistical problem 
to get so many men to do the amount of specific tactical training necessary; it should 
especially be considered that this is so in time of war, when a bit of doctrine may need to 
change for that specific campaign, it is difficult to give such a large force the requisite 
training in new doctrine when men are needed on the battlefield.  The rushed training of 
Marines during the Vietnam War is an outstanding example of this.
Special Operations
SOF will be analyzed in the same three ways that conventional forces were. To 
begin with, there is one unified United States Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM).  It is inherently smaller than any large conventional command, even 
though it includes SOF from every service.  Likewise, on deployment, there is a Special 
Operations Command set up in each area of operation.  Throughout this section, I will 
use the case of a SEAL operation in the Gulf War.  As part of General Schwarzkopf’s 
fake amphibious invasion, a group of Navy SEALs was tasked with destroying 
underwater mines and conducting underwater surveillance of the beach area.  In Iraq 
special operations were led by Special Operations Command, Central Command 
(SOCCENT).  Outside of the team itself, there is a much smaller bureaucracy for an order 
16
to go through than in the conventional sense; this is inherent in the small size.  
Shwarzkopf, the US Commander-in-Chief, Central Command (USINCCENT), gave a 
direct order to the commander of SOCCENT.  He gave an order to the commander of the 
Naval Special Warfare Group, who then briefed “Task Unit Mike.”15  Task Unit Mike 
performed the mission.  Task Unit Mike, a SEAL team, would have no more than seven 
members.  This has a few implications: first, there is very little room for error as a very 
large task is kept within a very isolated and small community.  As such, the second point: 
the importance of the objective is much larger than the size of the force; or despite their 
small size, SOF can have a very large war-changing effect.  Third: the smaller 
bureaucracy makes for quick action.  Presently, for instance, “The Pentagon is promoting 
a global counterterrorism plan that would allow Special Operations forces (SOF) to enter 
a foreign country to conduct military operations without explicit concurrence from the 
U.S. ambassador there.”16  Fourth: because of their small size, training, and the isolation 
of their missions, SOF are very adaptable in battle. 
The small size of SOF (some operate on the level of one or two soldiers), and the 
nature of their missions necessitate a blurred line in between enlisted and officer.  In the 
case of Task Unit Mike, there were approximately seven men with only one officer.  
They were operating underwater; obviously apart from any larger conventional force.  
Indeed, the officer is still in charge.  However, in such a situation, each man must be able 
to rely on his own instincts to make a decision.  Another case of this can be cited by a 
team of one Air Force Combat Controller and one Navy SEAL.  The two set up an 
observation post for two weeks calling down air strikes on an Al-Qaeda encampment in 
15
 Pirnie, Analysis of Special Operations Forces in Decision Aids, pp. 35-37.
16
 Ann Scott Dyson and Dana Priest, “Pentagon Seeking Leeway Overseas: Operations Could Bypass 
Envoys,” The Washington Post (24 February 2005), p.1.
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Afghanistan17: here, two enlisted men alone were responsible for the direction of air 
strikes; the direction of violence is something that Huntington inherently associates with 
officership.  It is not that there is no leader; that leader simply does not need to be an 
officer.  
This individualism is made more evident when the initial training of SOF is 
considered.
The thrust of conventional force training, after all, is the achievement of consistent performance of 
routine tasks to the highest attainable average standard.  By contrast, the emphasis in Special 
Operations is on directing individual skills to the accomplishment of functions unique to a given 
mission, generally a high-risk one.  Improvisation and independent thinking are essential.18
Consider the training of the SEAL element of Task Unit Mike.  Officers go to their 
Officer Candidate School, and enlisted soldiers go through their basic training.  Once at 
Basic Underwater Demolition/SEALs (BUD/S) School, however, the men go through 
training together.  While officers generally lead boat crews at BUD/S, and one officer is a 
class leader, the two work together simultaneously to foster an attitude of community.  
The men doing the training are even enlisted; contra Huntingtons’s argument, enlisted 
men are somewhat responsible for the training of officers here.  (Furthermore, in Marine 
Corps Scout Sniper School, for example, teams of two enlisted men are taught to operate 
independently).  In the end, a BUD/S class will graduate approximately ten percent of the 
men that started after a period of two years.  After that two years, the men finally go into 
battle.  SOF training is just above average.
All special operations forces share certain characteristics.  Be they a one man “unit” or a battalion, 
special operations forces can be identified by their flexibility, versatility, adaptability, 
responsiveness, durability, ingenuity, and capacity to act independently of other military forces.  
Because special operations are situation-specific and are not easily planned far in advance, special 
17
 Michael Hirsch, None Braver: US Air Force Pararescuemen in the War or Terrorism (New York: 
Penguin Books, 2003).
18
 Kelly, Special Operations and National Purpose, p. xvii.
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operations forces must be ready to treat the unconventional as if it were conventional, and to train 
for the extraordinary as if it were the ordinary.19
 There are a couple problems associated with this type of necessary training.  
First, the men must learn to be adaptable, that is, they must have a very wide base of 
knowledge, while at the same time learning a specialized task such as underwater 
demolition, or in the case of Green Berets, another language.  General skills can suffer as 
a result of requisite specialization.20  Furthermore, in order to gain the expertise necessary 
to have such an elite force, an enormous amount of money must be spent on a very small 
force.  It should also be noted that as a result of the difficulty of the training, SOF are 
given a heightened position in their respective services.  It is understood that they are 
outside of the regular community.  In the Air Force, for example, only special operations 
soldiers wear berets: this is a symbol for their separateness and their eliteness.  There is, 
simply put, an understanding that SOF guys are different than the conventional guys.21
This understanding leads to a unique relationship among SOF warriors that does not exist 
to so great an extent in the conventional military.  “While members of other military 
units, particularly in the Marine Corps, maintain a strong sense of loyalty and identity…a 
distinctive aspect of SOF organizational culture is that it cuts across military service 
lines.  A sense of a common and highly valued organizational bond exists among the 
members of the [SOF] community.”22  The SOF organization encourages togetherness 
among the special operators within every service. The enlisted, furthermore, simply have 
a more open relationship with officers in SOF.       
19
 Steven Lambakis, “‘Forty Selected Men Can Shake the World’: The Contributions of Special Operations 
to Victory,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (April-June, 1994), p. 213.
20
 Kelly, Special Operations and National Purpose, pp. 18-20.
21
 Hirsch, None Braver: US Air Force Pararescuemen in the War or Terrorism
22
 Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces (Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), p. 57.
19
Insofar as training within the context of a war, SOF pose one advantage and one 
disadvantage.  Repetition is one of the principles of special operations.  That is to say, 
when SOF are tasked with a mission, because of their small size, it is not a logistical 
problem to rehearse for that specific task.23  Part of Task Unit Mike’s mission, for 
example, included a rehearsal of the exact diversionary task they were to undertake.24
The only problem with SOF training in wartime is that SOF is a small community in high 
demand: as the type and quality of the individual soldier is essential to the effective 
execution of special operations, the initial training will never shorten in length or 
decrease in retention standards.  In other words, there will always be very few soldiers 
and their initial training can never be rushed due to the decrease in effectiveness it would 
produce.
Innovation
Conventional Difficulty
It is common sense that if one man has a club and another has a gun, the man with 
the gun will kill the man with the club.  With that being said, militaries that are in war25
generally take it for granted that innovation is good.  There are two types of problems 
with innovation on the conventional level, however.  First, the assumption that innovation 
is always tactically or strategically good is not correct for two reasons.  Second, when 
innovation would actually be good, there are four problems with making innovation 
happen.
23
 McRaven, SPEC OPS: Case Studies in Special Operaitons Warfare (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1995), pp. 
15-16.
24
 Pirnie, Analysis of Special Operations Forces in Decision Aids, pp. 35-37.
25
 Obviously, constant innovation can lead to arms races and then war.  As such, innovation can have 
negative effects in terms of beginning a war.  Many arguments like this are made about the causes of World 
War I.  
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The assumption that innovation is always good in war is incorrect because, when 
innovation occurs too fast, or weapons have not been properly tested, it is difficult for 
belligerents to determine how weapons should properly be used.  Thus the first problem 
has to do with the fact that it is very difficult to test a weapon to see if it is better used 
offensively or defensively.  The second problem, resulting from either the difficulty in 
testing, a misunderstanding, or an improper desire to innovate, is that innovation can lead 
to a complete misunderstanding of the security dilemma.  In World War I, for example, 
barbed wire, artillery, and machine guns were innovations used for offensive purposes 
that were in fact better suited for the defense26.  Believing the offense is more effective, 
tactically, when the defense is actually better, or vice-versa, is a horrible consequence 
that may be brought on by innovation.
Even when innovation is indeed for the best, there are still four problems.  (1) The 
primary problem is that of lag-time.  Lag-time is “that lapsed period between innovation 
and a successful institutional or social response to it.”27  Strategies that deal with 
successful conventional innovation accept that the only way to do so is in terms of 
generations.  This is necessary because senior officers must understand capabilities, then 
pass their understanding to younger officers, who must, before they innovate, understand 
a basic level of war-fighting.28  (2) As weapons become more complex, the lag-time 
increases, because it is much harder to test complex weapons than basic ones.29
(3) Innovation requires a change in doctrine.  It takes a radical spark, and even then the 
26
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military is hesitant, in its nature, to sway from tradition.  This increases lag-time.  
General Billy Mitchell’s voice for the utilization of the air as an effective war-fighting 
tool and the long-standing role of the horse cavalry30 are testament to a radical spark and 
resistance to change, respectively.  (4) The institutionalization, as Barry Posen puts it, of 
the conventional military is not kind to change.31  There is a large chain of command, and 
every officer in that chain has a say in whether or not innovation is accepted and doctrine 
is changed.
Special Operations
Special operations can be analyzed in three ways in terms of innovation.  First, 
innovation must be acknowledged as a key part within the operations of SOF.  Innovation 
in special operations overcomes many of the problems with conventional innovation.  
Second, SOF must be analyzed as a weapons system that itself can be used to more easily 
innovate a larger conventional force.  Finally, there are some drawbacks and 
shortcomings to innovation within special operations.
SOF overcome the problems discussed above in conventional forces in three 
ways.  (1) Whereas conventional forces are not accepting of change, SOF welcome it.  
The increase in lag time comes from a difficulty in changing conventional doctrine; with 
Special Operations, innovation is a part of the doctrine.  It is understood that “innovation 
simplifies a plan by helping to avoid or eliminate obstacles that otherwise would 
compromise and/or complicate the rapid execution of the mission.”32  Because speed is so 
vital to the high-risk maneuvers of SOF and part of its doctrine, innovation is usually 
welcomed.  (2) Because the force is so small, the chain of command is so short, and 
30 Ibid, pp. 152-169.
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training is so much more task-oriented and stresses adaptability, lag time is shortened 
significantly.  A special operations unit can be directly informed to take direct action 
from any source above it using an innovative weapon.  Because of the small nature of the 
SOF community, units are authorized to procure equipment per mission requirements 
without much fuss.  In a raid on a Vietnamese prison camp, for instance, raiders bought 
specialized equipment form civilian sources.33  In other words, SOF are not organized to 
ask: “Why would I change what has always worked in the past and incur a high cost?;” 
they are trained to ask: “What new tools can make the mission better no matter what?”  
Even more, because there is less divide between senior officers and younger officers and 
enlisted troops, innovation is more easily understood and utilized.  (3) Because special 
operations are nearly always offensive in nature and high-risk no matter what, there is no 
worry about the security dilemma.  The broad consideration of the security dilemma that 
must be analyzed on the conventional level does not exist in the special operations 
context.  Conventional forces must assess the risk involved in misunderstanding weapons 
and thus misreading the security dilemma because to misread the situation can lead to an 
unacceptable loss of force;  SOF are more likely to incur high risks by their very nature, 
as was discussed above.
As a weapons system, SOF are outstanding for innovation.  In this sense, they can 
test a weapon that conventional forces are hesitant to use, thus helping to alleviate the 
testing problem.  It is now common practice for large forces to use Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAVs) in surveillance.  SOF, as they stay ahead of the conventional lag in 
innovation, use UAVs to attack enemy targets.  A UAV with two hellfire missiles was 
33
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utilized by a CIA team in Yemen in November, 2002 to destroy an automobile filled with 
terrorists.34
Finally, special operations pose two problems in the realm of innovation.  (1) SOF 
utilize innovation, most often, in the form of utilizing highly modified and specialized 
equipment.35  As they seek to use these innovations in nearly all their missions, and they 
are permitted to do so by a short chain of command, SOF incur extremely high expenses.  
(2) There is a lag time involved in SOF innovation.  Much of the reason that SOF are able 
to innovate quickly and innovate well is that they are trained to do so.  As discussed in 
the section on general organization, this training takes a lot of time (it incurs a high cost 
as well).  The lag time involved with innovation in special operations, then, comes in that 
training elite soldiers is done in terms of years; training conventional forces can be done 
in terms of months if necessary.  Though this lag does exist, it is still much less 
significant than the conventional lag.
Limited War
The previous three sections have essentially served to separate conventional 
forces from SOF in terms of defining the force.  There is finally a ground upon which it is 
possible to actually analyze the strategic effect that each may have in war.  While SOF 
may be able to fight as part of a larger total war, it is quite difficult to analyze SOF in this 
context.  The inception of American special operations is widely argued to be in World 
War II36, when members of the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) conducted 
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sabotage missions on the economic and political infrastructure of Nazi-occupied 
countries.37 As the U.S. has only fought limited war since WWII, it is almost unnecessary 
to analyze SOF in the context of total war.  SOF have been exclusively utilized in the 
context of limited war since WWII.  The following section will cover conventional
theories and shortcomings in terms of limited war, and then explain what SOF can mean 
in that same context.  When this analysis is complete, there will be an adequate 
framework to analyze how SOF can pose a strategic advantage to conventional forces 
when thinking about the policy goals of the United States; that is to say, in every case to 
be analyzed, limited war will be the unifying theme.  
Conventional
There are many reasons as to why a nation would fight a limited war—to prevent 
the spread of Communism (as in Korea), to democratize (as in Afghanistan), and any 
other policy objective.  This section will discuss the utility of a conventional force versus 
the utility of SOF once limited war has actually begun.  There are two basic arguments 
about limited war in these terms.  (1) Once an action has been taken by one side, the 
enemy has every reason to believe that the same action will be taken again.  In other 
words, if a military sends one division of troops to an area, there is no reason to believe it 
will not send another.  (2) Limited war is about signaling.  There are certain thresholds 
that it should be understood cannot be crossed without consequence.  There are five 
reasons as to why limited war has such restraints.  1- Bargaining is constant in limited 
war.  The only bargaining tools available are the end of the war and the way in which the 
John Arquilla, From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient and Modern Times (New York: 
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war is fought; in other words, military and civilian leaders require a limit to place on the 
targets they intend to destroy.  2- Most bargaining is done tacitly in the form of a pattern 
of military action.  3- The arbitrary nature of many signals makes tacit agreements easier 
to understand.  To simplify: an army can cross a river or not.  4- These limits should be 
clearly understood by tradition and precedent, such as the use of nuclear vs. conventional 
force.  5- When communication has broken down, such signs are all that remain as a tool 
of negotiation and as such they must be utilized in limited war.38
Korea is a conventional case study of limited war par excellence.  The Chinese 
entered the war once the US decided to send a large offensive into Korea past the 38th
Parallel.  Once the United States compromised the integrity of the Korean Government, 
the Chinese were going to enter no matter what.39  In other words, there is very little 
leverage with conventional forces.  Signals are blatant and overt.  A conventional attack, 
as a symbol, offers very little as a sign; a large conventional attack, as it can be assumed 
others will follow, can always be assumed to compromise the integrity of the attacked 
nation, and as such, it is much more likely that force may escalate undesirably, as 
happened to the United States in Korea.  Furthermore, especially when speaking of 
bombing operations, there is a large fear of collateral damage—that more than just the 
limited target gets destroyed.
Special Operations
Special operations, in their very size, are a limited tool of national policy.  
Specifically, they offer much more leverage to policy makers in the context of limited 
38
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war.  As was discussed above, SOF offer a wide array of abilities, and thus can be 
precisely tailored to meet various policy objectives by sending various signals in the 
context of a larger conventional war.   SOF also offer an outstanding resource in attaining 
a limited objective without committing a large conventional force in peacetime.  Finally, 
SOF can accomplish limited objectives of a larger abstract war.
First, the reason that SOF offer such a point of leverage is that they work on a 
purely tactical level, but have strategic effects.40  In other words, the sign itself may be 
one showing a weaker force stance, but the actions of that sign are quite strong.  Also, the 
utilization of SOF to have an effect beyond their limited scope allows conventional forces 
to concentrate their resources elsewhere in the context of a limited war.  The destruction 
of Scud missiles in the Gulf War may be cited as an example of this.  While a small 
group of commandos participated in the destruction of these 29 missiles, this small group 
very well may have stopped Israel from entering the war.  
In peacetime, SOF can also operate to attain policy objectives.  That is to say, 
they can provide military skills to a situation at a time when a declaration of war is not 
sought or where conventional forces may exacerbate a crisis.41  The attempted rescue of 
hostages from Iran in 1980 is an example of this.  The United States did not wish to go to 
war with Iran; it only wished to rescue its hostages.
Finally, in an abstract war, SOF can accomplish limited objectives where the US 
is at war with only part of a nation, and not the regime as a whole.  In the grander war on 
terror, for example, the United States has SOF operating in the Philippines.  Obviously, 
the United States does not wish to escalate the conflict within that nation by sending in a 
40
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large force; and SOF are able to attain strictly the limited objective of fighting Islamist 
terrorist cells without much collateral damage.42
Conclusion
Because of the characteristics of SOF, in terms of their malleability, their unique 
organization, their eliteness, their willingness to innovate, and various other unique 
characteristics, they have the ability to attain a wide array of various policy objectives.  
The force can tailor itself to the objective very easily.  Since World War II, in the cold 
war era, the post-cold war era, and presently in the war on terrorism, SOF have provided 
a unique mechanism for the United States to fight limited wars and obtain limited tactical 
objectives that have a large strategic effect.  The rest of this thesis will serve to show how 
this precisely tailored strategic capability has evolved.
42 http://www.pacom.mil/philimagery/index9.shtml
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The Evolution Begins
In the history of Special Operations in the United States, there are two timelines.  
The longer is the timeline that describes the military of the U.S. conducting missions that, 
by today’s definition, would be considered special operations.  It is any “Class of military 
actions that fall outside the realm of conventional warfare during their respective time 
periods.”43  In an international sense, the first instance of a special operation is widely 
cited as the Trojan horse in the Peloponnesian War; the United States itself has used 
special operations via unconventional warfare in the Revolutionary War, The War with 
the Barbary Pirates, and most subsequent wars in its history.  
The second timeline, and the one whose inception is to be analyzed here, is the 
timeline beginning around World War II.  Asking why the United States military used 
SOF in the War is to ask why the United States military decided to indoctrinate SOF into 
its large-scale, conventional military; for what reason and how did the United States 
military innovate to include a small, elite force outside of its typical command structure?
Three types of ideas, all of which will be drawn out here, account for why this 
innovation happened and how it occurred.  These four categories of ideas intersect at 
some points.  (1) It was a war-time, not a peace-time innovation.  (2) There were specific 
historical reasons that SOF were needed in WWII.  (3) The reasons for and ways by 
which this innovation was implemented are similar to classical theories of innovation; the 
actual change in doctrine is unique unto itself.  Most innovations include a generation-
43
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long change in doctrine44; in this case, the doctrine only changes to the extent that it 
makes room for a small, elite group to make its own doctrine.  The innovation itself could 
be characterized as elite.
(1) The fact that this was a war-time innovation suggests that the lag time is 
significantly decreased.  In other words, because of the pressure of war, there was a 
perceived need to innovate to have SOF and quickly.  While it could be argued that the 
lag-time for this innovation was hundreds of years (stemming from the first utilization of 
unconventional warfare in the Revolutionary War), the true conception of special 
operations as a functional part of the military was an idea that went from conception to 
utilization was much quicker that had the U.S. had the luxury of changing doctrine during 
peacetime; a process that, in the case of changing the United States Marines into an 
amphibious assault force, took 37 years45.  To best understand the perceived need for 
quick innovation it is necessary to understand the specific historical reasons that Special 
Operations were needed here. 
(2) First and foremost, it must be understood that the United States was involved 
in total war here; in this case, the strategy becomes victory—winning the war outright is 
the political end.  Special Operations were perceived as strategically and tactically 
necessary to the political goal of total victory.  The role of SOF would be to fight several 
limited, local wars within the total war in order to reach this end.46  Second, there were 
two major branches of SOF added at the outset of World War II, and the circumstances 
44
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surrounding the inception of each must be understood.  The first is the Office of Special 
Services (OSS), a precursor to Army Special Forces, or Green Berets.47  Second is the 
inception of the Army Rangers.
The OSS emerged out of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s new deal bureaucracy.  
FDR had an Office of the Coordinator of Information; due to a leadership struggle 
between the group that controlled propaganda and subversive, guerilla military tactics.  
The COI quickly split to only control propaganda, while the OSS was created to control 
all else.  In order to protect economic interests and help control the spread of Naziism, the 
OSS met the perceived necessity of covertly aiding the French against the occupying 
Germans.  A group created in January of 1941 was operational by April of the year—
obviously turn-around this quickly meant the need to aid France was perceived as great.48
By October of that same year, the director of the OSS, William Donovan, had split his 
office into Special Intelligence (SI) and Special Operations (SO) branches; and had 
sanctioned these groups to act together in the field as Operational Groups (OG’s).49
Additionally, by 1942 in the Pacific Theater, the US needed to help in uprisings against 
the occupying Japanese in both Burma and the Philippines.50  The insurgents on these 
islands needed US training and assistance.  As the United States was fighting a two-front 
war, it did not have the conventional resources to supply these Low-Intensity Conflicts.
47
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The Rangers were created for a different reason altogether.  The British had a 
long-standing tradition of having an elite corps of commandoes; in the Spring of 1942, 
Generals in Europe wished for United States soldiers to gain combat experience before 
actually invading the mainland as a large force.  As such, Colonel Lucian Truscott was 
tasked with arranging for US troops to participate in British-led commando raids into 
German-occupied Europe.  Truscott was promoted to Brigadier General, and suggested to 
Generals Marshall and Eisenhower, now in the planning stages in the European theater, 
that the Americans create their own commando outfit.  His request gained approval in 
two days.  The 1st Ranger battalion was activated on 19 June 1942.  Though originally 
created to give troops experience by going on commando raids with the British, the Allies 
prepared for their invasion of North Africa and the Rangers were deemed too valuable a 
tool to be deactivated; the Rangers would carry out specific high-risk missions 
throughout World War II.51
(3) In four ways, this innovation can be seen as a normal US military innovation. 
First, from the historical perspective, it is easy to see that the reason for the innovation 
was military necessity in the strategy of this total war.  Further proof of this comes in the 
fact that Congress allocated no funds to any of the conflicts in France, Burma, or the 
Philippines: the military chose to spend its resources on special operations.52  2- Rosen 
says that, in order for the process of change to take place, a change must be sparked by 
senior military leaders with political pull.53  As was seen above, the Rangers were created 
with the approval of Generals Marshall and Eisenhower.  3- Civilians usually need to 
51
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intervene in support of a military leader to help change doctrine.54  It is evidence enough 
that the OSS was spawned by the New Deal of President Roosevelt.  4- Finally, as 
discussed in the first chapter, the military is a structure that generally resists doctrinal 
change.55  Special operations received a lot of criticism in WWII.  First, SOF take the 
best men from conventional units.  Winston Churchill regarded SOF as “A dangerous 
drain on the quality of an infantry battalion.”56  Additionally, generals criticized SOF in 
WWII  for ruining the morale of those not chosen for the elite units, the wastefulness of 
having elite soldiers stand idly by in some major battles, and finally the high casualty rate 
of most commando missions.57
Indeed, every innovation must be new in some way or else it would not be an 
innovation.  The only innovation made by the US military in this situation, however, was 
changing its doctrine to the extent that it would allow elite, unconventional units to exist.  
The allowance of SOF as a separate section of the military would prove to bring 
innovations unlike any other the United States military had seen before.  First and 
foremost, typically successful innovations take part over a generation where senior 
officers are able to impart new knowledge onto younger officers and younger officers are, 
in turn, able to act out a re-definition of doctrine.58  In this case, the innovation happened 
much more rapidly, as was already explained.  Second, this innovation involved the 
utilization of more British doctrine than American doctrine—in fact they were taught 
tactics completely antithetical to American doctrine.  “Much of the training for the (OSS) 
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OGs was…based on British commandos.  It placed a heavy emphasis on physical 
training, demolition, special weapons, and the hit-and-run tactics of guerillas.”59  The 
basis of the Army Rangers was, as mentioned, to join British commandoes.  Third, the 
innovation involved inventing a totally new command structure outside of the 
conventional military.  At its creation, the OSS was given the mandate to “Plan and 
operate such services as may be directed by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.”60
The exact organizational structure will be discussed later, but it should suffice to say that 
no unit as small as the OSS had ever taken direct orders from the Join Chiefs of Staff.  
Fourth, SOF were given relative organizational autonomy.  At his own behest, William 
Donovan had the power to split his bureau into two branches.  Rangers and the OSS OGs, 
it will be later shown, also organized their units uniquely for their specific tasks.  Finally, 
the men chosen were elite.  In the midst of war, in the example of the Rangers, SOF were 
deemed so strategically important that they should take away a regular Army battalion’s 
best men.  Rangers, however, were never given their own headquarters. 
For the preceding reasons and in the preceding ways, the conventional United 
States Military—a large, dominant force that relied upon large unit cohesion and a 
regular chain of command— decided that it was strategically necessary to sanction an 
elite force separate from itself.  The following chapters will discuss the repercussions—
positive and negative—and the evolution, of this decision, beginning with the role SOF 
played in World War II.       
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World War II: SOF in Support of Total War
Studying World War II in terms of special operations is a difficult and, in some 
ways, fruitless task.  The war was one won by millions of regular soldiers, slightly aided 
by SOF.  Two things make the analysis worthwhile.  First, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, it is necessary to ask why special operations were indoctrinated by the 
conventional military.  Second, to be discussed here, World War II is most useful as a 
tool of analyzing the role of SOF in total warfare.  It is immediately paradoxical in three 
ways: SOF engage singularly in limited warfare; in the context of total warfare, then, one 
must ask why and how elite forces are used in limited roles to support a total war.  
Furthermore, the utility of a study of total warfare can be questioned by the fact that 
World War II was the last total war engaged in by the United States.  Finally, a large part 
of the mechanism by which the U.S. has been able to avoid total war is the utility in 
limited war of SOF itself.  Despite this, total war is certainly a possibility in the future, 
and analyzing World War II provides a unique insight into the way that SOF can work to 
support any large-scale conventional operation.
Total Warfare Defined
To build a framework upon which to discuss the utility of SOF in World War II, 
an adequate definition and understanding of total warfare must be established.  A simple 
and common definition of total war is “The total identification of the nation with the 
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army and the full utilization of a country’s resources.”61  This differs inversely, then, 
from limited war, whereby not all of a country’s resources are utilized.  As the means by 
which a total war is fought are unlimited, so are the ends sought—total victory is the aim 
of total war.  With these limitless means and goals, the advance of military technology 
raises the stakes of war.  “During World War I the stakes were still only the relative 
strength of nations.  By World War II the stakes were the existence of nations.”62  Herein 
lay the greatest discrepancy between limited and total warfare.  One nation will only 
destroy another nation to the point that it can reach its strategic aim: in limited war, that 
strategic aim is limited political victory and therefore one nation does not seek the 
annihilation of its enemy; in total war, where total military victory is the strategic aim, 
complete annihilation of the enemy is sought without limits.  The only thing that hinders 
complete destruction of a nation is the total surrender of a bellicose nation before it is 
destroyed.  
Roles of SOF in World War II
In the aim of total victory over its enemies in Europe and the Pacific, SOF played 
limited, supportive roles.  Their role can be analyzed in this way in terms of three ways.  
(1) SOF were given specifically limited missions that did not have the aim of annihilating 
the enemy; this will be shown via the Cabanatuan prisoner camp rescue.  (2) SOF were 
given highly specialized roles in support of large-scale operations, as in the cases of the 
successful Battle of Zerf and the failed Battle of Cisterna.  (3) Highly elite units like the 
Jedburghs and OSS OGs were given reconnaissance, direct action, and guerilla missions 
in an attempt to undermine the authority of Nazi-occupied areas of Europe as early as 
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1941 and to support Allied invasions in 1944 and 1945.63  These missions usually 
involved training and executing with foreign militaries.  A section has been given to each 
of these specific roles; every section concludes by giving theoretical implications on the 
strategic use of SOF suggested by each war-fighting role.
(1) Very Limited Missions—Cabanatuan 
On the Pacific front, in late January of 1945, 128 Rangers of the 6th Ranger 
Battalion were tasked with rescuing American prisoners at the Cabanatuan prison camp 
in the Philippines, near Luzon.  The prisoners here were survivors of the Bataan Death 
March, where tens of thousands of American and Filipino troops had died.  The Japanese 
were notoriously cruel to prisoners, and an opportunity to rescue this many troops (521) 
would not be passed up.   The camp was located behind enemy lines and in the midst of 
heavy Japanese troop movements.  A slight failure of intelligence would lead to these 128 
Rangers and their Filipino guides and support going up against heavy Japanese artillery 
and what amounted to two division-size units of Japanese troops.64  The intelligence 
gathered by Alamo Scouts, a special intelligence group, though underestimating the 
amount of Japanese presence in the area, was enough to let the Rangers to know they 
would be outnumbered. 
What the Rangers lacked in size would need to be made up for with surprise.  The 
battle plans reflected this.  To best conceal the soldiers, “The decision was made to attack 
at dusk…the element of surprise was stressed as being of primary importance to the 
63
 Terry White, Swords of Lightning: Special Forces and the Changing Face of Warfare (New York: 
Brassey’s, 1992), p. 3.
64
 Dr. Michael J. King, Rangers: Selected Combat Operations in World War II (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 
Combat Studies Institute, 1985), p. 56.
37
success of the mission; all were cautioned to spare no effort to secure the same.”65  The 
plan consisted of breaking the battalion into two platoons and four assault groups.  One 
assault group would sneak up on the compound, kill the guards, and carry out a frontal 
assault on the camp; the other three assault groups would cover the flanks of the 
compound, with remaining Rangers being used to find and escort American troops from 
the camp.  Filipino guerillas were used to block the escape road, the City Cabu Highway, 
and would form a column to stop a counter-attack by the Japanese at the signal of a red 
flare from a Ranger on the inside once all prisoners were rescued.66  The Americans 
gained surprise, essentially bypassing most of the 7,000 Japanese troops in the area, and 
saving 511 prisoners, giving the Japanese 523 casualties, and only losing two Rangers 
killed.67   The operation was an unqualified tactical success: now the more 
important question of the theoretical implications of this operation in terms of SOF 
actions in extremely limited roles in support of a total war.
(1) Even by special operations terms, this was an action extremely limited in 
scope.  This is manifest by the fact that the Rangers did not conduct training specific to 
this mission—it was a limited mission of opportunity to the extent that, after 3,000 
American prisoners had already perished at Cabanatuan, the Army could not pass up any 
opportunity to save 521 survivors.68  The theoretical implication of SOF here is one of 
risk assessment.  Americans went up against 7,000 Japanese troops.  The goal of the 
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mission was to save 521 prisoners; when fighting a total war where these 521 troops are 
not strategically significant, it does not make sense to risk 7,000 regular troops—troops 
that could have a larger strategic effect on the war—to save 521 troops.  It is not worth 
risking large amounts of soldiers for a mission whose goal is not an attempted advance to 
total victory in the war.  On the other hand, it makes much more sense to risk 128 troops 
trained for direct action.  The strategic decision could be diagrammed like this: if the 
mission fails, the Americans only lose at most 128 troops in addition to 521 already lost; 
if the mission is a success Americans gain at least a few hundred troops and raise morale.  
It is a risk that was deemed worth taking.  Inherent in the term special operations is the 
assumption of high risk; in this way, SOF in extremely limited roles in total war allow 
American war planners to focus more acutely on the ends of victory (saving 521 
prisoners) than the means (128 Rangers) possibly lost in defeat.
(2) As these 128 Rangers were victorious, it shows the role of SOF as force 
multipliers in total war.  The strategic end here only raised morale and returned a few 
hundred troops to the Allied ranks. It will be more evident in their roles in direct support 
of larger strategic campaigns, but here it is clearly evident that, in overcoming the 
doctrine of mass with the doctrine of surprise, 128 Rangers were able to tactically defeat 
7,000 enemies and in that way act as a force multiplier.
(3) SOF use native people to guide them.  They inherently are more willing to use 
foreign aid to their advantage.  This is a lesson that conventional militaries should heed in 
fighting total war—it is an invaluable intelligence and support weapon.
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(2) Specialized and High-Risk Roles in Support of Larger Conventional Operations—
Defeat at Cisterna and Victory at Zerf
Ranger operations at Cisterna would be disastrous—of 767 Rangers, 761 were 
killed or captured.  On 22 January 1944, the 6615th Ranger Force landed at Anzio in Italy 
very smoothly, completing their mission of landing, extending the beachhead, clearing a 
small town, and meeting up linking with British and American regular infantry divisions 
to their left and right. In the next few days, the VI Corps (The large unit to which the 
6615th Ranger Force was attached) slowly moved its beachhead inland—it would turn out 
to be too slow an inward thrust, giving the Germans time to gather strength in their 
defenses.  The ultimate purpose of the landing was to push Germans holding winter line 
to the north.69  A few days later, the VI Corps decided to start its attack.  The Rangers 
were given the objective of taking and holding Cisterna, a bit of a march that required 
moving under concealment through an open field.  Poor intelligence would lead to 
massacre.  The Americans thought they would be going up against defenses—in fact 
Germany had taken the time they were given by the Americans to set up a counter-attack; 
the Germans fortified their positions with tanks and were able to use their superior mass 
to separate the two attacking groups of Rangers, and eventually surround the entire outfit. 
As they were surrounded, inexperienced Rangers began to surrender and the unit was 
essentially destroyed.70  The failure at Cisterna can teach three theoretical lessons.
(1) Many Rangers had been used as conventional infantrymen.  Rangers were 
used to defend conventional counter-attacks and hold the Winter line just months before 
their failure at Cisterna.  Using the Rangers in this conventional fighting led to heavy 
attrition—to fill their ranks, the Rangers were forced to use under-trained men from 
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conventional units—giving them only a month to train to become SOF-ready before the 
landing at Anzio.71  The failure of this battle lends credence to the argument that training 
is always paramount to SOF.  It is easy to see why in total war this training might be 
compromised—why not use the best soldiers to hold large conventional objectives?  If 
there are casualties among the SOF ranks, due to the nature of total war, it may mean 
sacrificing eliteness for a semblance of combat-readiness.  First, it needs to be made clear 
that Rangers are not trained for conventional fighting—they are best at and trained for 
direct action.  If too many Rangers are lost, their ranks are filled with soldiers 
inexperienced in direct action; so when Rangers are given appropriate missions, they 
have a high chance of failure due to under-training.  With the stakes of total war, it is 
tempting for planners to use SOF conventionally, but it is ultimately detrimental to the 
war effort.
(2) The problem with these types of missions—where SOF support conventional 
operations—is that it is easy to mix the two different types of forces together.  Especially 
in total war, their different missions can be confused and sacrificed in an attempt to gain 
total victory.  This situation is one that allowed Rangers to petition for their own 
headquarters.  The failure at Cisterna is one event that has paved the way to the relative 
organizational autonomy of SOCOMM today.  A Ranger Force headquarters was “most 
important to decide if the missions were proper for the Rangers.”72  Organizational 
autonomy may be needed for SOF;  conventional officers simply fail to understand their 
utility.  
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(3) Large operations in conventional warfare tend to be slow moving.  With their 
small size, SOF rely on speed to make up for mass; as shown in this case, when Rangers 
are forced to move at the slow pace of their conventional counterparts, their small size 
catches up with them.  This can also be seen as another argument for organizational 
autonomy—again, conventional leaders in total war are too quick to compromise SOF 
missions for the supposed aid SOF can give to the overall strategic end.
Zerf is a mission that is in direct contrast with the Battle of Cisterna.  Rangers at 
Zerf, Germany were similarly depleted due to conventional fighting, and yet the combat 
here from 23-27 February 1945 led to an amazing victory for the Rangers.  Conventional 
units of the Army’s X Corps began this attack to force Germans to withdraw and allow 
Allies to expand control of bridges.  The Rangers were given the task of cutting off the 
German route of withdrawal by infiltrating enemy lines and cutting off the backside of 
the enemy at Zerf.73  The Rangers assaulted Zerf; at a cost of 90 casualties, they took 328 
prisoners and killed 299 enemies.74  One very important theoretical lesson is learned from 
Zerf and separates victory here from defeat at Cisterna.
(1) In cutting off the enemy’s backside by infiltrating its lines, the Rangers 
participated in a large-scale conventional operation that arguably had a large strategic 
effect on the aim of total victory.  The reason that they were victorious here as opposed to 
Cisterna was that Rangers were allowed to do what they are trained to do with 
organizational autonomy.  SOF must be properly used—here, the special unit separated 
from the conventional unit, infiltrated enemy lines under concealment, and committed a 
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direct assault on an enemy objective—this is a mission for which the Rangers were 
trained.  In total war, it seems like it may be wise to use one’s best soldiers 
conventionally to have the largest strategic effect; without victory, however, there is no 
strategic gain.  As shown by the example of Zerf, the largest strategic gains that an SOF 
unit can have when assisting conventional forces comes when giving SOF autonomy in 
granting them the ability to do what they are trained to do.
(3) OSS—Supporting the Allies in France
The OSS had many OGs operating throughout both theaters in World War II.  The 
best group for analysis purposes, however, is 2671st Reconnaissance Battalion operating 
in France.  This group is widely regarded as the fore-runner to Army Special Forces.  
Additionally, this OG both assisted French resistance forces and helped in Allied 
invasions of France.
The OGs were created as early as 1941 for the following mission: 
The soldiers would not only provide training and material support for the resistance, they would 
also form the nucleus for local resistance forces who would attack enemy facilities deep behind 
the lines…training was based on the experience of British commandos.  It placed a heavy 
emphasis on physical training, demolitions, special weapons, and the hit-and-run offensive 
operational techniques of guerillas.75
Unlike the Rangers, the OSS was given nearly complete organizational autonomy, 
forming their own Headquarters; in France, the OSS was led by the 2677th Headquarters 
Company. At a point, however, these OSS groups stop having a traditionally military 
role, and it is thus hard to define all OSS teams as SOF in the military sense.  As such, in 
August 1944, the OGs were separated from the rest of the OSS in France, being 
designated the Special Reconnaissance Battallion to “distance the purely military OGs 
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from the agents, spies, and saboteurs of the Headquarters Company of the OSS.”76  In 
other words, the military-minded OGs were given their own organizational autonomy 
within the already relatively isolated OSS.
The role of these groups would now be to train the French resistance, the Maquis, 
to disrupt enemy communication and, more importantly, to conduct guerilla operations in 
an attempt to slow German movement toward a proper defense of Normandy; and, once 
Operation Overlord began, to help the Allied Forces by pestering the enemy with guerilla 
attacks.77  Jedburghs were multi-national commando teams—OSS OGs would often link 
with Jedburgh teams to commit such operations.  After training in Algiers, the method by 
which OSS OGs infiltrated France from Northern Africa was by means of jumping—an 
example of utilization of new technology.  Upon entering Germany, the OGs undertook 
operations until France was freed from German control.  By this time, the Maquis, 
directed by OGs, killed 461 Germans, wounded 467, and took 10,021 as prisoners.78
Two lessons can be taken from these OGs in terms of the effect of SOF aiding 
underground resistances to help in a total war effort.
(1) A lesson already learned via the case of the Rangers is that SOF act best when 
given autonomy—no matter how painful that may be to conventional commanders.  
While OSS OGs were given a good mission with an effective amount of autonomy, they 
did not actually begin helping in guerilla raids until they infiltrated France for this 
purpose in 1944—three years after the creation of OGs.  Guerilla operations can hamper 
an enemy.  As these types of operations were new to the United States, however, the U.S. 
was slow in their implementation.  “The unanimous conclusion among the OGs…was 
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that the OSS units were committed much too late to achieve maximum effect on the 
Maquis.”79  An underground force is generally disorganized, poorly trained, and under 
equipped.  As is evident in today’s insurgency in Iraq, however, what guerillas lack in 
money and training, they make up for with the will to fight—especially when their home 
is being occupied.  Their will to fight is an invaluable tool; without training, however, the 
strategic effect of these underground fighters is at worst negligible and at best under-
utilized.  By committing time, money, training, and equipment to guerilla forces earlier, 
the U.S. would have allowed small OGs to act as force multipliers more effectively.  By 
risking very few of its own men as trainers, and mostly French citizens as war-fighters, 
the U.S. could have set up a risk-assessment situation where there was a sizeable strategic 
benefit (hampering the Germans and scaring them, which they did, to a certain degree) 
versus a minimal strategic risk (at most a few hundred Americans).  Whereas success of a 
guerilla campaign could have helped, its failure would not have been a major strategic 
let-down in terms of total war; in subsequent wars the U.S. will heed this lesson and 
commit to training guerillas earlier.
(2) The second lesson learned is about the eliteness of an SOF soldier and what 
that means in terms of his isolation.  This lesson is especially poignant in times of 
training guerilla forces.  Many conventional soldiers are outstanding riflemen.  Many are 
outstanding at directing artillery fire.  The elite nature of an SOF soldier is oftentimes 
that, beyond outstanding tactical skills, his mind makes him a valuable weapon.  When 
given as much autonomy as an OSS OG was given, above and beyond the necessary 
language skills, the isolation of US forces requires that standards are high in terms of 
strategic understanding of what is happening.  The reason that this elite nature, physically 
79 Ibid, p. 10.
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and mentally, must be kept especially in times when an SOF soldier is isolated from the 
conventional army in total war, is that the only contact the leaders of resistance groups 
had with the United States was the contact the resistance groups had with the OSS men 
on the ground.  Their words and actions become U.S. foreign policy to leaders of an 
isolated resistance.  The most cogent commentary regarding this notion of an isolated 
SOF soldier in World War II is as follows: “His views had no importance in the eyes of 
the State Department representatives thousands of miles away, but for the fighters of the 
underground, they were taken as inspired declarations of Washington’s policy.”80  Wrote 
an OSS colonel serving with the Yugoslav resistance: “Here, I was America.”81  The SOF 
soldier on any level, then, needs a knowledge of the strategic implications of his own 
actions; unlike a normal rifleman, his understanding of war must exceed the tactical level.  
Minimally, the SOF soldier must have a basic knowledge of a “message” that the U.S. 
would wish to spread.  In subsequent wars, SOF will be used in this isolated manner to 
spread propaganda.
Conclusions: What Do SOF Mean Now?
In terms of this essay, the study of World War II lends nearly no credence to the 
assertion that SOF have a larger-than-tactical effect.  Indeed, the tactical operations of 
SOF in WWII did help bring strategic success to the Allies in this war.  But as this was a 
total war, tactical ends are essentially strategic ends.  In a situation where the endgame is 
total military victory, all tactical success is strategic success.  In that light, it is difficult to 
say that special operations were truly able to make a mark on U.S. policy.  This paper 
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seeks to show that SOF, in their tactical successes, provide a one-of-a-kind boost to the 
United States as it seeks its security and policy goals.  SOF were the ugly duckling to the 
conventional American war-hawk that won total victory.  For the most part, SOF in 
WWII can be characterized as highly specialized conventional soldiers.  The fact that all 
SOF units were deactivated after the war attests to this fact—SOF were deemed useful, 
perhaps, but not an integral part of a standing military force.
Conventional innovation is a slow-moving machine, including the organizational 
innovation of incorporation of SOF into the military.  The OSS would evolve into the 
CIA—sabotage and highly covert operations will stay in play.  World War II opened the 
door to the inculcation of SOF into the regular military in highly specialized conventional 
roles aimed at total victory; it will take the emergence of limited war to bring SOF inside 
the military establishment and even then the innovation is not complete.  
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-4- 
An Organization Without Organization
After World War II ended and the nuclear age began, the United States was thrust 
into a high-risk, bi-polar security environment.  While many grand strategies would 
compete for dominance, containment would ultimately become the prevailing security 
theme of the post-war world.  SOF will finally be able to leave their singular mark on a 
large-scale security policy via containment; alternatively, the nuclear and bi-polar nature 
of the security scene in this time frame will also put brakes on the use of SOF as a tool of 
defense policy. 
This chapter begins by briefly explaining the grand strategy of containment.
After this is accomplished, a section will be devoted to the organizational re-emergence 
and expansion of SOF and the simultaneous establishment of covert action as a norm 
among security options from the Truman through the Johnson presidencies.  The third 
section will use the China case as an example of why special operations may not be 
chosen as a form of action in supporting containment—in other words, rather than SOF 
supporting grand strategy, it will be shown why grand strategy may limit special 
operations.  Finally, the bulk of the chapter will use the medium-intensity conflicts in 
Vietnam and Korea to explain new ways SOF were used in support of larger conventional 
wars and will use low-intensity conflicts (LICs) in The Bay of Pigs and Laos to explain 
the role of SOF in covertly supporting US grand strategy.  It is important, through this 
section, to recognize various SOF as organizations on the cusp of organizational 
permanence within the U.S. military at large; even more, it is essential to notice that, as 
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SOF gain a place in the military establishment, their use as a tool of strategy is marred by 
organizational inadequacy.  In this light, two trends should be evident in the chapter.  
Leaders increase in their willingness to grant SOF strategic responsibilities; the necessity 
of an organizational overhaul of SOF grows congruently with the amount of 
responsibility granted to them.
Containment: A Brief Explanation
This section will serve as a basis from which to expand upon the role of SOF in 
supporting containment.  After this section, which has a focus on merely the ideology of 
containment, specific policy on singular areas (i.e. Indochina) will be explained as the 
paper dictates.  
Allying with the Russians in order to win World War II has often been referred to 
as a Faustian agreement—the free world allied with and allowed to expand an empire that 
threatened its very existence.82  “’Containment,’ the term generally used to characterize 
American policy toward the Soviet Union during the postwar period, was a series of 
attempts to deal with that wartime Faustian bargain.”83  George F. Kennan, who came up 
with the term, broadly described it as a “long-term, patient but firm and vigilant 
containment of Russian expansion tendencies.”84  It was the job of American policy to 
counter an ideologically different and aggressive nation that carried on a foreign policy 
that was “secretive, not frank, [had] a basic unfriendliness of purpose…for the 
foreseeable future.”85  In the end, and especially after the enemy acquired nuclear 
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capabilities in 1949 and total war became a zero-sum game where the end could mean the 
annihilation of a civilization, it was the job of the United States, the only Soviet 
contemporary, to balance the spread of Soviet communism and ensure the security of the 
free world.  In the nuclear age, military action has to be used very precisely so as to avoid 
the possibility of all-out war.  
In distrusting the Soviets, Americans saw communism not as an ideology but as a 
means by which the enemy could fulfill its expansionist desires.  By 1948, there was a 
three-part strategy for containment outlined by Kennan.  It called for first encouraging 
self-confidence in Soviet-threatened nations to restore the balance of power; exploiting 
tension between Moscow and international communist parties to check soviet influence; 
and finally modifying the Soviet view of international relations with a view toward 
negotiation.  From a military standpoint, the focus was on ensuring that the Soviets could 
not turn two separate power spheres—Europe and Asia—into a singular part of its 
empire.86  Kennan desired two independent power spheres in Europe and Asia.  As such, 
the primary focus of military actions in this chapter is on checking Soviet expansion into 
Asia.  
What does the strategy generally mean from a military standpoint?  The Truman 
Doctrine, given on 12 March 1947, stated that “It must be the policy of the United States 
to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or 
outside pressures.”87  Unless the U.S. sought a total nuclear war with the Soviets, won 
that war, and thereby drove the Soviets to the bargaining table, the military could not 
have a direct role in part three of the strategy—negotiating with the Soviets.  The military 
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was used directly in part one of the strategy in hopes of ultimately indirectly driving the 
power spheres toward successful democracy; once the economic disparity between the 
two ideologies was evident, it was hoped that the  Soviets would be driven toward part 
three and open diplomacy.  Kennan would describe the role of the military in balancing 
the Soviets as “making political positions credible, as a deterrent to attack, as a source of 
encouragement to allies, and, as a last resort, as a means of waging war successfully 
should it come.”  If the Soviet means of expansion was communism, the American means 
of balance could only be capitalism and democracy; as such, this could not be an openly
offensive military.88  Kennan described three criteria for the intervention of American 
forces in foreign lands.
“(1)Whether there are any local forces worth strengthening.  (2)The importance of 
the challenged areas to our security.  (3)The probable costs of our action and their 
relation to the results to be achieved.”89    The U.S. was tasked to 
Develop a level of military readiness which can be maintained as long as 
necessary as a deterrent to Soviet aggression, as indispensable support to our 
political attitude toward the USSR, as a source of encouragement to nations 
resisting Soviet political aggression, and as an adequate basis for immediate 
military commitments and for rapid mobilization should war prove unavoidable.90
As the nuclear age began, it would become vitally important to weigh the opportunity 
cost of intervention.  Military intervention, then, almost exclusively supported part one of 
Kennan’s strategy—to intervene in support of part two was counterintuitive if Americans 
thought that communism was ultimately self-destructive; even more, this “purely 
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ideological” intervention risked driving teetering communist nations closer to Moscow91
and to intervene as part of part three could lead to nuclear war.  The military was being 
set up for a long series of limited low and medium-intensity conflicts; in other words, the 
security situation was one that allowed for the renewal of SOF, and even more, led to a 
point where SOF were nearly an organizational stalwart in the United States military.
Two Timelines: The Renewal of SOF and the Covert Option
As quickly as World War II saw the onset of operational elements of the OSS and 
SOF in the military establishment as Rangers were formed, these organizations came to a 
screeching post-war halt.  The OSS became the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); 
operational elements were maintained in that organization, but using them as SOF in 
terms of military strikes was not considered immediately.  Ranger units were dissolved 
promptly with the end of World War II.92  The point here is that while the U.S. did 
innovate to bring SOF into the operational establishment, it appeared to be a purely 
wartime innovation.  This section details the renewal of SOF in two terms.  First, it 
details the re-birth of special operations specifically within the military.  Second, much of 
the talk of SOF operating in a strategic sense in the containment period dealt with their 
use covertly; in other words, being able to balance the spread of communism militarily, 
but being able to do so with as much deniability as possible so as to reap strategic benefit 
without bruising diplomatic approaches to policy goals.  The second timeline, then, 
discusses the onset of covert operations as a policy alternative for the U.S.  
Throughout the section, it will seem like a horrible mistake that at no point is 
there substantial evidence of an established organizational governing body of all covert or 
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special operations, and through the operational sections of this chapter, it will seem 
inconsistent that leadership changes from one special operation to another, even when
that operation is conducted within the same service.  These illogical gaps are necessary: it 
is key to note from the onset of this discussion that the lesson this era should teach policy 
makers and the military establishment alike; and the lesson that they finally do learn 
down the road in Iran; is that in order to be successful, SOF need an established 
organization and unity of command.  To put it another way: it is nearly more important to 
note the gaps and inconsistencies in the remainder of the chapter than what is actually 
written and clearly explained in the remainder of the chapter.
Timeline 1: The Renewal and New Nature of SOF in the Military
In 1952, the United States Army opened the 10th Special Forces Group and in 
1953 the 77th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, NC.  In 1957 the 1st Special Forces 
was activated abroad in Okinawa, Japan.  In 1961, the 5th Special Forces Group of the 1st
Special Forces was activated at Fort Bragg to conduct all operations in Southeast Asia.  
In the fall of that year, the first president, President Kennedy, to show particular interest 
in SOF, went to Fort Bragg to review the Special Forces program of the Army.  President 
Kennedy, now the namesake of the Army’s Special Warfare Center, would prove to be 
the high-ranking official that cemented the place of SOF in the military establishment.  
Rangers, under the same organizational structure as World War II, were activated for the 
Korean Conflict in the early 1950’s; it should be noted, however, that, beyond the already 
established scope of Rangers, Special Forces were created directly in response to the 
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situation in Vietnam, which will be discussed in the section on that conflict.  By the onset 
of the Vietnam Conflict, there would be approximately 2,000 SOF troops in Vietnam.93
The Navy also developed a special warfare capability.  In World War II, the Navy 
started Special Service Boats and Underwater Demolition Teams (UDTs).  In Korea, 
UDTs would help sabotage Korean shipping and clear underwater mines.  In 1962, to 
give the newly formed Special Forces Groups in the Army a maritime special warfare 
component, these UDTs were changed into SEALs (Sea, Air, Land Commandos) Teams 
One and Two.94
There are two important points to make about the formation of these SOF groups.  
First, in every work about the origins of SOF, President Kennedy is credited with having 
a special interest in this type of warfare.95  He saw an intricate security landscape that 
called for an unconventional warfare capability in Southeast Asia; his desire to meet the 
needs of the limited and specific conflict in Southeast Asia would lead him to desire 
unconventional warfare teams.  His forward thinking about a singular conflict would lead 
to the final creation of unconventional warfare as a key component in the armed forces.  
Second, SOF finally had published doctrine.  In Army Field Manual 31-21, Special 
Forces was defined operationally.  
Its role was to assume and carry out any mission assigned to it by the Army.  Its missions were 
many and varied because of its organization, flexible command arrangements, tailored logistical 
and fiscal procedures, and highly trained men.  Chief among them were planning, conducting, and 
supporting unconventional warfare and internal security or ‘stability’ operations…They could 
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train and work with others to infiltrate by air, land, or water, sometimes penetrating deep into
enemy territory for the purpose of attacking strategic targets, rescuing friendly troops, or 
collecting intelligence.96
There was finally a set of rules for SOF that fell completely outside the scope of 
conventional forces.  It will be important to note, however, that this capability was not in 
place for the Korean Conflict.
The Covert Timeline
Before it even had the organized military capability, the U.S. would begin 
exploring covert options to check Soviet expansion.  A long series of documents illustrate 
this exploration.  One FRUS document summarizes all of this activity, in a “Note on U.S. 
Covert Action Programs,” detailing the steps each President from Truman through 
Johnson took to explore, implement, and institutionalize U.S. covert operations.  
In Truman’s presidency, NSC 4-A established the CIA as “a branch for peacetime 
covert action operations…it was an exclusively Executive Branch function…prompted 
by the Truman administration’s concern over Soviet psychological warfare.”97  It was 
feared that with all of this power, the State Department and Pentagon would become 
wary of the CIA and develop its own covert establishments.  As such, NSC 10/2
superseded 4-A and defined covert operations as those that, “if uncovered, the US 
government can disclaim any responsibility for them.”98  The military, as noted above, 
would take years to establish forces that provided for clandestine activities and 
deniability.  The CIA, via NSC 10/2, was tasked with 
Propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action; subversion against hostile 
states…including support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the 
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free world.  Such operations should not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, 
espionage or counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations.99
While the CIA was given the ability to support foreign guerillas covertly, it had no 
authorization to aid a recognized military, or even commando, force.  
Within the CIA organization, the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) was tasked 
with handling all CIA covert action programs.  Integrating other elements of the U.S. 
foreign policy machine, OPC was to take peacetime guidance from the State Department 
and wartime guidance from the military.  NSC 10/5, arising during the Korean Conflict 
and Truman administration, guaranteed CIA governance over guerilla operations.100
There was no program of training a special force in order to prepare for war—the 
operations were planned and executed as threats arose—a problem which would not be 
quelled until the military establishment of Special Forces in the 1960’s.
In 1954, the CIA began to have some of its powers stripped away.  Via NSCs 
5412, 5412/1, and 5412/2, the approval and management of covert operations was taken 
from being only the responsibility of the President and Director of Central Intelligence 
(DCI) and the decision-making was broadened to a “Special Group,” which also included 
the Secretaries of State and Defense, by the end of Eisenhower’s presidency.101
After the failure at the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy ensured that, by 1963, 
there was a set criteria for bringing covert operations to the Special Group, thus ensuring 
more control from high-level government officials.  Before this incident, the DCI 
determined whether a covert operation should be brought to the attention of the group.  
The criteria included “Risk, possibility of success, potential for exposure, political 
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sensitivity, and cost (if it was more than $25,000), for determining whether covert action 
projects were submitted to the Special Group.”102  President Kennedy, in addition to the 
indoctrination of Special Forces into the military, would also form a separate Counter-
Insurgency Special Group called “The Special Group C1;” President Johnson would 
delegate the coordination of these activities to the Secretary of State.  Finally, the Name 
of the Special Group was changed to “Committee 303.”  The Special Group and 
Committee 303 approved 163 covert actions by 1967.103
In having covered this exhaustively meticulous section, it must be understood that 
there is a great disparity in the government as SOF and covert actions gain simultaneous 
but separate permanence.  One group specializes in a strategic end: covert actions aimed 
at gaining strategic advantages through direct actions against communism with complete 
deniability.  Another establishment focuses on a tactical means: the use of 
unconventional warfare.  In practice, the means will meet the ends in the time period 
discussed here; until the means and the ends meet organizationally, however, it will be 
very difficult for SOF to help the United States attain strategic goals.  As discussion 
follows of special operations that were explored, but not utilized, and both explored and 
utilized, it should be recognized that with correct organization, there would have been 
more opportunity to use SOF in situations where they were not; when they were used, a 
more insightful organization could have led to greater strategic success. 
Kennedy’s Overall Significance
The Kennedy administration, it seems, is the one that finally pushed for 
organizational innovation in the military.  The reason for this push can be attributed to the 
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views of containment on the military establishment and Kennedy’s keen interpretation of 
those views.  
As containment sought only to limit the spread of Soviet communism, it would 
immediately appear that there must be a means to fight small wars—in the time before 
Kennedy’s administration, however, there was no standing mechanism by which to 
accomplish this task.  As the military remained largely conventional, the United States 
only kept an asymmetric deterrent threat—it was all-out nuclear warfare or nothing.  The 
United States had limited security goals with only a large-scale military to give those 
goals force.
President Kennedy finally gave an accurate description of what the military would 
mean in a security situation dictated by the grand strategy of containment.  
In Southeast Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere in the Third World, the emerging thereat was 
communist guerilla warfare.  This would define the conflict between the East and West, and the 
United States needed to prepare for it…Kennedy came to see ‘special warfare’ as the way to 
counter guerillas.104
Whereas previous administrations were only able to rely on massive retaliation as 
a military deterrent, Kennedy ardently disagreed with this policy and sought to change it.  
It was simply not a credible deterrent to attack a small guerilla uprising, as containment 
needed to, with a nuclear and large conventional threat.  It would not deter; making the 
threat credible through action would lead to tremendous pitfalls; the strategic risk was far 
too great.  It is like killing a fly with a flame thrower.  Rather than burn his house down 
over a small pest, Kennedy decided to invent the fly-swatter.  He stated that
Events in Indochina and elsewhere have already knocked the props out from the  assumptions of 
massive retaliation; and our reduction of strength for resistance in brushfire or guerilla wars, while 
threatening atomic retaliation, has in effect invited expansion by the communists in areas such as 
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Indochina through those techniques which they deem not sufficiently offensive to induce us to risk 
atomic warfare.105
The counter-intuitive nature of massive retaliation not only did not protect the U.S.; it 
decreased security by allowing communist expansion.  Special Warfare would provide 
the U.S. with a logical and symmetrical deterrent to guerilla communist expansion in 
allowing the U.S. to act on its security concerns.
Kennedy’s inculcation of the unconventional capability—and his reasoning for 
that inculcation—will have the unintended but positive effect that SOF are able to assist 
the US in its limited escalation objectives in a medium-intensity conflict; it had the ability 
to infiltrate commandos into Laos during Vietnam without a major escalation of the main 
conflict and without compromising (in fact helping greatly) its main security concerns.  It 
had the direct effect of being able to isolate guerilla communist threats as in the first 
conflict in Laos. 
As the next section explains, there were large security concerns that weighed 
heavily on the reluctance to enter mainland China; but the fact that the capability of a 
low-escalation or unconventional force did not exist also contributed to the United State’s 
inability to reach its security goals in China with respect to the Korean War. 
Not Using SOF: The China Case
The United States would flirt with two opportunities to use SOF in a major 
strategic role in China.  In the first case, SOF would have been used to deter the entrance 
of or mitigate the effect of Chinese fighters in the Korean Conflict.  In the second case, 
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SOF would have been used to take out Chinese nuclear sites and thereby delay the 
nation’s entrance into the nuclear club.
Minimal Escalation in Korea
When the United States crossed the 38th Parallel into North Korea, the Chinese 
entered the war, attacking U.S. forces.  This happened because of misread intentions: as 
the United States crossed the parallel—the U.S. thought it was transparent in letting the 
Chinese know that it did not wish to threaten Chinese security or hydroelectric power 
from the Yalu River—it was supposedly clear in maintaining that attacking North Korea 
was not a springboard to attacking a communist China.  But the signaling was, in fact, 
muddled—the United States failed to recognize that China sought only to maintain the 
very limited aim that the U.S. was attempting to achieve—China sought the upholding of 
North Korea’s communist government while the United States’ only policy goal was to 
destroy that government.  As the war progressed, America expanded its aims, but 
remained limited by three essential factors: to avoid large amounts of civilian destruction, 
to avoid a spillover war into China or Russia, and to leave Chinese vital interests 
unharmed.106
Various options were discussed in an attempt to deter the Chinese from entering 
the war and thus allow the U.S. to achieve its policy goal of eliminating a communist 
government on the Korean peninsula without expansion of the war: all of these attempts 
would ultimately fail, and the U.S. would eventually sign a treaty returning to the status 
quo ante-bellum.  Within the war itself, President Truman’s camp believed that China 
was provoked by MacArthur’s charge into North, threatening the security of the Yalu and 
106
 Morton H. Halperin, “The Korean War,” The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics, 
6th Edition, ed. Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), pp. 181-
196.
60
Manchuria.  The Truman camp believed in a deterrence theory of “reassurance.”  The 
MacArthur side believed China entered because they were not threatened by air strikes.
The MacArthur argument is labeled by the deterrence theory of “credibility of threat.”107
Neither method of deterrence worked in stopping a Chinese entrance into the war: 
reassurance misread Chinese aims and U.S. limited aims disallowed the large-scale 
strategic bombing of Manchuria that MacArthur sought.
Could SOF have been used as an intermediary escalator or to launch a threatening 
strike into China before a charge into North Korea?  The U.S. did not want the complete 
escalation of strategic bombing in Manchuria any more than it wanted the unchecked use 
of Chinese supply lines and troops in supporting North Koreans.  Could a commando raid 
have been used to send a limited signal, or at least do significant damage to supply lines?  
The answer, of course, is no.  Today, SOF are used as signalers in limited warfare.108
Then, this was not even a possibility.  In asking why not, this case demonstrates three 
relevant facts: first, the United States will not take on a covert operation unless it has a 
certain level of deniability.  A commando raid, if it did any damage, would necessarily be 
attributed to U.S. forces.  Second, the United States will not risk war with a major 
security threat like China or Russia for the sake of a small commando raid.  Third, if U.S. 
grand strategy even allowed for a commando raid to take place here, the state of 
unconventional warfare capabilities in the U.S. was in such disarray as to make success 
highly doubtful.
Via NSC Directives 4/A and 10/2, paramilitary and covert operations fell under 
the responsibility of the CIA.  The CIA, by these directives, would claim responsibility 
107
 Thomas J. Christensen, “Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The Lessons of Mao’s 
Korean War Telegrams,” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer, 1992), pp. 122-154.
108
 This will be discussed in the next chapter.
61
for unconventional warfare as well; as an Army Special Operations Command was 
fashioned for Korea in the same light as that of World War II, a bureaucratic battle 
ensued: the Army had the capability to take on larger scale strategic special operations, 
but did not have the responsibility to train for these missions in peacetime.  The CIA had 
peacetime control of covert and unconventional warfare operations without the numbers 
or scale to use these tools to an extent that would provide a strategic advantage in a 
conflict the size of that in Korea.109  One organization possessed capabilities, while the 
other possessed the clearance to make those capabilities actionable.   Special operations 
into China were so minimal, in fact, that literally only one CIA operative penetrated into 
the mainland of Manchuria.110
Neither SOF nor the bureaucracy that controlled them were prepared to allow 
these forces to act in an isolated manner as signalers in a limited, medium-intensity 
conflict.  It is a starting point and it will starkly contrast with wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  At one point, SOF were not even considered as signalers, whereas today 
they are a primary option in serving this strategic function.
Stopping Chinese Proliferation
Over a decade after the Korean Conflict, the Chinese tested an atomic weapon.  
Before the weapon was attained, several options were discussed in halting Chinese 
proliferation.  A covert commando raid either joint with the Taiwanese or isolated 
employing U.S. agents on Chinese nuclear sites were discussed as options.  The fact that 
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SOF were seriously discussed as a counter-proliferation measure is a testament to their 
maturation since the end of Korea. 
President Kennedy, the man who ensured the indoctrination of special operations 
into the U.S. military machine, seriously thought about the possibility of such an 
operation.  He discussed with Chinese Nationalist General Chiang Chung-kuo “whether it 
would be possible to send 300 to 500 men by air to…atomic installations.”  CIA officials 
deemed such a mission as realistic.111  Both the CIA and the Pentagon looked into the 
paramilitary option of attack to the extent that a failed U-2 spy plane mission was sent out 
to gather intelligence on the Chinese nuclear facility at Baotou to see if it was able to be 
attacked.112
Ultimately, it was determined that no military action was advisable—even if 
successful, it would only delay the Chinese nuclear program a few years, and could have 
provoked a highly undesirable war with the Chinese.113  Still, a covert commando 
operation was discussed as a middle ground of force escalation; if the United States could 
have maintained deniability in destroying Chinese nuclear facilities, it may have done so.
Commando operations were specifically ruled out for two reasons.  First, an 
attack by agents within China was nixed because the capability did not exist.  Second, 
Taiwanese commandos dropped by Americans on Chinese facilities were a possibility, 
but such a raid provided the U.S. with no more deniability than a conventional strike 
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would have.114  In assessing risk, it made no sense to make war with China a possibility 
over a few hundred commandos. In a larger sense, it made no sense for the United States 
to risk war with a near-nuclear nation when it held the largest nuclear threat.  Why 
provoke war over a few hundred commandos whose effect may be negligible when 
nuclear weapons themselves could provide the stability that is sought.  Proliferation was 
not the worst alternative; accidental war with a major security threat was.  Special 
operations forces, especially when they are supposed to operate covertly, should never 
risk war with a high-level security threat.
SOF Alone: The Opportunity for Isolated Strategic Special Operations
The United States would not use commandos or conventional forces to attack a 
high-risk, nuclear security threat: it just did not make sense and could lead to an 
unwanted high-intensity conflict.  The U.S. would, however, intervene in its strategy to 
contain the spread of communism; it was willing to risk medium-intensity conflicts in 
Korea and Vietnam.  In both of these conflicts, SOF were used.  In Korea, there were no 
important commando raids into China, but SOF were regularly used to go beyond the 48th
parallel into North Korea in hopes of cutting off supply lines and to collect intelligence 
on the Chinese border.115  By Vietnam, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and CIA had 
expanded their respective special warfare programs.  Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrols 
(LRRPs) and Navy SEALs specialized in unconventional warfare, allowing the U.S. to 
bring a guerilla war to the North Vietnamese; additionally, SOF had an expanded search 
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and rescue role and were utilized, at times, to go behind enemy lines to assassinate 
Vietnamese officers.  
In both of these conflicts, the role of SOF continued to be expanded.  But when 
the aim is not total victory, it is difficult to argue that the tactical successes of SOF had 
strategic effects.  Just as in World War II, battles were fought, won, and lost on the 
conventional level.  Neither of the two medium-intensity conflicts in Asia allows SOF to 
put its singular mark on U.S. strategy. 
Vietnam is more important for analyzing the role of SOF in medium-intensity 
conflict not in the conflict in Vietnam proper, but in proxy conflicts in Southeast Asia.  
For various reasons, it will be shown that the U.S., thanks to a newfound unconventional 
warfare capability, was able to enter another country (Laos) to serve its security goals 
without escalating the main conflict.  Indeed, part of the reason for this is that Laos was 
not a major player like China was, but it is an important instance of use of force without 
escalation.
In purely low-intensity conflicts, the United States, and particularly its Executive 
Branch, would attempt to utilize isolated SOF to meet security goals and serve U.S. grand 
strategy.  The areas of operation focused on here will be the Bay of Pigs and two conflicts 
in Laos.  The United States was not prepared to allow SOF to operate directly against 
major security threats like China.  It was, however, ready to use these forces to fight 
proxy wars that contributed to U.S. grand strategy and helped to mitigate larger security 
threats.  The success of these respective operations will range from absolute failure to 
partial success.
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The Bay of Pigs: Small Conflict, Big Failure
In 1959, Fidel Castro began his takeover of Cuba.  As stated in the Truman 
Doctrine, the United States would support forces that sought to contain communist 
takeovers in their nations.  In this way, the CIA, under President Eisenhower, began to 
train guerilla exiles from Cuba in Guatemala, beginning plans for an attack and attempted 
overthrow of Castro’s government.  The CIA developed a plan whereby an amphibious 
attack by guerillas, including air-strikes by exile pilots, would spark a general uprising in 
Cuba and an overthrow of Castro’s government “within a matter of weeks.”116  SOF were 
supposed to be utilized, in training Cuban exiles, to aid the grand strategy goal of 
containing communism.
As sure as the CIA was in the success of a possible attack, the military was highly 
doubtful.  Kennedy would not allow U.S. personnel to attack Cuba in the first place, and 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff doubted the operation would be successful—in this way, the CIA 
was forced to strongly push its agenda: in the ongoing bureaucratic war for control of 
special operations, the CIA would become attached to pushing a cause that most unbiased 
experts deemed to have only minimal chance of success.117
The CIA wanted support from the U.S. military, desiring commandos to assist in 
the ground raid.  Kennedy, however, would not budge from his stance on not allowing 
U.S. ground troops to invade Cuba.118  The operation failed when, after initial air strikes a 
few days before the invasion, Washington would not allow air strikes to happen on the 
day of the invasion.  Kennedy changed the invasion plan on the day of, and the Cuban 
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Air Force, though it only had twelve planes, was able to destroy the invading force.  Had 
the air strikes even been allowed, the mission still would have failed due to a lack of 
surprise and adequate intelligence.  A CIA Information Report on 6 April 1961 stated that 
a “Great mass” of Cubans had some disdain for Castro’s regime and that “It [was] 
generally believed that the Cuban Army [had] been successfully penetrated by opposition 
groups and that it [would] not fight in the event of a showdown.”119  This intelligence 
assessment proved to be way off base.  
Lucien S. Vandenbroucke points out three reasons that this mission failed.  First, 
though the executive has direct control over covert special operations, he cannot abuse 
this power and overrule on-site commanders, as Kennedy did in canceling D-Day air 
strikes.  Second, the executive cannot allow an agency to feel such an attachment to a 
cause that it engages in “wishful thinking” to the point that it hides information that 
disagrees with its plans.  Such was the case with the CIA in the Bay of Pigs incident.  
Third, competing organizations must be used to check one another by giving more than 
one organization a vested interest in strategic special operations.  In removing the 
military completely from this operation, Kennedy effectively quieted what would have 
been valuable criticism of the operation.120
Though he received poor intelligence, it is still evident that Kennedy had goals a 
bit too high for SOF—an operation of this scale may be feasible in today’s security 
environment, but it was not in the time of Kennedy.  It was certainly a mistake to even go 
ahead with the operation, especially in the doubtful manner in which Kennedy decided to 
run it.  It is a testament to the primitive nature of the operation that the means to wage a 
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guerilla attack—the military’s special warfare capability—was completely excluded from 
the organization that oversaw paramilitary actions in the area of operation.  Because of a 
lack of organizational foresight, the mission was always doomed to fail.  
Moreover, the Bay of Pigs can be seen as an over-reliance on SOF.  It is an 
amazing capability.  An Executive may feel that he can rely so easily on these amazing 
groups of soldiers that he fails to properly assess the risk of failure.  The mission was 
doomed to fail, and Kennedy may have been so blinded by the ease with which he could 
use SOF that he improperly assessed the risk involved.
Hotfoot and White Star: Covert Successes in Laos
As France was losing influence in Southeast Asia, a power vacuum was created 
that the Soviet Union was more than happy to exploit.  In Laos, a microcosm of events in 
the whole area, Souvanna Phouma was the heir apparent to the Laotian throne.  A 
communist army, the Pathet-Lao, and a neutralist army under Kong Le formed an 
alliance.  They had begun to threaten the status-quo Laotian government, specifically 
beginning to take over the eastern half of the country in the Plain of Jars.  Failure in this 
intervention by the U.S. would come via its support of a right-wing government and the 
loss of neutralists to the communist side.     
Meanwhile, two communist factions, the Chinese and the U.S.S.R., fought for 
communist control of the power vacuum.  In appeasing North Vietnamese and Laotian 
communists, the Soviets began extending aid to the Pathet-Lao and neutralists.  “The 
U.S.S.R. capped its persuasive efforts by initiating airlift from North Vietnam to the pro-
Communist forces fighting the ‘imperialists’ in Laos.”121  Through the Vietnam Conflict, 
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Russian communist influence would grow proportionately larger in North Vietnam and 
Laos.
Americans had a relatively hands-off system in place in Laos, only observing the 
situation lightly via its supposedly-civilian (the group consisted of several civilians and a 
few covert operators) Program Evaluation Office.  As communist influence grew in the 
area, however, the U.S. strategy of containment dictated a more hands-on approach to 
keep the status-quo.  In this light, the United States did not seek to ruffle feathers by 
giving overt and unfettered support to the Armeé Nationale de Laos while the French 
military was still supposedly running the show there.  As such, the U.S. negotiated with 
the French to allow the PEO to enter Laos as a civilian watchdog.  The first SOF mission 
into Laos, codenamed Hotfoot, would include a small battalion of Army Special Forces 
from the 1st Special Forces in Okinawa entering Laos under the auspices of civilian aides 
to the French effort as members of the PEO.122  Why compromise the status-quo sought 
by U.S. strategy when it was possible for U.S. policy-makers to pin all external military 
involvement onto the French?  
Though the Phoumist Nationals were not the most desirable government in Laos, 
they were the best alternative to the Pathet-Lao communists.  In its attempt at 
containment, this intervention in Hotfoot allowed the U.S. to set up a relationship with 
anti-communist Laotian elements by appeasing one of their needs.  The French, after the 
incident a Dien-Bien Phu in Vietnam, were no longer a military factor in Southeast Asia.  
As a result, Phoumists ardently sought the help of a U.S. SOF mobile training team 
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(MTT)—the Green Beret battalion sent in as “civilians.”123  Small amounts of Army SF 
would train Laotian Nationalists and accompany them on a limited number of missions 
through 1961; Washington was still hesitant to allow further expansion of a yet unproven 
unconventional capability.  Furthermore, the U.S., via the PEO and the State Department 
sought a strategically favorable diplomatic solution between Phoumists and the Pathet 
Lao.   As such, U.S. forces in Laos through 1961 carried out a number of low-profile, 
mostly training missions.124  Successful unconventional warfare hinges upon a trust 
between SOF personnel and indigenous forces—this relationship would be built in 
Hotfoot and utilized in the next phase of the Laotian operation—White Star.
The French were not getting anything done, and a more aggressive President 
Kennedy sought to respond to what he felt was a severe communist pressure coming from 
North Vietnam.  He would escalate the conflict covertly via the insertion of 400 SF 
warriors into Laos, replacing the PEO presence altogether, in the form of White Star 
MTTs.  Washington still sought a diplomatic solution, but as this became a decreasing 
possibility, a more hands-on approach involving direct action in conjunction with 
unconventional warfare was sought by Kennedy.125  More importantly, SOF were now 
the sole military extension of the U.S. policy of containment in Laos.  
In addition, Laos provided a good grounds from which Kennedy could expand his 
new definition of symmetric unconventional warfare in containment.  The Bay of Pigs 
was a horrible failure for his vision, and Laos provided a hedge to his possible 
embarrassment.  It was a clandestine mission with only 400 soldiers—any defeat would 
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be kept relatively quiet, while any victory could be used as evidence of unconventional 
success in policy circles.  SOF were needed, in the context of this administration, because 
sending in more troops than the 400 in Laos would have increased Kennedy’s fear of 
another horrible debacle like that faced in Cuba.126
The White Star teams acted until 1962’s Geneva Agreements concerning Laotian 
neutrality, when the military side of the program ended (the CIA was constantly involved 
in Laos).  The major strategic contribution of the SF teams was in building up the 
neutralist army in Laos.  This involved working with one specific tribe—the Meo—
commanded by Vang Pao and armed by the CIA.  The U.S. plan was two-fold: it 
involved building a guerilla force; that force would be coaxed into trustworthiness via a 
civil affairs campaign.  The Green Berets, as part of Mission Hotfoot, directed the Meo to 
“Evacuate and move to seven mountain sites surrounding the Plain of Jars, each of which 
had been selected because of its strategic potential for threatening a major enemy supply 
route.”127  100,000 people would come to these sites, where the hungry refugees were 
well-fed and supplied by Agency for International Development Flights by Air 
America128—the only overt part of what was an essentially military strategic move.
By the time Hotfoot became White Star, Meo guerillas, in their strategic sites, and 
trained and aided by elite U.S. forces, were able to successfully battle the Pathet Lao 
forces129; while men were fighting, families became increasingly dependent on the 
“altruistic” food shipments of the U.S. The Meo, trusting the U.S., fought very well.  
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The success of this mission can be judged in the success of reaching its end.  The 
U.S. did not want to completely destroy the Pathet-Lao and it could not because they also 
had neutralist support; the U.S.S.R. would not give up its support of communist Laotians, 
and as such, the U.S. returned to its grand strategy of finding a peaceable agreement that 
stopped only the further spread of communism.  “The American objective was to keep 
the Mekong Valley out of Pathet-Lao control…and consolidating a bargaining position 
vis-à-vis the Communist bloc in the increasingly likely event of a new international 
conference.”130  The goal of White Star was to create a military threat to deter the Pathet 
Lao that was credible enough to gain a favorable diplomatic agreement with Moscow.  
Army SF, in this case, were the tools of U.S. grand strategy.  When official agreements 
were reached in 1962, “Meo forces reached a strength of 14,000 to 18,000 men, thus 
making them roughly equivalent to the Pathet-Lao forces and twice as large as Kong Le’s 
army.”131  By the end of the agreements, the United States formally had a relatively 
neutral tri-party arrangement in Laos and an army with stockpiles of weapons in the Meo 
that favored U.S. wishes to the point of still fighting a border insurgency with the Pathet-
Lao in American interest.132  The mission, on a base level, was successful in that Laos 
was not yet a communist nation.
Theoretically, the missions in Laos have four implications.  The first three can be 
expounded from President Kennedy’s remarks on Laos made in 1961.  Stressing the 
importance of the mission, Kennedy stated that “The security of all of Southeast Asia will 
be endangered if Laos loses its neutral independence.  Its own safety runs with the safety 
130 Ibid, p. 184.
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of us all.”133  After acknowledging the threat grew after Soviet intervention, he at no 
point admits to American intervention, instead saying only that “I want to make it clear to 
the American people, and to all the world, that all we want in Laos is peace, not war…a 
settlement concluded at the conference table, not the battlefield.”134
These remarks bring forth the following points on the use of SOF to support a 
foreign policy.  First, as acknowledged by Jay, Madison, and Hamilton in the Federalist 
Papers, democracies are bad at foreign policy.  In the context of the cold war, the 
U.S.S.R. did not have to reconcile harsh foreign policy moves with its people; even more, 
Stalin did not have governmental checks on military decisions.  In keeping the military 
intervention a secret, Kennedy mitigated the strategic advantage possessed by a 
dictatorship in military decisions.  In making a high-level decision to send in Army SF, 
Kennedy avoided the democratic problems of informing the people and likewise avoided 
bureaucratic checks on military decisions.  It also levels the playing field in an ability to 
covertly support guerillas—a symmetric response to Soviet intervention.  Second, a 
covert option gives the executive a mechanism to push a personal agenda.  Kennedy 
wanted one thing: a symmetric response to communist guerilla warfare; so he pushed 
unconventional warfare.  Kennedy needed another thing to push his unconventional 
agenda: a positive but widely deniable (to the public and the geopolitical world) outcome 
after the failure at the Bay of Pigs.  Third, in this situation, a conventional intervention, 
and the escalation of force that this would have signified, was highly undesirable.  In the 
context of limited warfare, then, SF were used as a delicate but lethal signaler; Green 
Berets were used as a middle ground of escalation in between purely diplomatic and 
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purely conventional military responses.  The State Department, and its ambassador to 
Laos, Averell Harriman, wanted only a diplomatic approach, “But Kennedy’s strategy 
was to combine the Pentagon’s force with Harriman’s conciliation.”135  SOF allowed the 
U.S. to simultaneously offer the carrot and the stick—at once it solves the disparity held 
between MacArthur’s “credible threat” and Truman’s “reassurance” in Korea by allowing 
the tempered use of both inducements to drive the opposition to the bargaining table.
The final implication here is indirect.  In establishing an unconventional presence 
in Southeast Asia, the United States was able to build relationships with pro-American 
indigenous factions.  In leaving this footprint in the area, the United States set itself up to 
deal with future security concerns in Southeast Asia.  Though happenstance in this 
instance, it is the first time that SOF were used proactively and not reactively.  This result 
of unconventional warfare would greatly aid the United States two years after Operation 
White Star was finished and it needed Vang Pao’s guerilla force to help out again in 
Laos.
The “Vietnam Laos”: Escalate the Force not the Conflict
From 1964 to 1972, the covert paramilitary campaign operating in areas 
concerning the Vietnam Conflict was controlled by the Military Assistance Command 
Vietnam’s Studies and Observation Group (MACVSOG or simply SOG).  The teams run 
by SOG, which encompassed the entire breadth of the Kennedy-initiated unconventional 
warfare capability, conducted various missions to counter the North Vietnamese 
Communist influence in Southeast Asia.  For the purposes of this section, only one will 
be discussed:
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Cross-border covert reconnaissance operations against the Ho Chi Minh Trail by U.S.-led 
indigenous teams to disrupt the movement of North Vietnamese Army supplies and troops by 
identifying targets for air strikes, snatching or capturing enemy soldiers, wiretapping lines of 
communication, and distributing psywar materials.136
The theoretical implication discussed, then, is that, unlike in Korea, the United States was 
able to meet strategic and diplomatic ends by escalating force by intervening in another 
nation bordering the central conflict without further escalating the conflict itself.  In this 
section, the first part asks why the U.S. intervened here and not in China a decade earlier 
followed by a brief explanation of the SOF campaign in Laos during the Vietnam 
Conflict; then the limitations on and failures of that campaign will be discussed; finally 
there will be a discussion of how to change those failures.
To begin, it must first be asked why the United States intervened here and did not 
intervene in China during the Korean Conflict.  The United States will not invade a top-
level security threat covertly or overtly—the risk is too much.  Even had the covert 
mission in Laos been found out, the diplomatic fallout would not have been too great, and 
in the end it would not matter, as both South Vietnam and Laos would ultimately become 
communist states.  Furthermore, because of White Star, U.S. SOF already had a basis of 
operation in Laos, something it did not possess in Manchuria.  Finally, the capability 
simply existed during the Vietnam Conflict whereas it did not during the Korean War to 
carry out a large-scale covert paramilitary operation.
The operations of SOG in Laos lasted from 1964-1972 and carried two names at 
different times: “Shining Brass” and “Prairie Fire.”  The primary SOF source utilized 
here was Army SF.  The field organization specifically in charge of Laotian cross-border 
operations was OP 35.  To execute an operation, a team usually crossed the border with 
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three Army SF personnel and nine indigenous guerillas.137  The reason for the missions 
was simple: the North Vietnamese used the Ho Chi Minh Trail, part of which ran through 
Laos, to move soldiers and supplies in between North and South Vietnam.  It was a 
strategic imperative to stop unfettered use of the trail by the enemy.  The original plan 
called for three phases.
First, recon teams would be infiltrated into Laos to identify NVA headquarters, base camps, and 
supply caches.  Once found, they would be attacked by air strikes.  Phase two involved the 
deploying of company-size units cross-border to execute strikes against NVA facilities uncovered 
by recon teams.  Finally, indigenous tribesmen in the areas surrounding the trail would be 
organized into resistance cadres for long-duration operations against the NVA…Phase three was a 
replay of White Star.138
Phase three was necessary because Pathet-Lao and NVA controlled the areas surrounding 
the trail.  
Ultimately, these missions would not be completely successful.  The reason for 
this is organizational limitation.  The Ambassador to Laos was now William Sullivan.  
Under the misguided authorization of the President, he essentially carried veto power 
over operations in his area of operations; and he used the power, not approving third-
phase direct action operations for four years.  Sullivan imposed many limits on operations 
that he did approve: SF could not infiltrate more than 20 kilometers into Laos or more 
than ten by helicopter.  Operations initially needed to be planned 30 days in advance; 
after some success, SOF had that decreased to a week and ultimately 48 hours.  The chain 
of command for approval of the original thirty-day operational plan was as follows: 
General WestmorelandPacific CommandOffice of the Special Assistant for 
Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA) in the Pentagon in coordination with 
White House, CIA, Department of State and DefenseAmbassador Sullivan, who 
137 Ibid, p. 222.
138 Ibid, p. 224.
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possessed final veto power.  Furthermore, whenever conventional units needed help in 
important engagements, as in the Tet Offensive in 1968, OP 35 was essentially shut down 
to aid conventional units, a mistake made in World War II.  Only the great success of SF 
teams would help lift any of these limitations.139  Operations in Laos ended a tactical 
success; but they were a strategic failure congruent to that in Vietnam.  
The point is this: the need for and the capability of SOF now existed.  The proper 
understanding of the force, however, was not yet realized.  The capability was there, and 
yet the military refused to effectively develop it; “Kennedy’s edict [of unconventional 
warfare] challenged everything the mainstream military stood for.”140  In the innovation 
of SOF, then, there seems to be an impasse.  The capability was now very large, and 
could have been be very successful; there was even a command linked directly to SOF 
and a President that pushed their inculcation into the mainstream.
President Kennedy understood the role SOF could play in supporting U.S. grand 
strategy.  He could not mandate, however, that the Pentagon properly understand this 
role.  Innovation usually takes generations.  Young officers must be taught over a 
generation until they can implement change as senior officers.  Senior military officers 
are often bullheaded to a change in doctrine.141  Young officers, the ones running SOF 
operations in Laos and other proxies to Vietnam, will be the ones that must bring the 
proper understanding of SOF to the conventional military.  Until then, their role will be 
trivialized by misuse in major conflicts.  
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In project White Star, Kennedy, an innovator, and his successor, President 
Johnson, had essential control.  In the Vietnam Conflict, the military and State 
Department were given control of SOF.  In this act, SOF were doomed to be misused.
Conclusion
SOF evolved in this era from an absolute absence of consideration to a point 
where U.S. policy makers were not afraid to utilize them in operations directly linked to 
the nation’s strategic goals.  SOF were called on during the cold war to escalate force in 
the very limited way that only such a small and elite group could.  In assessing why none 
of these operations can be categorized as an unqualified success, one of two conclusions 
must be reached:  strategic goals may be outside the scope of SOF and the asset should be 
relegated to purely tactical missions; or there is a reason that these operations were never 
completely successful that can be fixed.  
In subscribing to the second alternative (as this paper will), it is important to note 
that each of the operations explained in this chapter involved several organizations both 
within and outside of the U.S. bureaucracy, each with its own leaders and 
organizations—SOF had no unity of command.  While this certainly led to failures, the 
nature of the problem did not lead to an actionable solution.  In each situation, competing 
organizations were able to blame one another for failures.  Normally in the United States, 
the President is ultimately held responsible for military operations whether they be 
successes or failures.  In these cases, however, the actions were largely hidden from the 
public eye; as such the President (with the Bay of Pigs being an exception) maintained 
his own deniability, thereby allowing no one to be held accountable as a basis for change.  
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SOF have the ability to take on strategic security objectives alone, but it will 
ultimately take an extremely embarrassing and public failure to bring about the changes 
that will make success in these operations possible and complete the generations-long 
innovation of SOF—neither that deep a failure nor that strong a change happened in this 
era of special operations.  SOF were, however, finally isolated from the conventional 
framework under the innovative, though at times misled, guidance of President Kennedy 
and tasked with taking on objectives directly linked to grand strategy in White Star.  The 
era as a whole was an important step in the evolution of strategic special operations, but a 
step that will lead to an unqualified failure—the very failure requisite to make successful 
strategic special operations possible.      
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-5- 
SOF in the Carter and Reagan Administrations: Establishing 
the Modern Context
SOF had a hard time finding their way within the framework of the military at 
large.  The special operations capability, which by 1972 had existed organizationally for 
thirty year, was still not a full and functioning part of the United States military as the 
cold war entered its final stages. 
This chapter deals with special operations in the years from the end of the 
Vietnam Conflict through the end of Reagan’s Presidency; it outlines, historically and 
theoretically, the final stages of the integration of special operations into the United
States military.  It explains what events and strategic conditions necessitated an 
autonomous and unified SOF organization.  In that way, it will establish a framework 
through which it is possible to analyze special operations up until the present and into the 
future.
From Vietnam to Desert One
This section describes the direction of special operations from the end of the 
Vietnam Conflict up to, but not including, the defining catastrophe of SOF in the failed 
hostage rescue in Iran.  The trajectory of events can be seen as the set-up for hostage 
rescue failure.  The set-up had two parts.  First, the United States, in this time period, 
refused to look beyond any security threat with the exception of an all-out war with the 
Soviet Union, and thus pushed aside any military capabilities beyond the large-scale and 
conventional.  Second, even when the U.S did decide to create a small, elite force to deal 
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with low-level threats, that force was improperly conceived; a small case study of the 
inception of Delta Force in the late 1970s will shed light on this part of the failure.
Much like after World War II, SOF were virtually eliminated from the 
Department of Defense following the end of major fighting in Southeast Asia.  By the 
mid-1970s, special operations were reduced by 70% in personnel and 95% in funding.142
The reason for this is an inherent contradiction in girding for small-scale threats in the 
bipolar context of the cold war.  There is an opportunity cost involved: preparing for 
small wars would reduce the capability to deal with large-scale wars.  After the Vietnam 
War, then, “For a variety of political reasons, soldiers and statesmen [found] it easiest to 
justify force procurement aimed at deterring, or at least containing, Soviet aggression.”143
It would seem illogical for the U.S. to prepare for a tiny threat while its main enemy 
posed a gargantuan threat.  
The contradiction, however, is more complicated than it seems.  While the 
U.S.S.R. posed the gravest threat to the U.S., a tactical study of the cold war “Suggests 
that armed conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union [was] the least likely 
contingency America [faced].”144  In all cold war-era conflicts, the U.S. and the Soviets 
went to great lengths to avoid direct fighting, as exhibited in Korea, Vietnam, and Laos.  
On a strategic level, the Soviet Union was able to further its political cause by supporting 
anti-U.S. regimes; a failure to recognize the major strategic threat posed by small-scale 
tactical threats will be manifest later by the situation in Iran.
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The capability of a small, elite force, however, was pushed onto the United States 
by outside events, senior former-SOF officers, and, as per usual in the world of SOF 
innovation, the urging of the U.S. executive.  The second part of the imminent failure in 
Iran, then, deals with the improper building of the capability.  The inception of Delta 
Force, in itself, was misdirected.  It was indeed an innovation in the U.S. military 
pantheon, but as a group, the military was responsive, not innovative.
Three kinds of influence would come together in the late 1970s and 1980s in an 
attempt to force the capability of that elite force.  First were human influences: SOF had 
civilian advocates; supporters within operational ranks; and finally, some senior officers 
that saw the necessity of a peacetime special operations force but would give these forces 
no more than a gentle push.  Lieutenant General Sam Wilson, for instance, “Was one of 
the few senior officers who believed that the critical weakness in American military 
capabilities was the inability to respond to conflicts other than World War III.”145  But 
there were not yet any high-ranking officials willing to justify the necessity of the SOF 
capability.  The assistant deputy chief of staff of the Army in the late seventies, and 
eventually the Chief of Staff in 1979, was General Edward Charles Meyer.  Throughout 
his career, Meyer had worked with and was a gentle advocate for SOF.  Even he, 
however, could not justify much spending on a low-level capability in the face of total 
war with the Soviets.  “General Meyer knew there was little interest in the Department of 
Defense for rebuilding a special operations capability.”146  So it took outside motivators 
to establish an elite force.  The second influence, then, was public outcry from outside 
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events.  “Television coverage of events such as the 1972 Olympics, when Arab terrorists 
murdered members of the Israeli Olympic team in Munich, made a deep impression on 
the public.”147  The third influence, a pattern stemming from the days of Kennedy’s 
presidency, was the force of the American Executive.  After the rescue of hostages from a 
hijacked airplane in Mogadishu, Somalia in 1979 by German SOF and the famous Israeli 
commando rescue at Entebbe in 1976, President Jimmy Carter forced a counterterrorist 
capability on the Department of Defense.148
Thus, Delta Force was established in 1977; five years after the incident at Munich 
in 1972.   It was not mission-ready until 1979.  Delta Force, however, had a very limited 
mission—counter-terrorism.  As a result, its creation “Did not establish a joint special 
operations capability, nor did it signal wholehearted support for special operations forces 
in general.”149
That it took five years to establish Delta after the terrorist threat manifest itself in 
Munich reflects the fact that the Pentagon was not enthusiastic about this elite force.  
“Remaining Special Forces groups had little money for training and were rarely called 
upon.”150  Today, it is generally accepted that SOF must constantly innovate and spend 
large amounts of money on training, and training as a joint force among all services.151
While SOF had some advocates among the military’s leadership, it still lacked senior 
officers with a proper understanding of the capability.  Sustained innovation requires 
junior officers who, over generations, become senior officers that advocate for change 
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and also acutely understand the thing they advocate.152  Thus, at the time, if Delta were to 
be used properly as an innovative capability, lots of money needed to be spent on 
peacetime training: the value of this paradoxically large investment into deterring what 
looked like a small threat would not be seen until after the tragedy in Iran.
The unwillingness to invest in this capability is indicative of the reasons that the 
hostage rescue would fail.  On a tactical level, the U.S. did not properly grow SOF; 
flowing from that improper growth, the U.S. did not look at the SOF capability as a 
combined one: the Army, Navy, and Air Force built separate low-intensity capabilities, 
thus compromising the joint nature of the rescue effort.153  The absence of a competent 
low-level military threat was symptomatic of strategic misjudgment.  The United States 
failed to regard second-tier threats as serious.  
The Reformative Process
This section will begin by looking at the failed hostage rescue in Iran, the 
strategic pitfalls of the failed rescue, and most importantly, it will discuss how the United 
States reformed its strategy at large and changed the organization and tactics of SOF to 
meet with that change in strategy.  It will then explain how those reforms were half-
completed by Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada in 1983.  After this partly-successful 
strategic special operation, the United States was ready to form Special Operations 
Command as part of its large-scale reforms of the military in its 1986 Goldwater-Nichols 
Department of Defense Reorganization Act.  Because of the failure in Iran, the mild 
failure in Grenada, the United States’ new security strategy as the cold war was boiling 
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down in the Reagan Administration, and finally the relentless work of innovative 
civilians, there will eventually be a framework in which it will be possible to analyze the 
strategic role of special operations in the modern context from the end of the 1980’s 
through the terrorist strike of September 2001.
Desert One—Horrible Tragedy with Mild Consequences
 “On November 4, 1979, a mob of Islamic fundamentalists overran the U.S. 
embassy in Tehran, seizing sixty-three diplomats and embassy personnel.  Thus began the 
Iranian hostage crisis, a 444-day ordeal that was to be the Carter administration’s most 
serious foreign policy crisis.”154  Iran was in the middle of a revolution that brought 
Islamic fundamentalists to power; and the new rulers did not actively seek to end the 
hostage crisis.  It became eminently clear that this responsibility would fall on the U.S.  
As of 6 November, the United States began discussing the possibility of a rescue mission 
in its joint Special Coordinating Committee (SCC).  President Carter would only approve 
a rescue if diplomatic means of recovering hostages failed altogether.  The U.S. public 
commiserated with Carter’s sentiments.  But as March 1980 came, the public began 
demanding that something be done to free the hostages; and the looming Presidential 
elections meant that Carter had to act.155
The military began planning for the rescue in November 1979.  Because the 
capability did not exist, an ad hoc Joint Task Force (JTF) was formed to begin training 
for the threat.  Obsessed with maintaining a high level of operational security (OPSEC), 
the Commander of the JTF reported directly and exclusively to the Joint Chiefs of Staff; 
only the executive, the JTF, and the SCC had any knowledge of rescue operations.  The 
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JTF dubbed the mission “Desert One.”156  Most of the conventional military and U.S. 
bureaucracy were kept completely separated from the preparations.
That brings out two crucial theoretical points. On the tactical level, the stage was 
set for a benchmark moment in the development of the SOF capability.  It would be up to 
SOF exclusively to be the military arm of the nation’s most important foreign policy goal 
at a time when these forces were not prepared to carry out such a mission.  Even if the 
U.S. wanted to rescue the hostages immediately, the capability did not exist.  On a 
strategic level, between 3 and 4 November, terrorism went from being a low-level non-
concern that the U.S. did not sufficiently plan for in the face of the Soviet threat, to the 
nation’s primary policy concern. 
Thus, as the JTF began to form at the end of November, its Commander’s 
assessment was that “A force capability was beginning to emerge, but that major 
deficiencies in planning, intelligence, communications, and training were evident.”157
Again, ill-preparedness on a strategic and tactical level seemed to doom Desert One from 
the beginning.  Indicative of special operations mission training, many training exercises 
went into rehearsing for this singular mission.  Between 30 November and 23 April, the 
JTF trained for countless hours, bringing together Marine Corps helicopter pilots, Air 
Force C-130 crews and Combat Control Teams (CCTs), and the Army’s Delta Force.158
That training was wasted.
On the day of the mission, 24 April 1980, the following tasks were assigned.  The 
Army’s Delta Force and Air Force CCTs would drive in humvees to the embassy, with 
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Delta carrying out the actual prisoner snatch; Air Force C-130 crews would take these 
commandos on low-level flights from a training area in Oman to a remote Desert staging 
area; Marine pilots flew underneath radar detection in RH-53 helicopters from the Navy’s 
aircraft carrier Nimitz; accompanied by more Air Force C-130 crews used to refuel the 
helicopters.159
What would follow can only be characterized as an extremely complex failure.  
After the failure, the JCS appointed a Special Operations Review Group to make a report 
of the events at Desert One.  The problems of the attempted rescue were so manifold that 
this group would find 23 problem areas worth analysis.160  The following is the Special 
Operations Review Group’s summary of the mission itself in a section entitled 
“Execution and Abort,” and could serve as military proof of Murphy’s Law.
On the evening of 24 April, after 5-1/2 months of planning and training under very tight OPSEC, 
eight RH-53 helicopters took off from the aircraft carrier Nimitz and began a journey of nearly 600 
nautical miles at night and low altitude to a preselected refueling site, Desert One, in the desert.  
The C-130 element with the ground rescue forces was also in the execution phase on a different 
track and time schedule to Desert One. Approximately two hours after takeoff, the crew of 
Helicopter #6 received cockpit indications of an impending rotor blade failure; landed; verified the 
malfunction (an automatic abort situation); and abandoned their aircraft.  The crew was picked by 
another helicopter, which then continued the mission individually.
Approximately one hour thereafter, the helicopter formation unexpectedly encountered a dust 
cloud of unknown size and density.
The helicopters broke out of the first area of suspended dust but, within an hour, entered a second, 
larger and denser area.  While attempting to navigate through this second area with severely 
degraded visibility, a second helicopter (#5) experienced a failure of several critical navigation and 
flight instruments.  Due to progressively deteriorating flight conditions that made safe flight 
extremely questionable, the helicopter pilot determined that it would be unwise to continue.  He 
aborted the mission, reversed course, and recovered on Nimitz.  Eventually six of the original eight 
helicopters arrived at the refueling site in interval between approximately 50 and 85 minutes later 
than planned. 
While en route, a third helicopter (#2) experienced a partial hydraulic failure, but the crew elected 
to continue to the refueling sit e believing repairs could be accomplished there.  Upon landing, 
however, the crew and the helicopter unit commander determined that the helicopter could not be 
repaired.  A hydraulic had failed due to a fluid leak, and no replacement pump was available.  
Even if a pump had been immediately available, there was insufficient time to change it, repair the 
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cause of the leak, service the system, and complete the next leg prior to daylight.  The helicopter 
was unsafe to continue the mission unrepaired.
Earlier, it had been determined that a minimum of six operational helicopters would be required at 
the refueling site to continue the mission.  Since at this point there were only five operational, the 
on- scene commander advised COMJTF (Commander, Joint Task Force) by radio of the situation, 
and he in turn communicated to Washington the status of the force and his intention to abort the 
operation and return to launch base.  The President concurred in the decision that the mission 
could not continue, and preparations began for withdrawal of the five operational helicopters, the 
C-130s, and the rescue force.
While repositioning one helicopter to permit another to top off his fuel tanks for the return flight, 
the first helicopter collided with one of the refueling C-130s.  Both aircraft were immediately 
engulfed in flames in which eight crew members died and five other members of the team were 
injured.  Since the C-130 was loaded with members of the rescue force awaiting extraction, even 
greater injury and loss of life were avoided only by swift and disciplined evacuation of the burning 
aircraft.  Shortly afterwards, ammunition aboard both aircraft began to explode.  Several 
helicopters were struck by shrapnel from the explosion and/or the burning ammunition, and at 
least one and possibly more were rendered nonflyable.  At this point, with time and fuel running 
out for the C-130s, the decision was made to transfer all helicopter crews to the remaining C-130s 
and to depart the area.161
Certainly, high-risk missions like these have a large chance of failure.  The security 
situation, however, demanded that the U.S. be able to carry out high-risk missions with 
small, elite forces to meet large policy objectives.  The events at Desert One would be 
laughable if not for the eight Americans pointlessly lost.  But the importance of the 
mission to U.S. policy, coupled with the public nature of the failure162, forced change.    
Thus, rather than abandon the capability as it had in the past, the tragic events in Iran led 
the U.S. to overhaul its strategy as well and reform the forces necessary to support that 
strategy.  Next we turn to the political and strategic fallout caused by the failed rescue 
that led to reform.  Then, there is a discussion about what the reforms were and how they 
were made to meet that new strategy.  Those changes, made from 1980-1983, will prove 
to be incomplete.
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 The botched rescue had important strategic consequences.  There was political 
fallout from the failure itself; and there was an exposure of the gaps in U.S. security 
strategy that were already present.  In the aggregate, the incident bore or shed light on 
four consequences.  The first two consequences deal with general strategy.  There were 
international and domestic political ramifications of actually failing a rescue; and the 
failed rescue showed that third world nations and non-state actors, acting alone, had the 
ability to pose large security threats to the United States, specifically via terrorism.  
The last two consequences regard the botched rescue as indicative of a failure of 
the U.S. to pay attention to low-level threats.   The security atmosphere precipitated by 
not treating low-level threats with seriousness was one permissive to Soviet relative 
gains.  The USSR was able to use Third World anti-American powers to its favor; and 
while the U.S. spent so much time balancing with the USSR on a conventional level, the 
failed rescue helped to reveal that Soviets had a very capable unconventional force to 
support their Third World agenda that the US, for a long time, overlooked.
(1) The Iran hostage rescue failed for several reasons; in any failed rescue, 
“Whatever the reasons, the ‘rescuing’ country may suffer a grave political and 
psychological blow.”163  In terms of Desert One, there were consequences on a domestic 
and international level.  Domestically, Carter lost the 1980 election to President Ronald 
Reagan by 440 electoral votes164 because he failed embarrassingly to meet his most 
important foreign policy objective.  Internationally, and foreshadowing the next three 
consequences of failure, the lack of an adequate response by the U.S. showed terrorists 
and Third World powers that one of the world’s most powerful nations was susceptible to 
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low-level attacks.  “The entire world wondered if the United States [military] had indeed 
become a ‘paper tiger.’”165
(2)  The first pre-existent threat manifest by Desert One was that Third World and 
non-state players offered a significant security concern that had long been overlooked.  
Just after his inauguration in 1980, President Reagan stated that “Terrorism has become a 
widespread and regrettable fact of [the] international system.”166  The U.S. was not well-
suited to meet these threats.  The U.S. military was concerned with its nuclear stalemate 
with the Soviets; as the cold war wore on for over 40 years, “U.S. power steadily 
declined relative not only to the Soviet Union…but also the Third World.  Cuba, 
Vietnam, Iran, Nicaragua, Ethiopia…these countries symbolized growing U.S. difficulty 
in maintaining control of these third-world countries.”167  The U.S. may have been in a 
situation of mutually assured destruction that stopped all-out nuclear war with the 
Soviets; but in terms of classic balance of power concerns, it was losing relative power 
vis-à-vis secondary and tertiary threats.  Desert One was a clear expression of this 
declining global influence.   In this case, SOF helped the United States to realize a 
decline in worldwide political consideration.
(3) In not controlling Iran specifically, the United States allowed the Soviet Union 
to gain relative power in the Middle East.  The hostage situation was a tangible result of 
the political situation in Iran.  That political situation greatly favored Moscow.  From a 
security standpoint, the United States had intelligence-gathering sites on Iran’s Soviet 
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border.  After Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolution was so successful, these sites were 
closed.  Additionally, Iran had been a U.S. ally in policing the Middle East.  “Iran 
immediately…withdrew from the role of policeman for the Persian Gulf, thus depriving 
the United States of a reliable ally who could safeguard Western interests in the 
region.”168  From a geo-political standpoint, “Khomeini embraced the Anti-American 
grouping in the Arab world.”  Khomeini cut off relations with Israel and Egypt, the 
remaining important U.S. allies in the Middle East, in 1979.169  Due to the public failure 
of the rescue attempt, Russia was able to use this blow to the Americans as an attack on 
the credibility of the U.S. as an ally, and use the situation to its relative diplomatic gain.  
“It signified abroad that for the defense of even its closest clients, the United States was 
no longer able, or willing, to ignore the cost.”170  Within Iran, after Desert One, 
communist pro-Moscow factions were allowed to operate in the open and thus contribute 
to the political situation in Iran.  “Khomeini’s regime virtually eliminated all the 
persistent sources of tension between Moscow and [Iran].”171  None of this is to say that 
the failed rescue itself caused these strategic losses.  Desert One, rather, manifest gaps in 
U.S. security strategy that the USSR was already taking advantage of.
(4)  The Soviets were able to paint a picture to Third World powers of the U.S. as 
an ally unwilling to defend its closest partners.  The American inability to help its poor 
allies came into direct contrast with a vast Soviet capability to do so.  The U.S. failed 
geopolitically by allowing its most dangerous threat to protect its own allies.  The Soviets 
were able to offer this protection due in large part to a far superior SOF capability.  The 
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U.S. failed to balance with the Russians on any tactical level that did not deal with 
conventional and nuclear forces.  Indeed, the Soviet Union, as a closed society, was able 
to carry out any covert operations it wished; it did not have a democracy that unsavory 
military actions could compromise.  But the United States, its open society aside, 
completely failed to acknowledge the importance of the SOF capability.  SOF, especially 
when used clandestinely or covertly, help level the international playing field with closed 
societies that do not have constraints on their foreign policy options.  Rather than 
attempting to level the field, the United States permissively left the Third World open to 
lean heavily in the favor of the Soviets.  In 1987, a study was commissioned by the 
Special Operations Panel of the Readiness Subcommittee of the House Armed Services 
Committee entitled United States and Soviet Special Operations.  The first chapter of that 
study is entitled “Comparative Priorities: Soviet Consistency/U.S. Inconsistency.”  The 
crux of that chapter, and the study as a whole, is that “U.S. priorities [overlooked] a large 
part of the conflict spectrum, and in any case are inconsistent.”172  In terms of SOF being 
the force behind operations on the low end of the conflict spectrum, it speaks to the fact 
that Soviets placed a large emphasis upon peacetime special operations, while the U.S. 
never did; the U.S. recognized it was falling behind in the Third World, but, in the face of 
the Soviet threat, did not foster the forces necessary to winning Third World proxy 
conflicts with the U.S.S.R.  The U.S., partially because of a public disinterest in Third 
World intervention after the traumatic experience in Vietnam, unequivocally failed to 
prepare for anything beyond all-out nuclear war.173
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Desert One showed that the United States was completely unprepared to cope 
with an emerging threat from developing nations.  How would it reform to meet with 
these threats?  The Nixon and Carter administrations had looked to primarily diplomatic 
means for controlling these low-level threats, and it did not work; the debacle in Iran 
showed that these means were not enough to stave off significant geopolitical fallout 
from smaller international players.  “These approaches failed badly as the 
Iranian…revolution and the hostage affair in Tehran demonstrated.”174  Hand-in-hand 
with that failure was an allowance by the Nixon and Carter administrations for special 
operations to “Fall form favor after the Vietnam War.”175
The passing over of this tactical necessity was disastrous.  As shown above, the 
mistake was felt far beyond the tactical; Desert One was indicative of a decline in relative 
U.S. power on the strategic level.  In recognizing the implications of that decline, 
President Reagan knew he had to change something quickly and carry out that change 
well.  By the mid-1980s, “The Reagan Administration [promoted] a strategy of indirect 
military intervention in the Third World, low-intensity warfare, which [was intended] not 
only to halt the decline of U.S. influence, but also to regain control over countries like 
Iran.”176   An un-abrasive, non-conventional force was necessary to fight the type of war 
that Reagan sought.   What follows are the steps taken to establish a dominant and 
effective standing special operations capability to meet with the strategic necessity of 
low-intensity conflicts. In terms of SOF, then, the final steps of their innovation and 
acceptance into the American military machine are intrinsically linked with U.S. security 
strategy.  Those steps would not be completed until 1987.
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The first step came in direct response to Desert One’s failure.  Within four 
months, the Special Operations Review Group wrote its Rescue Mission Report for the 
JCS.  The report analyzed 23 areas of concern from the mission, 11 of which were 
considered to be “Major Issues.”  Of those 11 issues, four can be said to only have a 
scope limited to rescue missions in a place like Iran: Size of the helicopter force; 
Alternatives to the Desert One site; Handling the dust phenomenon; and C-130 
Pathfinders.  Seven of those major concerns, more importantly, had to do with the state of 
the SOF capability at large in 1980: OPSEC; Independent review of plans; Organization, 
command and control, and the applicability of existing JCS plans; Comprehensive 
readiness evaluation; Overall coordination of joint training; Command and control at 
desert one; and Centralized and integrated intelligence support external to the JTF.177
Among these seven issues, an overriding theme appears that the joint SOF capability 
lacked any coherent and understood organization.
The most important part of that report were the conclusions.  In addition to 
several counterfactual ideas about what could have made the Desert One operation a 
success, the report drew two general conclusions and made two recommendations for 
SOF reform, and ultimately for reform of the military in general.  One of the conclusions 
was that, if a JTF had already existed, it could have better understood the level of OPSEC 
was necessary—because the organization did not already exist, the COMJTF was under 
the impression that too much OPSEC was necessary to the detriment of gathering proper 
information to carry out the attack.178   The first general conclusion was more important, 
however; for it would give birth to reform.  That conclusion stated:
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The ad hoc nature of the organization and planning is related to most of the major issues and 
underlies the group’s conclusions.
By not utilizing an existing JTF organization, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to start, literally, from 
the beginning to establish a JTF, find a commander, create an organization, provide a staff, 
develop a plan, select the units, and train the forces before attaining even the most rudimentary 
mission readiness.
An existing JTF organization, even with a small staff and only cadre units assigned, would have 
provided an organizational framework of professional expertise around which a larger tailored 
force organization could quickly coalesce.
The important point is that the infrastructure would have existed—the trusted agents, the built-in 
OPSEC, the secure communications.  At a minimum, COMJTF would have had a running start 
and could have devoted more hours to plans, operations, and tactics rather than to administration 
and logistics.179
It was apparent, then, that strategic special operations required a standing, joint force not 
fashioned after the conventional model of separate forces carrying out separate duties.  
The two recommendations it made were for the establishment an organization to 
make that capability possible.  Its first recommendation was that a “Counterterrorist Joint 
Task Force (CTJTF) be established as a field agency of the JCS with permanently 
assigned staff personnel and certain assigned forces.”  It recommended that the CTJTF 
should have officers of all four branches of the military that reported directly to the JCS 
and that its forces should be permanently assigned to the JTF, and that they should be 
“Selected on the basis of their capabilities in the field of special operations of various 
types.”180  The first recommendation, then, was for the final organizational permanence 
of SOF in the U.S. military.
The second recommendation dealt with who should make this capability come 
into being.  At no point have SOF personnel, those who understand special operations 
doctrine, had an integral say in SOF innovation; it would be necessary, as models of 
military innovation show, for those with proper understanding of the capability over a 
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generation to indoctrinate the innovation.181  In this light, the report urged “The JCS [to] 
give careful consideration to the establishment of a Special Operations Advisory Panel, 
comprised of a group of carefully selected high-ranking officers who have career 
backgrounds in special operations”182 to help form this capability.
The right ideas were present from the Special Operations Review Group; 
predictably, it would take years before their recommendations were heeded.  The same 
General Meyer that helped and hindered the formation of Delta Force, in May 1980, tried 
to listen to the recommendations of the Review Group.  He proposed a Strategic Services 
Command (STRATSERCOM) in the Army as a “New combatant command that would 
reach beyond the Army and bring the counterterrorist forces of each of the military 
services together in a joint permanent task force.”183  Predictably, the JCS would not go 
for this, citing normal fears of diminishing conventional capabilities.  In the Army, as in 
the rest of the services, the most that was initially done was a coalescing of the SOF 
within each respective service: there were ready and standing forces, they were simply 
not joint.184
While the military resisted reform, the American civilian bureaucracy was more 
helpful in enacting it.  Noel Koch was a special operator in Vietnam who landed a job as 
deputy assistant secretary in the Defense Department.  He pushed hard and formed, from 
the Special Operations Review Group’s suggestions, a Special Operations Policy 
Advisory Group (SOPAG).  He chose all well-respected and retired officers who were of 
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General rank and had special operations experience to be on the panel.  The panel 
reported directly to the Secretary of Defense.185
Simultaneous with his push to establish SOPAG, Koch also fought for a policy 
directive forcing the JCS to form a joint SOF element.  On 3 March 1983, Koch 
convinced Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Thayer to sign off on the directive; to 
appease the JCS, Secretary of Defense Weinberger would not do so, keeping the policy 
directive from ultimately having its desired effect.  The memorandum officially carried 
four points.  Those were:
1.  Necessary force structure expansion and enhancements in command and control, personnel 
policy, training, and equipment will be implemented no longer than the end of Fiscal Year 1990.
2.  Collateral activities will be enhanced as necessary to provide fully effective support to the 
planning and execution of special operations.
3.  Each service will assign SOF and related activities sufficient resource allocation priority and 
will establish appropriate intensive management mechanisms to ensure that these objectives are 
met.
4.  Resource decisions for current and programmed SOF, once made at the Secretary of Defense 
level, will not be changed or reduced by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) or Service 
staffs unless coordinated by the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Neil Koch in 
this case) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense and approve by the Secretary of Defense.
It closed by saying that it was necessary for each service to submit a master plan for 
implementation of these changes by 1 March 1984 to Koch.186
In the memo, there was no direction to implement these changes, so it was hard to 
achieve the joint command that Koch sought.  But two positive effects were felt.  First, 
because Koch was made an integral part in these changes as per the memo, there was an 
advocate for SOF involved in the changes.  Second, there was an immediate formation of 
the Joint Special Operations agency (JSOA) underneath the JCS.  This group would not 
have great power in innovating SOF; rather, it was a group that re-established the joint 
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SOF capability of the Vietnam War; in other words, the JCS would not take any focus 
away from conventional war-fighting, at least not to a degree that had never been felt 
before.  In the end, JSOA was a weak organization, given the power only to lobby for 
SOF, but not direct SOF action before submitting plans to higher military authorities187, 
again reminiscent of MACVSOG in the Vietnam Conflict.  
Koch simultaneously lobbied for SOF in Congress.  Congress dealt with military 
acquisitions, and the effects of his lobbying did not cover broad acquisitions concerns, 
but only those stemming directly from Desert One.  With the help of some allies in 
Congress, Koch was able to help draft Initiative 17, lobbying for a greater helicopter 
allocation to SOF.  Opponents of special operations, however, essentially put the
Initiative down by allocating helicopter activities of SOF to the army, thus diminishing a 
joint capability even more.  Initiative 17 was largely unsuccessful.188
Still, all the lobbying of Koch and his allies in the civilian bureaucracy, together 
with help from military organizations such as the Special Operations Review Group, did 
have some effect.  By the mid-1980s, their relentless work activated the Joint Special 
Operations Command (JSOC), commanded by one Brigadier General.  Though 
technically a unified command, it was largely ineffective.  The scope of this command 
only encompassed the most elite units of every service’s SOF (Navy SEAL Team 6, 
Delta, Army SOF Aviation Unit Task Force 160, and 2 Battalions of the Army’s 75th
Ranger Regiment).  JSOC, however, did not complete the core of SOF reform: the 
creation of a “Unified command of SOF and protection of SOF fiscal and manpower 
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resources.”189  The conventional military was scared of handing over control of such a 
potentially expensive resource to a command separate from its own sphere.  The 
capability had not yet tested its mettle, and thus conventional leaders felt it was too risky 
in terms of the possible harm done to large-scale capabilities, specifically in the budget.  
If the JCS still controlled the SOF budget, and SOF did not yet have widespread 
Congressional support, the conventional military could keep the SOF budget at 1/10% of 
the entire defense budget.190  In providing slight increases in budget, manpower, and a 
nominal joint capability, the JCS were able to appease Congress and Reagan’s policy-
makers that sought an expanded low-intensity capability.
From 1980-1983, there was a struggle to reform SOF.  There was still a lot of 
pressure to keep SOF marginalized in the military by not granting them their own 
autocratic and unified command.  As usual, it was largely up to civilians to maintain a 
standing special operations capability.  By 1983, the reforms were still half measures—it 
would take something else to force them to completion.  The reform returned SOF to 
what they had been in Vietnam. Consequently, the success that SOF have in their next 
important mission, Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada, is only partial, with many areas of 
failure.  
The partial failure of SOF in Grenada (and historically, in every other SOF 
campaign), coupled with Reagan’s Third World strategy of the mid-1980s and the 
looming security vacuum presented by the cold war’s end,  would complete the 
innovation.  Conventional minds, throughout history, followed a pattern of building up 
SOF for war then diminishing the capability post-conflict.  SOF will work best when they 
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are finally given authority to advocate and plan for themselves outside of the 
conventional command structure; the recognition of the necessity for this type of 
organization was finally forced by the security situation at the end of the Reagan 
Administration and the tactical lessons learned from Grenada; the whole process, in 
retrospect, will have been started by the failure of Desert One.
Operation Urgent Fury: Proving the Tactical and Strategic Necessity of Joint Forces
Operations in Grenada in 1983 were the first sign of Reagan’s new policy toward 
the Third World.  This conflict proved the tactical necessity of a joint SOF outside of the 
typical military organizational structure to support Reagan’s policy. In Vietnam, SOF did 
not have singular organizational authority, and their missions were not completely 
successful.  The same will be said in Grenada; only, after Grenada, the SOF capability 
was grown, not deactivated.
Grenada is the southernmost Caribbean Island.  On that island were 
approximately 1,000 U.S. citizens, many of whom were medical students.  Grenada had a 
supposedly democratic government.  The United States, however, in again overlooking a 
Third World Soviet expansion—this time in its own hemisphere—failed to realize that 
the supposedly democratic party coming into power was actually communist.  That 
government, the New JEWEL (Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education, and Liberation) 
Movement (NJM), led by Maurice Bishop, “In their dealings with Soviets and 
Cubans…sought to prove that they were good Communists, useful as a launching pad for 
spreading subversion to neighboring countries, and useful as allies.”191  Bishop 
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wrongfully imprisoned all figures of internal opposition.192  The nation, and its deceptive 
leadership, became very unstable.  
On 23 October 1983, terrorist bombings in Beirut, Lebanon killed 241 U.S. 
Marines.  This contributed to the perception of the U.S. military as largely ineffective.  
President Reagan felt it was necessary to “Improve the credibility of U.S. military 
capabilities.”193 Given the high U.S. civilian presence, the political unrest, a Cuban 
military detachment on the island of Grenada, the bombing in Beirut, and Reagan’s desire 
to forcefully control the Third World, Operation Urgent Fury (which launched officially 
on 25 October 1983) was labeled as a “Just cause that could restore confidence of the 
American people in their military.”194
Geopolitically, the invasion reached its goals.  “Grenada represents to many the 
first instance in which a subdued by a Communist-dominated, Soviet-supported 
government has been liberated from without.”195  In terms of body count, the operation 
was also a success.  The U.S. suffered 19 killed and 134 total casualties; the Grenadian 
and Cuban Forces suffered 92 killed and 509 total casualties.196  But Operation Urgent 
Fury did not come close to complete tactical success.  On the conventional level, the 
largest failure was that “There were interoperability problems between the services, 
particularly in the area of communications.”197 Nearly all the problems stemmed from an 
inability to be joint in nature.  
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As a result, SOF were also quite ineffective.  SOF were involved in seven of the 
eight listed objectives for the invasion of Grenada.  Only two of the planned SOF 
missions were successfully implemented.198  Most of the problems with SOF in Grenada 
pointed back to their improper implementation and organization by leaders.  First, “The 
1983 invasion of Grenada caught the CIA without a single agent on the island.”  As a 
result of this, the U.S. improperly estimated the number of Cuban forces it would fight; 
more importantly, though the U.S. claimed to be intervening to save the 1,000 American 
civilians on the island, it “Did not know where many of them were...and took three days 
to locate some 400 students living on the western half of the island.”199  Though saving 
these medical students may have been a trumped up causus belli aimed at appeasing the 
American public, the operational mishaps still exposed gaps in U.S. capabilities.  The 
lack of intelligence and coordination of intelligence could have been solved by having a 
standing and prepared joint SOF organization.  A standing organization “Is able to
develop close, permanent ties to other organizations, notably the intelligence agencies, 
whose support is vital in special operations.”200
Once the main invasion started, SOF mostly failed much in the same confused 
manner as Desert One.  Like in Iran, the biggest problem was that most of the SOF never 
even got to their targets.  Also, there was no integration of SOF—though JSOC was 
formed, each individual group of SEALs, Rangers, Delta, or Air Force SOF group fought 
for its own specific missions, and most of these failed.  In the end, SOF could hardly be 
utilized beyond the tactical level in this operation because their organization made their 
possible effects negligible.
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  To show a few examples of failure, Delta Force was clandestinely dropped in on 
the night of 24 October to report the suitability of a drop zone for a large paratrooper 
invasion on 25 October and clear a runway for air operations.  They were, however, 
discovered by construction workers before their mission ever started; these construction 
workers alerted Cuban forces, and “According to some accounts 22 Delta members were 
either killed or wounded in this engagement by the time they were rescued by 
Rangers.”201
Three SEAL teams also dropped in the night before the invasion.  They were 
supposed to prepare the beachheads for an amphibious landing by Marines in the 
morning.  They were supposed to drop into the ocean from the air, inflate boats, and 
secure their respective beachheads.  Of the three teams dropped, only one even reached 
their beachhead; one of the teams had a member die due to improperly parachuting into 
the ocean, while the second failed team drifted off to sea in turbulent waters because its 
boat’s engine failed.202
The only thing that could be characterized as a mild strategic-level success for 
SOF was in securing Governor General Sir Paul Scoon, an important political figure that 
would later help to stabilize Grenada.  Tactically, however, this mission was even a 
failure.  The plan originally called for a Black Hawk Helicopter to come and retrieve the 
Governor with his SEAL rescuers.  The Black Hawk, predictably, was nowhere to be 
found due to improper landing conditions.  The SEALs waited with the Governor for a 
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day until a group of Marines with Armored Personnel Carriers came to take the group 
away.203
Grenada, again, was a geopolitical success.  Outside the Pentagon, however, the 
fight was seen as a tactical embarrassment on many levels.  Where the military saw 
victory, the civilian community saw failures of SOF and conventional forces.  “Even with 
the establishment of JSOC, there was little or no integration of the units of 
SOF…communication failures throughout American force only amplified the command 
and control chaos that resulted from a lack of joint planning and training including 
special operations and conventional forces.”204
Goldwater-Nichols in Light of SOF: Finally a Unified Command
The military was stuck in the cold war whereas security strategists and the 
American civilian bureaucracy—after the terrorist events in Beirut and Iran; and after the 
invasion of Grenada—saw that American security strategy and the military that backed 
that strategy were outdated.  The military services fought to restrict joint commands and, 
concordantly, an autonomous SOF command.  Because the Pentagon refused to do it 
alone, Congress would take it upon itself to force the entire military to reform in the mid 
to late 1980s.
This civilian-inspired innovation was based on the strategy of low-intensity 
warfare professed by Reagan. The whole military, therefore, would be forced to become 
joint in nature to fight a different type of war.  This type of war was Low-Intensity 
Conflict (LIC), which “Demands that war be morally waged with minimum violence.”205
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Part of the reform was based on a necessity to have a quiet and elite force capable 
of minimal escalation—in other words, a capable and standing SOF force.  The strategic 
necessity of a capable SOF, coupled with the newfound organizational requirement for a 
military ready to act jointly, and a Congress willing to destroy harmfully conventional 
military notions, would lead to a unified SOF capability that was finally outside of the 
conventional command structure—Congress will win the battle that SOF never had the 
power to win by itself.
Legislative Dominance: Civilians Champion the SOF Cause 
There were four civilian documents integral to implementing change.  All spoke 
very specifically to joint capabilities.  The first document was called the Locher Report or 
Defense Organization: The Need for Change.  This report was begun in June 1983 and 
reported in October 1985.  The second document was President Reagan’s response to the 
first report.  The president made a “Blue Ribbon Commission” to look into the findings 
of the Locher Report; this commission produced their Interim Report on Defense 
Management in February 1986.  The third document is a piece of legislation.  On 1 
October 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act was 
made law.  The Cohen-Nunn Amendment to this legislation dealt specifically with SOF.  
Each of these documents sought to change the military as a whole in terms of re-
organization of joint commands and increased civilian control206; for the purposes of this 
paper, the focus will be limited to how each far-reaching document spoke to the limited 
gain of special operations as part of larger reforms.  There will be additional discussion of 
other civilian actions taken to further the SOF capability.
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The Locher Report made many radical suggestions to the point of wishing to 
disestablish the JCS altogether.  For the purposes of SOF, the most important suggestion 
made was “To remove the Service component commanders within the unified combatant 
commands from the operational chain of command.”207  In terms of special operations, 
this would mean that JSOC would report directly to the OSD and would be completely 
autonomous.  As research was being done for this report, Neil Koch was back working 
civilian channels of influence.  Seeing that Congress was going to be the one to force 
reform, not the military, he gained Congressional allies.  In the mid-1980s, Koch had two 
important people working in Congress to do what he hoped to achieve in the OSD.  
Representative Dan Daniel was a ranking member of the House Armed Services 
Committee who by 1985 had formed the Special Operations Panel on the Readiness 
Subcommittee; Senator Bill Nichols (The one that would ultimately be a namesake of the 
bill to change the military) also was public about the need to revolutionize SOF.208  Koch 
ensured that SOF would be a large part of military innovation in the 1980s.
The second paper, which came from a commission established specifically by 
President Reagan, had three recommendations that deal more specifically with how to 
implement innovation in unified commands and to what extent these commands can 
compromise conventional military organizations.
Subject to review and approval of the Secretary of Defense, Unified Commanders should be given 
broader authority to structure subordinate commands, joint task forces, and support activities in a 
way that best supports their missions and results in a significant reduction in the size and numbers 
of military headquarters.
The Unified Command Plan should be revised to assure increased flexibility to deal with 
situations that overlap the geographic boundaries of the current combatant commands and with 
changing world conditions.
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For contingencies short of general war, the Secretary of Defense, with the advice of the Chairman 
and the JCS, would have the flexibility to establish the shortest possible chains of command for 
each force deployed, consistent with proper supervision and support.  This would help the 
Commanders in Chief (CINCs) and the JCS perform better in situations ranging from peace to 
crisis to general war.209
The paper described a flexible command that could operate without borders and 
undertake missions short of war.  Reading between the lines, the commission called for 
an autonomous SOF capability based in a new security strategy, but used language that 
was not so radical so as to make the report’s findings unactionable.
Finally, on 1 October 1986, the military was forced to reform via Congressional 
legislation.  The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act was not afraid to change 
conventional military mores.  The law stated:
(a)  UNIFIED AND SPECIFIC COMBATANT COMMANDS.—With the advice and assistance 
of the Chairman of the JCS (CJCS), the President, through the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), 
shall—
(1)  establish unified combatant commands and specified combatant commands to 
perform military missions; and
(2)  prescribe the force structure of those commands….[the responsibility of those 
shall be constantly updated no less than every two years]…
(c)  DEFINITIONS—In this chapter:
(1)  The term “unified combatant command” means a military command which has 
broad, continuing missions and which is composed of forces from two or more military 
departments.
(2)  The term “specified combatant command” means a military command which has 
broad, continuing missions and which is normally composed of forces from a single 
military department….
(b)  CHAIN OF COMMAND.—Unless otherwise directed by the President, the chain of 
command to a unified or specified combatant command runs—
(1) from the President to the SecDef; and
(2) from the SecDef to the commander of the combatant command.210
When SOF did get its own combatant command, then, it would have organizational 
autonomy outside of the conventional military; that command’s existence and the 
necessity of its acquisitions and operations would be ensured by reporting directly to 
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civilian leaders that championed their cause; the slow-to-innovate military would be left 
out of the SOF chain of command, and unlike in Vietnam, the hesitant-to-approve State 
Department would ultimately have little say in special operations.  As the Act goes on to 
explain, “The Combatant Commander organizes commands and forces within that 
command as he considers necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.”211
Two final parts of the act ensured permanence for special operations and ensured 
that conventional military minds concerned with their forces getting their classically huge 
portions of the defense budget would be sufficiently enraged.
(a)  COMBATANT COMMAND BUDGETS.—The SecDef shall include in the annual budget of 
the Department of Defense submitted to Congress as a separate budget proposal for such activities 
of each of the unified and specified combatant commands as may be determined.212
The SecDef now had complete control over the SOF budget—the special operations 
capability was no longer restricted through JCS fiscal manipulation.  From 1982 to 1987, 
the SOF budget would increase from $441 million to $1.7 billion.213  To ensure that this 
meant special operations, the innovation was made final as the act stated:
SEC. 212.  INITIAL REVIEW OF COMBATANT COMMANDS
(a)  MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED.—The first review of the missions, responsibilities, and 
force structure of the unified and specified combatant commands…shall include consideration of 
the following:
(1)  Creation of a unified combatant command for special operations missions which 
would combine the special operations missions, responsibilities, and forces of the armed 
forces.214
Obviously, the military services did all they could to stop this change.  But as the 
law came into effect, SOF gained more Congressional allies that would ensure their 
existence.  Senators William Cohen and Sam Nunn provided the Nunn-Cohen 
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Amendment to the 1986 Defense Reorganization Act that passed on 14 November 1986.  
The effects of this amendment were thee-fold.  First, it established United States Special 
Operation Command (USSOCOM) led by its own Commander in Chief (USCINCSOC); 
and the civilian attaché to that command by legislating into the Department of  Defense 
the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations and Low-Intensity 
Conflict.  All exist to present-day as the leaders of the SOF capability.  Second, it 
outlined in law the elements of special operations as “Direct action, strategic 
reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, civil affairs, 
psychological operations, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, theater search and 
rescue, [and] such other activities as may be specified by the President or SecDef.”  
Third, as the SecDef was responsible for reporting budgets for each of the unified 
combatant commands, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and 
Low-Intensity Conflict was made responsible for advocating and justifying the budget for 
special operations; the SecDef could only review an approved budget under the direction 
of the USCINCSOC.215  SOF now had civilian partners that forced their organizational 
permanency in a military that did not want the capability.  The rest of the story of special 
operations in U.S. strategy will be understood in that framework.
Conclusion: Forced Innovation in the Face of Emerging Threats
The United States transformed to be able to employ low-intensity warfare in the 
Third World.  The failure of Desert One and the partial failure of Urgent Fury begot a 
joint, peacetime-ready force capable of fighting effective low-intensity conflicts as these 
missions led to the indoctrination of SOF inside the military but outside of its 
conventional command structure via SOCOM; and ensured large-scale reform in the U.S. 
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military.  The Army outlined five components necessary to Reagan’s reform to a low-
intensity capability: Counterinsurgency; Organization of and support for insurgencies (or 
unconventional warfare); Spearhead operations (or direct action); Terrorist and counter-
terrorist actions like rescue operations; and Peacekeeping operations.216  A low-intensity 
strategy, based on these components, clearly cried out for effective SOF.
As the U.S. was developing this capability, the Soviet Union was at the beginning 
of its end.  By the time the U.S. had adequate SOF, the Berlin Wall had nearly fallen.  As 
the Soviets fell from power, the United States arose as the world’s hegemon; along with 
this rise to unipolarity, America faced proliferating security concerns as the geopolitical 
world was thrown off kilter.  The United States went from a nation essentially concerned 
with one adversary and one type of security threat to a nation with different enemies and 
likewise varied security threats.  
In this new security situation, an adaptable and elite force was needed to face 
what was a multiplying number and type of threats to the United States.  Because of 
Desert One, SOF (as part of the military at large) were forced to change to be able to 
fight many different types of battles.  This change was forcibly mandated by civilians 
when military officers refused to innovate.  The U.S. military may have been right in 
paying so much attention to the nuclear Soviet behemoth; but now that behemoth was 
gone and all that remained were rising low-level threats.  The new security situation 
would prove the necessity of the special operations capability.  SOF were reformed out of 
a need to control the Third World via low-intensity conflict in a cold war balancing game 
with the U.S.S.R.; but their worth would be proven in the modern, post-cold war context 
by contributing a credible responsive threat to U.S. security strategy in the Third World 
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and beyond.  The Pentagon tried with all of its might to counter Goldwater-Nichols and 
Cohen-Nunn legislation to no avail; the emerging security situation of the late 1980s and 
the 1990s, coupled with continued civilian support of special operations, would force the 
necessity of autonomous SOF.  The next chapter, then, shows how SOF, through U.S. 
Special Operations Command, became a vital part of U.S. security strategy on several 
levels, and why, ultimately, they were forced to undergo their latest strategic innovation 
by becoming a preventive threat after 11 September 2001.
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-6- 
Utilizing then Coalescing the Capability: The Strategic Roles of 
Modern SOF from Multifarious to Unified
When the cold war ended, and for approximately twelve years that followed, the 
United States did not need to focus on balancing against another geopolitical superpower 
or major military threat.  Furthermore, until the 1990s, SOF strategy could only be 
analyzed in the light of ongoing innovation.  Before then, the capability was never stable 
and so discussion of their use was clouded by the problem of their solidification in the 
military.  After the cold war, it became possible to analyze their strategic significance 
alone.  From 1989 through 2001, the capabilities, funding, and doctrine of SOF stayed 
relatively consistent, with small, steady growth, even as the military in general suffered 
deep budget cuts following the cold war and Gulf War.217  Obviously, there were still 
some skirmishes over the extension of SOF power, but the organization had relatively 
stable permanence.218
The first part of this chapter outlines the strategic role that SOF played in this 
time period through a categorical analysis.  After 11 September 2001, the SOF capability 
underwent an evolution nearly as significant as it had in the 1980s. USSOCOM would 
coalesce all of the capabilities it developed and perfected in the 1990s under one war as 
SOF emerged as the leaders of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).  Additionally, 
special operations in the U.S. would move from a purely responsive capability to a 
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partially preventive capability.  The second part of the chapter discusses the implications 
of the latest innovation of SOF and also analyzes the present role of special operations in 
the GWOT.  A conclusion to the entire paper, at the end of this chapter, will look back 
through the evolution of the SOF capability in a search for lessons about their strategic 
use in an attempt to provide recommendations for the present and future utilization of 
SOF in U.S. security strategy.
Part One: The Precisely Strategic Roles of Modern SOF, 1989-2001
In the post-cold war security situation through 2001 where most tangible threats 
were posed by several different types of low-level problems, SOF allowed policy makers
to tailor a precise military response to specific security situations.  Indeed, SOF went on 
many high-risk, tactically difficult but broadly unimportant missions.  This thesis does 
not focus on those “Rambo”-type missions, however.219  More importantly, SOF in this 
period offered a strategically precise, purely responsive capability.    As a precise 
capability, the strategic use of SOF in the 1990s came in addressing proliferated threats 
when no single enemy was present.  Despite the lack of a well-defined enemy, there was 
no “Void in the necessity for potent U.S. military forces.”220  In terms of their definition 
as a precise strategic threat as opposed to conventional forces, special operations 
“Employ at times the bare minimum of manpower and equipment to achieve 
disproportionately greater payoffs that may be crucial to high policy.”221
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Given the organizational framework established in the previous chapter, and the 
strategic necessity of a smaller-sized force established above, SOF were tasked with 
several types of missions on the tactical level as a low-level military capability to counter 
low-level security threats: “Direct action, strategic reconnaissance, unconventional 
warfare, foreign internal defense, civil affairs, psychological operations, 
counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, theater search and rescue, [and] such other 
activities as may be specified by the President or SecDef.”222  Keeping the varied types of 
threats in mind, SOF are essential in the adaptability of their force to meet many different 
strategic ends.  “The true value of special operation forces to the United States lies in 
their ability to perform at different levels of conflict, independently and in conjunction 
with larger operations.”223  SOF can be tailored precisely by U.S. policy and strategy to 
counter different types of belligerents.224 The first part of this chapter will analyze five 
categories detailing how the United States used SOF’s new organization and numerous 
tactical missions as precisely-tailored and oftentimes highly effective tools of U.S. 
strategy.  Each category will be accompanied by an illustrative case (or cases, when 
necessary) as tools of analysis.  Both the categories and the case studies often overlap.
(1)  The first category of strategic special operations will be spearheading then 
assisting conventional ground campaigns.  There are several strategic benefits to sending 
in special operations before conventional forces, especially in the context of low-intensity 
(LICs) and medium-intensity conflicts.  Operation Just Cause in Panama will be the case 
study for an SOF-led LIC; Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm will assess the role of 
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SOF in leading a medium-intensity conflict.  The role of SOF in humanitarian 
intervention in Somalia as part of Operation Restore Hope will show the negative 
strategic implications of using SOF after conventional forces,
(2)  The next role of SOF deals with their use in mostly non-violent situations.  
When use of force is to be avoided, SOF are often more delicate than conventional 
forces, and so can be more useful in nonviolent humanitarian efforts.  Operation 
Uphold/Restore Democracy in Haiti will be used as an example of this.
(3) SOF in the 1990s were often used as a strategically acute threat; conventional 
forces, alternatively, offer a strategically obtuse threat in several cases.  This deals with 
cases in which SOF alone are used as direct tools of policy when the use of conventional 
ground forces is unwanted.  SOF were an acute capability in the sense that they allowed
policy makers to force a military solution on a little problem without applying so much 
force as to extend the conflict to a strategically undesirable amount.  Conventional 
ground forces presented an obtuse capability in the sense that it would be difficult to 
minimally escalate a small conflict when employing a large ground force.  This can be 
explicitly seen in the role of U.S. SOF in supporting several NATO or UN-run coalitions 
for humanitarian intervention in the 1990s.  Operation Allied Force in the Balkans will 
serve as an example of this type of SOF action.
(4) Beyond limiting escalation of conflict to a strategically desirable level, the low 
profile kept by most SOF allows even a strategic extension of a conflict to reach policy 
goals without suffering political consequences; conflict extension by the obtuse 
conventional threat often carries heavy political consequences.  Anti-drug operations in 
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Colombia that also served (and still serve) to accommodate broader policy objectives will 
be used as an example of this delicate conflict extension.
(5)  The final characterization of the strategic use of SOF in the 1990s deals with   
their support of strategic air campaigns.  There will be a lot of overlap between this 
category and previous ones, but it warrants a separate analysis.  For several reasons 
through the 1990s, the United States chose strategic air bombing as the predominant 
military method to reach policy objectives, especially in joint military actions with 
NATO.  SOF had a unique way of contributing to strategic bombing campaigns that will 
be discussed with the previously-used cases of the Gulf War and Operation Allied Force 
in the Balkans.
Role 1: SOF as the Leading Elements of Conventional Campaigns
Be they mostly conventional or mostly unconventional conflicts, all of the 
military actions of the United States except for the Gulf War (a medium-intensity 
conflict) in this time period were low-intensity conflicts.  As such, a framework for why 
SOF are used in LICs in this time period must be established.  After that is done, each 
specific section will explain the strategic nuances of each respective conflict (the section 
on the Gulf War, for example, will explain the strategic utility of SOF in support of a 
larger, medium-intensity conventional campaign).  Note that many of the situations 
discussed are similar and hence most of the strategic implications noted have more 
breadth than just one of the discussed cases.
To begin, LICs, in whatever policy objective they sought, were paramount to U.S. 
security strategy through this time period.  In his 1991-1992 National Security Strategy, 
President George Bush stated that a primary policy goal of the United States was to 
116
establish “A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human 
rights, and democratic institutions flourish.”225  The United States would intervene in 
foreign lands to promote all of these outlined conflicts; clearly, conventional operations 
that show a large force presence do not go far to promote institutions such as human 
rights, political and economic freedom, or democracy.  
It would seem that U.S. intervention is quite altruistic.  Realistically, however, 
there are hard political objectives usually sought via this type of intervention.  These 
types of LICs  
Are  fought in those areas where we perceive our security or interests are 
imperiled…[those interests include] considerations of trade, resources, access and basing, 
protection of our citizens, elimination of criminal elements, maintenance of a regional balance of 
power, or sustaining a government favorable to our country or to the governments of our allies.226
In general, 
The advantages special operations forces bring to this particular field of battle are obvious.  Their 
small size makes them ideal for escape and evasion, enables them to be highly mobile once 
deployed, facilitates their insertion into and evacuation from the field of action, and improves the 
chances that their activities can be performed clandestinely where necessary.  Clearly, a single-
mission event may be of high political importance and, therefore, may require a highly 
controllable and disciplined fighting force.227
A necessary condition for an intervention to promote human rights, economic freedom, or 
political freedom is that the nation being “attacked” is politically or economically 
unstable or does not grant the most basic of human rights to its people.  That is a very 
politically unstable situation—a delicate force such as SOF can be more useful in that 
situation than an obtrusive conventional force.
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In assessing Operation Just Cause in Panama, and Operation Restore Hope in 
Somalia, it is necessary to ask why, in particular, SOF were used to somewhat violently 
spearhead and then assist a conventional campaign in these a low-intensity conflicts?  
First, “The enemy fears elite units the most,” and thus SOF can help to overwhelm him 
into a quick and tidy surrender, minimizing the risk put on all operations.228 Second, LICs 
usually take place in Third World nations where the United States, for strategic reasons, 
does not wish to harm the infrastructure of an already badly bruised nation.229  “If among 
the rules of engagement is the requirement for no collateral damage, it will be necessary 
to use only the forces capable of meeting such stringent requirements.”230  Third, the 
United States oftentimes finds itself combating clans and militia in its interventions.  
They do not have the financing to provide for advanced technology.231  As such, most of 
the first steps of interventions are night-time incursions against enemies who do not have 
night-vision capabilities; then, as the invasion begins, the emphasis is usually put on the 
speed and mobility provided by the technology and small size of SOF to carry out 
attack.232  Fourth, because SOF are small, they are able to quickly transition to a peace-
keeping force from a fighting force233, and thus help to hastily end a conflict.  This will 
be seen especially in Panama.
SOF offer three capabilities when leading both medium-intensity conflicts and 
LICs in support of conventional forces.  First is the ability of SOF to carry out high-risk, 
policy-intensive direct action missions that are tactically limited to one important 
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objective.234  In LICs, that is usually an attempt to disable the leader of an unsavory 
government; in medium-intensity conflicts, the mission objective can have deeper 
geopolitical consequences than the displacement of a leader.  Second, SOF can offer 
outstanding special reconnaissance; coming from men on the ground, the intelligence 
provided by SOF is oftentimes more useful than that of electronic means of intelligence 
to the point that SOF intelligence significantly contributes to conventional success in a 
campaign.235  Third, SOF run psychological operations (PSYOP) that often contribute to 
success.
Turning next to the first Gulf War, how can SOF play a strategic role in medium-
intensity conflicts (MICs)?  In contrast to LICs, in MICs, there is an organized military to 
combat.  In assisting a conventional military force that is fighting a standing army, SOF 
are not well-used in regular infantry support.  That was established in World War II.  
However, SOF can act as a force multiplier “By diverting enemy forces to fight tactically 
unimportant battles, or to occupy strategically marginal territory.”  In that way, special 
operations can tie down a good amount of enemy resources, making the fight easier for 
conventional forces.  Considering how much SOF are feared and respected, this works 
well.236
CASE: PANAMA 
Panama’s leader, General Manuel Noriega, had a long history of inciting anti-U.S. 
sentiments in his nation.  He had harassed American military personnel stationed there 
for several years before the United States invaded his country.  The U.S. had 
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diplomatically forced Panama to hold democratic elections; when Noriega’s handpicked 
successor was defeated, however, the General assumed power as a dictator.  After one of 
his military leaders staged a failed coup attempt, the country suffered widespread unrest.  
As Noriega declared a state of war on 16 December 1989, a U.S. Marine officer was shot 
and killed at a roadblock.  The United States would invade just after midnight on 20 
December 1989, stating its objectives as “Safeguarding American lives, defending 
democracy in Panama, combating drug trafficking, and protecting the integrity of the 
Panama Canal Treaty.”  Strategically, the United States sought to stabilize the Third 
World as the cold war wound down.237  In terms of SOF, this operation was important in 
that it was USSOCOM’s first chance to show off its joint capability in a major campaign 
since its inception in 1987.
In terms of reaching its strategic objectives, and in terms of SOF helping to reach 
those objectives, the operation was greatly successful.  Importantly for the staying power 
of SOF, “Operations involved unprecedented coordination between conventional and 
special operations forces.”238  In the war plan, SOF were to be employed at night, 
quickly, efficiently, and violently.  Before the invasion, an Army SF team extracted an 
American from a Panamanian prison—this was an attempt to meet the policy objective of 
keeping Americans safe.239  Joint SOF teams are credited with collecting the intelligence 
key in successfully neutralizing 27 targets as the mission began and securing strategic 
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areas such as airfields.  Additionally, SOF teams helped to capture Noriega, though that 
effort was largely diplomatic.240
Most notable is the extent to which SOF helped to quickly resolve the conflict and 
then stabilize the nation.  “Within 72 hours of the outbreak of hostilities, all major 
combat operations ended.  U.S. forces quickly shifted over from the role of war fighters 
to that of peacekeepers.”241  Then, “After the operation, SOF language skills and regional 
expertise proved essential in the stability and later reconstruction operations.”242  The 
success of this operation, given its timing just six weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
was important in the message it sent to the unstable nations of the Third World.
CASE: SOMALIA
If the invasion of Panama helped the United States to stabilize and ally itself with 
the Third World, as well as set a high precedent for future interventions, Operation 
Deliver Hope in Somalia helped to destabilize Third World Africa, upset the American 
public, and set up a situation where African intervention was not possible as a policy 
option in the near future.  The failure of this special operation had horrible strategic 
consequences; though it achieved some tactical success, ignored elements of the basic 
LIC theory laid out above led the operation to a horrible strategic failure.
Somalia was a nation controlled by warlords.  The UN commissioned a U.S.-led 
peacekeeping force to stop these warlords from taking UN food shipments and 
blackmailing food for political support.  SOF were responsible for running operations in 
the country side, whereas conventional forces ran the operations in cities.  Peacekeeping 
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is mostly nonviolent243, and this peaceable operation was not working very well.  As 
such, the UN changed the role of the peacekeepers to peace enforcers, providing military 
forces of the now 21-nation coalition the ability to protect themselves by “all means 
necessary.”  By the middle months of 1993, there were 17,000 peace enforcers in 
Somalia.244
Mohammed Fara Aidid was the most powerful warlord in Somalia, and the Habr 
Gadr was his daunting militia.  Operating in the capital of Mogadishu, Aidid’s Habr Gadr 
killed 24 Pakistani soldiers; they then killed four American journalists and dragged their 
bodies through the streets.  The UN and U.S. had begun a large conventional campaign; 
that campaign was so large that it incited the perception among Somalis that they were 
under attack.245
Then, only after the conventional campaign was underway, did President 
Clinton’s new SecDef, Les Aspin, call for a joint special operations task force (JSOTF) 
assigned to carry out the high-risk, policy- intensive mission of snatching Aidid.  Due to 
the timing of this operation after the conventional campaign, it was impossible for the 
United States to maintain a low profile either among the media at home or among the 
people of Somalia.  The large conventional campaign had joined together an enemy 
willing to fight for their homeland.246
SOF were being used after a slow conventional campaign and their use 
clandestinely was essentially out of the question.  Thus, when a prisoner snatch from 3-4 
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October 1993 failed, it was no surprise.  Their post-conventional deployment mitigated 
the advantages that SOF presented in tactically fighting LIC.  18 American JSOTF 
members were killed, and some of their bodies were dragged through the streets for the 
American public to see on CNN; it was not very low-profile.
Generally, “Public intolerance of casualties radically constrains the government’s 
ability to use armed force effectively to defend national interests and to maintain a more 
peaceful world order.”247  Clandestine SOF can help the U.S. to reach these policy goals 
without needing to keep the public widely informed.  Thus, after the 18 soldiers died in 
Mogadishu, and their mutilated bodies were shown on CNN, public opinion forced 
President Clinton to withdraw U.S. forces from Somalia.248
The large conventional campaign incited the Habr Gadr militia to a combined 
form of violence.  The failure to spearhead the operation with the violent JSOTF in the 
first place, coupled with the capability of the militia and the American intolerance for 
casualties, led the United States to not be able to reach its Third World policy goals.  
More importantly, this would hinder future policy options.  Only a year later, the incident 
in Mogadishu was fresh in President Clinton’s mind as he failed to send any military 
coalition in an attempt to halt the genocide that killed over a million people in another 
African nation: Rwanda.  Clearly, it is imperative to U.S. low-level security strategy that 
SOF spearhead LICs.
CASE: GULF WAR
In spearheading the medium-intensity conflict in Iraq in 1991, SOF supported 
conventional victory and the U.S. policy of stabilizing the Middle East via 
247
 James Burk, “Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the Casualties 
Hypothesis,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 114, No. 1 (Spring, 1999), pp. 53-78.
248 Ibid., p. 54.
123
reconnaissance, diversion, and PSYOP missions.  SOF also took on a singular, high-risk, 
policy-intensive mission that widely secured the U.S. interest of Middle Eastern stability.  
After the war ended, Army Special Forces continued to help ensure stability, especially 
for Kuwait.  
Before the campaign began, all SOF elements operated to provide intelligence 
along the borders of Iraq with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.  As the conventional campaign 
began, SOF helped by providing real-time intelligence to conventional leaders in 
battle.249  Furthermore, Navy SEALs diverted large amounts of Iraqi regular forces.  
Iraqis thought an amphibious assault was looming; as such, Navy SEALs set charges in 
buoys in the water and snuck onto the beach to set up for an apparently amphibious 
landing.  The main assault came from the south and west, but this diversion brought two 
Iraqi divisions to the east, thereby eliminating their ability to defend the main assault.250
Additionally, “After the cease-fire, an Iraqi division commander stated that, next 
to coalition bombing campaigns, PSYOP was the greatest threat to his troops’ morale.”  
PSYOP campaigns encouraged mass surrender and desertion, and Iraqi forces’ actions 
show the effect that PSYOP had.251
The most strategically important mission of SOF in the fight itself was in locating 
Saddam Hussein’s Scud missiles.  Hussein had sent a few harmless Scuds into Israel in 
January 1991.  Aerial reconnaissance had trouble locating and destroying these missiles.  
“Although they inflicted little damage, the Scud attacks threatened to draw Israel into the 
ongoing Persian Gulf Conflict.  Any Israeli military action would have destroyed the 
249 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress (April, 1992), J-10, J-11.
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fragile Arab coalition that had been forged against Iraq.”252  It was reported that U.S. 
SOF helped to identify 29 of these Scud launchers behind enemy lines with the help of 
the British SAS.253  A Pentagon study would later say that SOF did not destroy this many 
missiles; it may not have achieved complete tactical success, but “The Scud-hunting 
campaign…ultimately dissuaded Israel from entering the Persian Gulf War, thereby 
meeting its key strategic objective of preserving the Arab coalition.”254
Finally, leading up to and following the war, Army Green Berets helped to 
maintain area stability by training and building up the Kuwaiti military.  They were the 
primary advisors to the Kuwaiti military at all levels.  “At the end of August, the 
Kuwaitis had less than two functional brigades.  By February, they had been reequipped 
and special forces teams had trained elements of six brigades.”255
Role 2: SOF Leading Mostly Nonviolent Campaigns
There are five reasons why SOF are helpful in promoting relatively nonviolent 
LICs.  First, “SOF are particularly adept at national assistance tasks that require cultural 
familiarity, linguistic skills, and a long-term commitment.”256  SOF are delicate and more 
adept at delicately understanding the sentiments of the people in the downtrodden nations 
that the U.S. intervenes in; this understanding becomes particularly important when the 
United States is making an attempt to speak without weapons.  Second, just as SOF are 
capable of quickly transitioning from a violent force to a peacekeeping force, they can 
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just as easily make the transition from peacekeepers to war fighters.  If the situation 
dictates quick military action, SOF are more adaptable than conventional forces.  Third, 
though the actions are “nonviolent,” security must still be established.  SOF are more 
likely to have the ability to abide by stringent rules of engagement while still maintaining 
security.  Fourth, these types of operations are generally associated with nation-building.  
The Army lists nine military tasks to support nation-building including, among others: 
coordinating coalitions, intelligence, and support for or with local and regional allies; 
commanding local armed forces; and providing operational security.  Army SF are the 
only group in the military capable in themselves of accomplishing all nine tasks.257  Fifth, 
intervening non-violently usually means the training of international forces, a job for 
which Army Green Berets are specifically tailored.
CASE: HAITI
The operations in Haiti, named Operation Uphold/Restore Democracy, largely 
utilized Army SF as they supported the international coalition and nation-building there.  
The intervention became necessary as the democratically-elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide 
was overthrown in a coup, causing a mass exodus of refugees to the Dominican Republic 
and United States.258  The operation there had three strategic objectives: “To restore 
democracy in Haiti; to eliminate the refugee problem; and to enhance the credibility of 
the U.S., the U.N., and the Organization of American States (OAS).”259  SF were vital in 
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preparing all of the multinational forces for missions and served as the main military 
advisors to all members of the multinational effort.260
At the outset, Army SF went into Haiti to establish security and did so with 
minimal bloodshed.  SF developed a relationship with Haitians that allowed them to 
move freely throughout the country and keep order; once they established security, SF 
changed to a different role (Rangers were used as a quick reaction security force once SF 
established initial security).  The most important of their missions came in supporting 
democracy and human rights—in other words, in directly supporting the nation-building 
mission.  “SF personnel gave civic lessons, held town meetings, and forced judges to 
preside over cases where suspects were being held without trial.”261
Role 3: The Acute Threat
The role of SOF in the Balkans, in large part, deals with their special form of aid 
to strategic bombing campaigns.  Beyond this role, Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 
1999 is a good tool for analysis of SOF on three levels: first, as an acute force escalator; 
second, as a bastion of neutrality in ethnic conflict; third, as promoters, specifically, of 
human rights.  All three of these require the application of SOF as a strategically acute 
threat.  A strategically acute military threat is defined here as one that can be tailored to 
meet specific policy objectives without extending the conflict to an undesirable level or 
compromising other strategic objectives.  In other words, a strategically acute military 
threat limits geopolitical collateral damage.
When SOF are used as acute escalators of force, they are a direct instrument of 
policy.  This is applicable on two levels.  First, “A state may undertake special operations 
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to control the intensity and scope of a conflict.”262  In this way, SOF serve as a middle 
ground of escalation between diplomacy and conventional attack, or (as was shown by 
Operation White Star in Laos in the late 1950s) lend military credence to diplomacy via 
low-level actions simultaneous to that diplomacy.  This aspect of the diplomatic role of 
SOF can be most candidly seen in the current war in Afghanistan; as such, the role will 
be discussed in the part of the chapter covering SOF’s role in the GWOT.  
Second, SOF can be used as the final instrument of policy following a larger 
campaign. “SOF may be employed to provide a very low ceiling of violence or perhaps to 
bring about the end of a crisis.”263 Strategically, this second type of acute escalation 
capability explains how SOF help to resolve ethnic conflict.  It would sound as if SOF 
used in this sense are not spearheading and thus doomed to the same failures as they were 
in Somalia in 1993.  As will be discussed later, SOF in this role are most often utilized 
after strategic air campaigns that have destroyed the morale of the opposing force; this is 
unlike Somalia where an unsuccessful conventional ground campaign only incited the 
fighting force.
Why SOF are good at dealing with ethnic conflict is simple.  Green Berets 
especially are good at infiltrating and understanding a culture and thus understanding an 
ethnicity’s grievances.  Second, in situations of ethnic oppression, after the ethnic 
cleanser has been stopped, SOF are responsible enough to make sure that the ethnically 
cleansed do not start another conflict.
Situations of ethnic conflict are oftentimes synonymous with human rights 
offenses.  SOF are particularly good at promoting human rights.  The motto of Army SF 
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is “De Oppresso Liber”—Latin for “Freedom from the Oppressor.”  In that light, all SF 
that deploy outside of the U.S. are extensively trained in the promotion of human rights.  
SOF in general stress human rights.  The commander of the U.S. Army Special 
Operations Command (USASOC) stated that “I can tell you that Special Forces soldiers 
will…continue to serve as the conscience and the example of lesser developed nations 
regarding human rights.”  This is true to the point that Army SF host other nations 
specifically for human rights training.264
CASE: KOSOVO
Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic entered Kosovo and began committing acts of 
ethnic cleansing, forcing the ethnic Albanian Muslims living in Kosovo (a large majority 
of the population) to become refugees in the bordering nations of Albania and 
Macedonia.  From March to June, 1999, the U.S. and NATO allies engaged in a major 
military strategic bombing campaign to stop Milosevic.    The U.S. sought three primary 
policy interests in the campaign: Ensuring the stability of Eastern Europe; Thwarting 
ethnic cleansing; and Ensuring NATO’s capability. 265
SOF would most importantly be on the ground well after June, 1999 in a well-
orchestrated campaign that highlighted their use as a direct tool of policy in conflict 
resolution.  Specifically here, they were acutely used to help meet the policy goal of 
conflict resolution in ethnic conflict.266  Diplomacy was a two-part endeavor in Kosovo. 
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Before Operation Allied Force began, there was an attempt to nonviolently end 
Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing; during and especially after the violent part of the campaign 
ended, “The diplomatic objective was to prevent the conflict from widening.”267  To this 
end, there was a need for “Force capabilities that can handle unexpected circumstances 
and threats across the full range of military options…for forces that are able to adapt and 
transition across diverse operations calling for combat, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, 
and humanitarian assistance.”268
Army SF would fit this bill perfectly.  Region-specific Green Beret operational 
units are referred to as A-teams, short for Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA).  In the 
Balkans, the bulk of the conflict resolution capability fell on ODA 563.  Ethnic 
Albanians, obviously, were not too happy after having been oppressed.  A guerilla group 
called the Kosovar Liberation Army (KLA) formed as a resistance to the Serbians. The 
downfall of Milosevic, coupled with the fact that SOF initially aided the KLA in training 
to help destroy certain Serbian ground targets269, could have created an environment 
permissive to Albanian backlash toward Serbians.  
As SOF are quickly adaptable to changing strategy, however, ODA 563 was 
utilized to meet the strategic objective of not allowing extension of the conflict.  The A-
team interdicted several train shipments of arms ands weapons caches in the mountains 
that were intended to end up in the hands of the KLA. Before and during Operation 
Allied Force, ODA 563 had been working to establish relationships in Albanian refugee 
missions carried out that are classically SOF missions; henceforth, it is necessary to rely on secondary 
sources in an attempt to succinctly extrapolate the role of SOF.
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camps and villages.  They were able to use these relationships, their understanding of 
subtle Kosovar cultural nuances (For instance, it is an insult to talk to Kosovar Muslim 
women; SF troops gathered intelligence from only males, no matter how young), and 
their experience with the KLA, as primary sources of intelligence in conducting and 
coordinating village raids on guerillas and weapons stores.270  ODA 563 helped to 
disallow extension of the conflict once the primary sustained violence of the air campaign 
was finished.
Role #4: Acute Strategic Extension
SOF were utilized in many LICs that were not directly linked to high policy.  
Winning the war on drugs, for instance, was a low-level policy objective in the 1990s.  
SOF could be utilized acutely under the guise of solely combating drug armies, or 
narcoguerillas.  Conventional intercession to stop the flow of drugs into the United States 
was widely criticized due to the regional political fallout caused by the obtuse nature of 
large-scale war fighting.271  SOF, a more delicate capability, can be precisely tailored to 
fight these types of specific conflicts without suffering political fallout.  Even more, 
because SOF can be trusted to follow strict ROEs, while fighting these tactically acute 
conflicts, the United States has been able to utilize clandestine SOF to subtly aid higher 
regional policy objectives.
CASE: COLOMBIA
In 1999, the Colombian Government announced “Plan Colombia,” a $7.5 billion 
effort whose specific goal was to cut the Colombian drug trade in half over five years.  
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The United States pledged $3.5 billion to this effort, as well as a significant contingent of 
SOF support.272  SOF had been operating in Colombia, however, throughout the 1990s. 
Though the specific plan was to limit the drug trade, SOF have helped to reach a number 
of larger strategic objectives.  
In Latin America, the United States has classically sought important regional 
policy goals.  “U.S. policy toward Latin America [has demonstrated] that the Panama 
Canal and the sea lanes connecting the east and west coasts of the continental United 
States must remain in U.S. or friendly hands.”273  In the past, that meant stopping extra-
continental powers from entering Latin America; since the end of the Cold War, 
however, that strategy has “Given way to countering non-territorial threats from ‘hostile’ 
or ‘disruptive’ hemispheric governments and political actors.”274
Concerning Colombia specifically, “The national interests at stake for the United 
States are central to our well-being as a society, to regional security and international 
order, and to the future of economic integration within a democratic framework for the 
Americas.”275 In Colombia, the drug trade is deeper than simply selling drugs for 
money—it is a political entity.  Political insurgents in Colombia defend the drug trade in 
return for financing; politically-motivated (Communist and Fascist) insurgent guerilla 
tactics give rise to self-defense paramilitary groups.  Hence, combating drug-defending 
guerillas “Is nothing less than a grand strategy for remaking Columbia into a dignified 
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and stable democracy…that will not succeed unless there is a security shield.”276  At any 
time, between 300-500 SOF are in Colombia to meet the national security concerns 
produced by the drug war.  A higher force presence than this would give too much 
traction to political insurgents.  Army SF operate in advising and training the Colombian 
military to combat guerillas.  Additionally, SOF helicopters are used in combat 
missions.277  CIA operatives and elite military task forces attack the drug trade from the 
top down in widely assisting in attempts to capture and kill drug kingpins that run the 
destabilizing cartels.278  SOF are used to specifically combat a drug trade in Colombia; 
while doing so they are fighting an enemy that “Produces adverse social effects that 
undermine the sovereignty, democracy, stability, well-being, and security of all the 
countries of the Western Hemisphere.”279  Hence, SOF are delicately escalating the 
strategic importance of the conflict as they help attain several policy objectives beyond 
just stopping the drug trade. 
Role #5: In Support of Strategic Bombing
The Gulf War showed a continued tradition of strategic aerial bombing in support 
of medium-intensity conflict.  Through the 1990s, strategic bombing in LIC became a 
primary tool of American policymakers.  This was so for several specific reasons, but the 
basic assumption that led to strategic change is that aerial bombing began to be seen as a 
tool of coercion, or “A threat to inflict pain on the target if the target does not accede to a 
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demand”280 even in situations of low-level intervention.  The use of this type of strategic 
bombing in both types of conflict increased exponentially in the 1990s for two empirical 
reasons: Unbelievable technological advances in precision-guided munitions decreased 
collateral damage; and Not using ground forces caused a large decrease in U.S. and allied 
casualties that Washington was largely unwilling to stomach.281
CASES: GULF WAR AND KOSOVO
 In the 1990s and into the present, air power and SOF became very appealing to 
U.S. strategists.  “To put it succinctly: Air Power + Special Operations Forces + Local 
Proxies = Low-Risk Win.  That has been the increasingly clear message of the last 
decade”282  That is a formula that the Unites States put to use in reaching its objectives in 
Iraq in 1991 and Kosovo in 1999.  In Iraq, frequent bombings helped the United States by 
ruining Iraq’s infrastructure and accomplishing high policy objectives without risking 
ground forces.  In Kosovo, there was much debate over whether the U.S.-led coalition 
employed the proper scheme of coercively bombing.283  Despite the argument over its 
proper use, coercive strategic bombing was U.S. policy in Kosovo and it did compel 
Milosevic to withdraw Serbian forces from the region at the cost of not a single NATO or 
U.S. life.284  In both of these campaigns, SOF played a vital role in strategic bombing in 
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four ways: Target reconnaissance and assessment; Destruction of enemy air defenses; 
Securing people on the ground; and Combat Search and Rescue.
Over the last few years, just watching television (the “Shock and Awe” campaign 
over Baghdad) is enough to inform the viewer that Americans begin wars by bombing its 
enemy aerially.  Before that happens, SOF provide reconnaissance for and mark targets 
for the bomber pilots and strategists who choose targets, and  use their unique clandestine 
abilities to go behind enemy lines and help destroy their air defenses.  
Aerial reconnaissance is often useful, but it is not completely reliable.  SOF are 
used to fill in aerial and satellite intelligence gaps.  In Iraq,  “U.S. special operations 
before and during the Persian Gulf War included missions along the Kuwait-Saudi border 
and deep inside Iraq to fill in the intelligence gaps”  left by reconnaissance satellites and 
aircraft.285 In Kosovo, British and American SOF embedded with KLA forces in Albania 
“Provided NATO aircraft with targeting data.”286
These same forces in Kosovo helped to destroy strategic Serbian air defenses.287
SOF operated to a larger effect in destroying Iraqi air defenses in 1991. Low-flying Air 
Force SOF helicopters flew underneath Iraqi radar to destroy key Iraqi radar sites on the 
Saudi-Iraqi border.288
One flaw of coercive air power is that it cannot coerce by itself and that, once it 
does coerce, air power cannot be used to solve a power vacuum; in other words, a 
strategically successful air campaign is contingent upon the ability of other forces to 
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control the situation on the ground.289  To a certain extent, then, the flaw is manifest by 
its success: a good strategic bombing campaign, especially in terms of humanitarian 
intervention, will leave a power vacuum as it unseats an unsavory leader or political 
group.  As discussed in the section solely devoted to Operation Allied Force, Army SF 
have a unique ability to help in ethnic conflict resolution.  This is especially true in the 
power vacuum left by a successful strategic bombing campaign.
Finally, Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)—the rescuing of downed pilots and 
a role attributed to SOF, usually Air Force commandos—is an important factor in 
strategic bombing campaigns.  The pilot, in these situations, becomes the hand of 
American policy; and, surely, there is a large amount of utility in making sure that hand is 
steady.  Operationally, the rate of success of CSAR missions is minimal.  In the Gulf 
War, for example, only three of the seven attempted CSAR missions were successful.290
Psychologically, however, there can be great effect.  First, pilots operate more effectively 
when they know a rescue will be attempted should they crash.  Second, strategic bombing 
can be sold to the American public because it limits casualties; at least the appearance 
that everything is done to save U.S. troops is helpful in keeping public opinion 
favorable.291
Part Two: Coalescing SOF Capabilities 
The events of 11 September 2001 vastly changed the security situation of the 
United States and changed the strategic nature of SOF.  One of the low-level threats that 
SOF had been created to counter became the primary security threat to the United States.  
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SOF would innovate to become the most widely-used U.S. capability to combat the 
terrorist threat. 
The first section in this part of the chapter outlines and defines what the modern 
terrorist threat is and why it is paramount in American security strategy in order to 
establish a framework for why SOF are used in combating it.  The second section will 
explain the innovations that SOF has undergone and plans to undergo in order to combat 
terrorism.  Finally, the third section explains how the United States has used these 
changes in SOF to combat terrorism.
Defining the Threat
The character of the modern terrorist threat dictates the use of SOF against it.  
Several characteristics make this so.  It is a threat that uses the United States’ extended 
presence in globalization as a weapon to recruit and execute attacks against the U.S.; It is 
motivated by religion and geopolitics and also thrives on impoverished and 
underdeveloped societies; It uses tactically and strategically sound weapons; It is 
supported by a complex financial structure and well-organized in autonomous cells that 
loosely follow the ideology of important leaders while at the same time making it 
difficult to capture many terrorists at once.  There is a significant amount of overlap 
among the nature of all of these characterizations—specifically in the way terrorists use 
globalization to their benefit on many levels.
(1) The more global presence the United States shows, the easier it is for terrorists 
to attack American interests and the more traction they gain in recruiting members to 
their ideology.  In history, terrorism was always done against empires and colonial 
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powers.  More recently, it usually targets US-led globalization;292 it has usually picked
the easiest target.  In the modern context, globalization has allowed terrorists to attack US 
interests abroad.  The vast reach of the media and of internet technology—the technology 
that fuels globalization—has aided terrorist groups in their goal of instilling fear.293
Tools like e-mail improve communication.  Tools like Al -Jazeera increase sympathy 
among targeted groups.  Tools like CNN and internet news providers allow carnage to 
instill fear in vast audiences.  This is the most rational way to attack Americans: it draws 
attention but does not always lead to immediate military intervention by greater military 
powers.
Additionally, part of globalization is a vast urbanization of both developed and 
developing nations.  This has a two-fold effect utilized by terrorists.  First, terrorists have 
a higher concentration of targets.294  Second, when Western powers do intervene to stop 
terrorists conventionally, specifically in the Middle East, it leads to urban warfare.  Urban 
warfare mitigates the advantage of more advanced and larger militaries, it ensures that 
more westerners are killed, and most importantly, it ensures that interventions are long 
and exhaustive.  The longer an outside state occupies a land, the more hate can be 
directed toward it and the easier it is for terrorist groups to garner sympathy.
This last aspect hints at the most important strategic aspect of the modern terrorist 
vis-à-vis globalization—the “brinksmanship” model.  This is a paradoxical tool of 
terrorist coercion.  By this model, low-level threats can challenge U.S. or Western 
interests abroad or at home, thereby inducing either the threat of intervention or 
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intervention itself.  When this threat or intervention occurs, terrorists groups are able to 
garner support by appealing to sentiments of anti-Western grievances (grievances 
heightened by the extension of America in a globalized world).  This sentiment is 
coupled with an appeal to heightened feelings of Arab nationalism and Islamic fanaticism 
against the West.  In the end, terrorists use low-level threats to provoke intervention or 
the threat thereof, hence producing more anti-Western sentiment and gaining ideological 
traction.295
(2) It is motivated by religion, poverty, and geopolitics and, under the framework 
of globalization, all three motivations work together in framing the highly complex 
terrorist ideology in the modern world.  Neither poverty, religion, nor politics provide 
necessary causes for terrorism, but all three, understood in terms of globalization, create 
an environment permissive to terrorist activity.   It is a highly complex relationship that is 
difficult to succinctly explain, but the strategic effects of the interplay between all three 
motivations are gravely clear.  
 Terrorist organizations can manipulate globalization not only to help serve 
strategic militant purposes, but also to manipulate attitudes of people in the Middle East 
and other areas of high terrorist activities.  “Al-Qaeda…is able to do so much harm 
because of the secondary support and sanctuary it receives in vast areas that have not 
experienced the …benefits of globalization.”296  By fighting the war versus the West, 
terrorist groups are able to curry favor with the peoples of these nations by presenting the 
absolute disparity between the haves (West) versus the have-nots (the people of 
developing nations).  In framing the contradiction so starkly, terrorist groups purposely 
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allow hate for the West to fester.297  Modern technology and western influences abroad 
allow this message to sink in.
The religious ideology of the Muslim world puts America in a horrible strategic 
position.  Islam dictates a theocratic government, so Islam and politics are inextricably 
linked.  If America intervenes to provide democracy, it can be labeled as a Western 
institution; it thus provides more fodder for political-minded Arab nationalists.  
“Religious terrorists are, by their very nature, largely motivated by religion, but they are 
also driven by day-to-day practical political considerations within their context-specific 
environment.”  Hence, it is impossible to separate the political and religious motivations 
of terrorists.298
Also, religion allows terrorist strategists to have an important “diplomatic” 
advantage.  Islamist terrorists like Osama bin Laden have religious grievances with both 
apostates (pro-Western Islamic nations) and idolaters (non-Islamic nations), and only 
support “properly” Islamic nations.  In this light, people like bin Laden are able to 
publicly frame U.S. politico-military action as they see fit.  As the U.S. maintains a 
military presence in Saudi Arabia for political reasons, terrorists can say the United States 
is aiding what is an apostate nation in Saudi Arabia that is a geopolitical danger as it is 
positioned in the Middle East.  If the United States intervenes in an Islamist nation, bin 
Laden can say that the U.S. possesses an anti-Arab, anti-Islamic political ideology.  
When the United States does not intervene in areas like Indonesia or Chechnya, where 
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Muslims are being killed, bin Laden can frame this geo-political action a “Willingness to 
tolerate, or even inflict, Muslim deaths.”299
These religious-politically motivated sentiments become entangled with 
sentiments of disenfranchisement spawned by the poverty that is so prevalent in parts of 
the world where the Islamic-political complex exists.  This dangerous triumvirate cocktail 
provides a situation where the United States becomes strategically and ideologically 
damned by any action or inaction alike.
(3) It uses tactically and strategically sound weapons.  Suicide terrorism is at the 
height of terrorist escalation.  Terrorism has three levels: demonstrative, destructive, and 
suicide.  After the terrorists have attempted to convey their message by appealing to 
others, suicide terrorism is the final limit.  It is the mechanism by which the terrorist 
strategists use coercion as a tool.  “The record of suicide terrorism from 1980 to 2001 
exhibits tendencies in the timing, goals, and targets of attack that are consistent with this 
strategic logic but not with irrational or fanatical behavior.”300
In that light, then, suicide terrorism has worked as a coercive tool.  According to 
Robert A. Pape, out of eleven suicide terrorist campaigns from 1980-2000, six of them 
were at least somewhat successful in reaching their strategic goals.  Being somewhat 
successful in a campaign is based on the willingness of the opponent to be coerced.301
The only way to deal with suicide terrorism, then, is to hit it head-on.  The West, 
in the current context, will not give in to it.  This means that even if their ultimate goal of 
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political coercion is not reached, terrorist groups still reach some strategic advantage 
under the “brinksmanship” model.
From a tactical standpoint, the suicide terrorist is a great weapon.  It is impossible 
to forget that terrorist soldiers are skilled enough to fly planes into three national 
landmarks on U.S. soil—one of which is the home of the U.S. defense bureaucracy; and 
kill thousands of innocent Americans.  In a broader sense, by the time a group reaches the 
point of suicide terrorism, “The victims or objects of terrorist attack have little intrinsic 
value…but represent a larger human audience whose reaction the terrorists seek.”302  The 
greater the amount of death, the more fear incited and the larger the audience that will see 
the carnage in the media.  If the suicide terrorist is on a bus, and that bus empties before 
he blows up, he can just move to the crowded coffee shop.  A Scud missile does not have 
that capability.  Ultimately, then, because of the rationality of the suicide terrorist—that 
is, his commitment to carry out the strategic objective of instilling fear through mass loss 
of life—the suicide terrorist is the most dangerous weapon of the terrorist organization.
Additionally, as terrorists groups become more prominent, they are able to 
technologically innovate. With more money and more personnel, they can gather new 
means of fighting, as well as sustain long-lasting campaigns, not just singular attacks.303
(4) It is supported by a complex financial structure and well-organized in 
autonomous cells that loosely follow the ideology of important leaders while at the same 
time making it difficult to capture many terrorists at once.  Terrorist groups use the 
technology available from globalization to their advantage in this sense.  The internet 
specifically has allowed terrorist groups to act with relative security.  Using the internet 
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and new tools of communication, terrorist groups are able to act in cells.  Should its 
enemies defeat one small cell, it is extremely difficult to find a link to the actual planner 
of the terrorist act.  Using websites and the media as a whole, terrorist leadership is able 
to set up a highly complicated network whereby “Small cells and individuals are inspired 
to take action on their own.”304  Despite the disjointed nature of their organization, 
terrorist groups are still unified under and motivated by an Islamist ideology.305  Because 
of the disjointed nature of their organization, it is difficult to fight many different cells at 
once that operate alone and ignorant of one another.
In thinking of modern terrorists networks as a business, it is likewise difficult to 
track the sources of their financial backing.  “It has become a vast enterprise—an 
international movement or franchise operation with like-minded local representatives, 
loosely connected to a central ideological or motivational base, but advancing their 
common goal independently of one another.”306
Strategically, the terrorist groups are a disjointed but global threat.  As of 2004, it 
was projected that 18,000 terrorists trained in camps in Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. 
Today those “soldiers” are positioned in as many as 60 nations worldwide.307
The Changing Role of SOF
Between 2001 and the present, the SOF capability has been immensely changed 
in order to defeat the terrorist threat.  It has quietly become a primary military tool of 
U.S. security strategy.  The 2004 Unified Command Plan officially designated that 
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USSOCOM had the lead in the GWOT.308  As one Congressman put it, “Their role has 
moved from the tip of the spear to the entire thing.”309  It is with strategic special 
operations that the United States currently envisions winning the GWOT.   
Several changes have taken place to solidify the role of SOF as paramount in U.S. 
security strategy.  There are two major thematic, doctrinal changes: SOF have moved 
from a purely responsive capability to a partially preventive, partially responsive 
capability; and SOF have unified their mission under the GWOT.  Five empirical changes 
have happened or are presently happening to support the thematic innovation.  SOF have 
tried to do away with ad hoc task forces; USSOCOM has moved from a supporting
combatant command to a supported combatant command310; SOF personnel have 
increased in number; SOF funding has increased; and SOF power has extended into 
civilian bureaucracies, especially the intelligence bureaucracy.311
The terrorist threat is a serious one.  No other enemy has been able to attack 
America’s homeland and, in doing so, kill thousands of civilians, destroy symbols of the 
United States’ economic freedom, and mangle its military headquarters.  U.S. security 
policy reflects this gravity.  The opening lines of the 2006 National Security Strategy
read:
America is at war.  This is a wartime national security strategy required by the grave challenge we 
face—the rise of terrorism fueled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder, fully revealed 
to the American people on September 11, 2001.  This strategy reflects our most solemn obligation:
to protect the security of the American people.312
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Fighting terrorism, as the strategy goes on to say, cannot be done by attacking terrorist 
cells alone.
America also has an unprecedented opportunity to lay the foundations for future peace.  The ideals 
that have inspired our history—freedom, democracy, and human dignity—are increasingly 
inspiring individuals and nations throughout the world.  And because free nations tend toward 
peace, the advance of liberty will make America more secure.
These inseparable priorities—fighting and winning the war on terror and promoting freedom as 
the alternative to tyranny and despair—have now guided American policy for more than 4 
years.313
The language used in the National Security Strategy that deals with fighting the war on 
terrorism is the same type of language used concerning America’s LIC policy throughout 
the 1990s.
In the period where SOF were at the forefront of American LICs, the capability 
maintained a varied focus by spearheading and supporting the conventional military in 
many types of American interventions.  The war on terrorism has coalesced those many 
capabilities into the singular focus of leading and winning the GWOT, and that focus has 
been expressed in SOF doctrine.  The 2006 United States Special Operations Command 
Mission states, in its entirety:
USSOCOM leads, plans, synchronizes and as directed, executes global missions against terrorist 
networks.  USSOCOM trains, organizes, equips and deploys combat ready special operations 
forces to combatant commands.314
The role of SOF is to lead the global network of U.S. regional combatant commands in 
fighting the GWOT.  As outlined in the National Security Strategy, the ability of SOF to 
do so is based upon its skills in nation-building, freedom-spreading, and human rights 
promotion.  SOF engaged in all of these missions in the 1990s; the mission is not new—
rather, it is simply unified under one goal paramount to U.S. security strategy.
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The second major thematic change for SOF in this time period has been the move 
to a partially preventive capability.  All of the campaigns discussed in the 1990s dealt 
with situations where the United States decided to respond to pre-existent threats.  SOF 
were responsive.  Special operations have always been deterrent in exemplum.315  In other 
words, if a dictator (like General Noriega) begins denying human rights to his people, and 
SOF lead the way in an intervention to topple that dictator, then a successful intervention 
has the theoretically in exemplum deterrent capability of coercing other nations like the 
one invaded (Panama, in this case) to grant its people human rights.
As will be explained later, one of the largest roles of SOF in the GWOT comes in 
breaking vast networks of terrorist support globally.  As SOF attempt to cultivate 
freedom and human rights in terrorist-permissive societies, the hope is to prevent future 
terrorist attacks.  The USSOCOM Command Vision lays out what is the “end state” that 
SOF hope to achieve in their current mission.  The closing sentence of that document 
reads that SOF ought to be, in the end, “Leading the Global War on Terrorism, 
accomplishing strategic objectives of the United States.”316  SOF are inextricably linked 
to U.S. strategy by the GWOT.  Reflecting the National Security Strategy, the strategic 
aim of SOF is to prevent terrorist acts before more Americans die.  Though it is part of 
the mission, SOF do not simply hunt and kill terrorists post facto.  Unlike the role of SOF 
in LICs in the 1990s, as President Bush writes, “We have kept on the offensive against 
our enemy.”317  Unlike the previous security situation, the GWOT has dictated an 
offensive policy from Washington, aiming SOF at preventing future terrorist strikes.
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In order to accomplish these major strategic innovations, SOF have undergone the 
following five empirical changes.  
(1) In realizing lessons from history and early on in the GWOT, SOF have tried to 
do away with ad hoc task forces.  A current “SOF Truth” is that “Competent SOF cannot 
be created after emergencies occur.”318  In order to stop terrorists before they act, SOF do 
not responsively innovate, but proactively plan.    
(2) USSOCOM has moved from a supporting combatant command to a supported
combatant command.  The shift is one “From a force provider [to other combatant 
commands] to a combatant command with global responsibilities leading the War on 
Terrorism.”319  USSOCOM now draws resources from other combatant commands as it 
fights a borderless war. 
(3) SOF personnel have and will continue to increase in number.  The Department 
of Defense has tasked USSOCOM with increasing its Army SF, Civil Affairs, and 
PSYOP personnel by 33% by 2007.  Additionally, a Marines Special Operations 
Command (MARSOC), signifying the first Marines under USSOCOM, was formed, and 
will add 2,600 fighters with many special operations capabilities.320
(4) SOF funding has and will continue to increase.  Since 2001, there has been an 
81% growth in the SOF budget, and that is projected to continue to grow at an even 
higher rate.  This is in order to match the increased strategic importance of SOF since 
2001.321
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(5) SOF power has extended into civilian bureaucracies, especially the 
intelligence bureaucracy.  From 2002 to the present, there has been significant funding 
“Dedicated to improvements in SOF intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), 
organic human intelligence and technical capabilities.”322  Military Liaison Elements 
(MLEs), for instance, are small SOF units that reportedly work out of U.S. embassies in 
foreign nations to help gather intelligence on terrorism and then use that intelligence to 
prevent terrorist acts, and may be able to do so without explicit support of U.S. envoys to 
that nation.323
SOF in the War on Terrorism: Why and How?
The terrorist threat has been established and changes made in the SOF capability 
that respond to that threat have been discussed.  Special operations have been recognized 
as the primary tool of U.S. strategy in the GWOT.  Two questions remain: why do SOF 
now have the lead in the GWOT and how have SOF been utilized in U.S. security 
strategy (and likewise, how are they planning to be used) in fighting this global war in 
lieu of and in conjunction with conventional forces?  Those two questions will be 
answered together in ten ways.
(1) SOF are easily and quickly adaptable to a changing security situation.  It was 
and is difficult for the conventional military to innovate itself quickly and effectively to 
prevent an asymmetric terrorist threat.  Unlike the conventional military, SOF have 
proven to be quickly adaptable to a security situation that quickly altered after 11 
September 2001.  
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The variety of possible strategies and military missions are without practical limit.  For this 
reason, the variety of special operations possibilities ought to be regarded favorably by defense 
planners, especially in a world of rapid-paced change and novel security challenges. The readiness 
of special operations to execute military missions vital to the state, and their ability to serve 
directly and indirectly the will of the political leadership in nearly every conceivable 
politicomilitary context, underlie the unique dimension of special operations forces…The fact that 
special operations forces can perform multiple missions on any level of a conflict increases the 
likelihood that special operations will be relevant to a commander’s particular military strategy.324
(2) As the United States has realized that conventional nation-building does not 
work, the role of SOF in fighting the GWOT has rapidly grown.  A change in the 
language describing the strategic role of SOF from 2000 to 2006 reflects this growth.  A 
special operations/LIC symposium held in 2000 acknowledged that SOF should have a 
proactive role in combating terrorism.  Realistically, however, the focus of that meeting 
was that SOF should continue to prepare to fight post-cold war LICs—in other words, 
SOF should have maintained a role in US strategy similar to the one it had through the 
1990s and planned to fight large-scale threats via technological innovations structured 
congruent with conventional technical military innovations.  There was little focus on 
fighting a long-term war on terrorism.325  SOF doctrine statements likewise did not speak 
of any war on terror or of supporting that war, but similarly focused on continuing to 
innovate to combat normal low-level threats.326
Immediately after the terrorist strike in 2001, the United States took on a strategy 
of large-scale, conventional nation-building in the latter part of the assault in Afghanistan 
and the war in Iraq.  The role of SOF was at first limited to supporting conventional 
combatant commands in the GWOT.  Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s words 
suggest that the entire military, conventional capabilities included, should have changed 
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to fight the GWOT.  Though acknowledging the success SOF had in the early stages of 
the war in Afghanistan, he went on to say that “Now is the time to change our armed 
forces…wars in the twenty-first century will increasingly require all elements of national 
power.”  The words suggest that the entire military should have prepared to fight the 
many-fronted GWOT, girding to engage in nation-building in several underdeveloped 
and developing nations.327  The Pentagon had not yet figured out how to use its most elite 
troops in fighting this type of war.328
The war in Iraq, since the insurgency began, has shown that the conventional 
military is not capable of the quick reform necessary to win a battle of hearts and minds; 
and that insurgency has bogged down the large-scale military.  The 2004 Unified 
Command Plan promptly stated that USSOCOM was to be the leading combatant 
command in the GWOT329—SOF were moved to the forefront of U.S. security strategy.
(3) The low-level presence of SOF helps solve the “brinksmanship” model of 
terrorist diplomacy.  SOF inherently produce less collateral damage than conventional 
forces.  Special operations are quieter than conventional operations.  It is necessary to be 
offensive to counter terrorism; employing SOF allows U.S. policy makers to enjoy the 
strategic benefits of combating terrorists without the strategic fallout of openly 
intervening in Islamic nations.  In other words, the United States can attack terrorists 
without terrorist leaders accusing the United States of being a “Blasphemous military 
presence”330 and thereby garnering increased anti-American sentiment.  The clandestine 
and ambiguous nature of SOF allows the United States to define its own diplomacy, 
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rather than allowing people like Osama bin Laden to define our strategic actions to the 
Islamic world.
(4) SOF allow for increased diplomatic success in the GWOT.  As they have been 
used historically, SOF can act as a mid-level force escalator in between purely diplomatic 
and large-scale conventional military action.  They allow for an operationally successful 
force projection that does not necessarily ruin attempts at diplomatic nation-building.  
Furthermore, in the context of the GWOT, SOF can conduct their own diplomacy 
in offering both carrots and sticks in an attempt to coerce terrorists.  SOF offer carrots as 
they grant human rights and unforeseeable freedoms to people that usually support 
terrorists and sticks in harshly but quietly killing terrorists.331  The relatively quiet nature 
of this force presence allows for increased cooperation with other nations in combating 
terrorism while at the same time not compromising operational success.  In preventing 
the emergence of more terrorism, the goal of SOF is to internally transform nations 
without making the source of that transformation widely known.  The “[SOF] goal is to 
make local conditions untenable for terrorists through local focused engagement with 
like-minded nations to address the conditions that allow terrorism to emerge.”  As these 
conditions change, SOF  “Allow populations misinformed by censorship or other 
impediments to hear the truth, which is our most valuable tool.”332  The truth will sway 
disenfranchised populations away from pro-terrorist Islamist sentiments.    Most 
importantly, then, the United States hopes that the SOF capability allows leaders in the 
Middle East to have a greater opportunity to combat terrorism without openly 
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cooperating with the United States and thereby losing their Muslim base to anti- Western 
Islamist factions.
(5) SOF can combat terrorism on all levels, and are thereby the only logical 
response to the threat.  Conventional forces represent an asymmetric response to 
terrorism, whereas SOF, utilizing unconventional warfare for prevention, and classical 
anti-terrorist direct action roles, offer a multi -level symmetric response.333  SOF have the 
ability to simultaneously conduct the war from the bottom up via proactive 
unconventional warfare—or winning hearts and minds and peeling away the layers of 
terrorist support; and conduct the war from the top down via direct action responsive to 
quickly actionable intelligence.
“The goal of Unconventional Warfare is to help win a war by working with—as 
opposed to neutralizing or fighting around—local populations…it demands that efforts at 
all levels—strategic, tactical, and operational—be coordinated.”334  From the outset of the 
war in Afghanistan through its first democratic elections and into the present, Army SF 
and other SOF personnel have infiltrated a disenfranchised society in order to give its 
people a sense of true entitlement.  As the impoverished are influenced to tend away from 
terrorist Islamism, layers of terrorist support and funding and safe grounds on which 
terrorists have been able to train in the past are stripped away, and terrorism is prevented.  
There is an additional sense of democratic nationalism given to the disenfranchised as 
SOF fight with indigenous forces that is strategically important to the United States—
terrorists become an adversary of the very people they hope to recruit.
The responsive part of the fight involves fighting from the top down.  SOF place a 
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large emphasis on special reconnaissance to collect good, actionable intelligence, and a 
direct action capability that allows for effective terrorist-hunting missions to be carried 
out based on this intelligence.  This is a capability only possible given the advanced 
technology and joint nature of SOF.  
Here is one example of this type of operation. In 2003, a Predator surveillance 
drone being run by an SOF team captured intelligence that an important terrorist leader 
was on the move in Afghanistan.  Within minutes, a high-ranking SOF officer, U.S. Navy 
Captain Robert Harward, received notice of this, and gave the immediate go-ahead on a 
direct action mission to capture the terrorist.  Within 30 minutes a plan was set, and 
within another 30 minutes, Mullah Khairullah Kahirkhawa, an important Taliban leader, 
was captured.  The entire mission utilized Army, Air Force, Navy, and even Danish 
SOF.335  Only an effective unconventional campaign can ultimately prevent terrorism, but 
the strategic hope of these types of rapid and violent missions is to deter terrorists by 
making an example of some of them. 
(6) Only a complex force can handle fighting a war on so many levels.  The 
disjointed, complex, and somewhat unitary nature of small, solider-centric SOF joint task 
forces allow the U.S. to offer a symmetric response to cell-oriented, unitary terrorist 
groups.  One of the current “SOF Truths” is that “Humans are more important than 
hardware.”336  Reflecting this reliance on complex warriors as their greatest weapon, SOF 
have changed training to ensure that each war-fighter can be used as a multi- faceted tool 
of U.S. strategy.  Before the GWOT, for instance, certain Army SF focused on special 
reconnaissance, some on direct action, and some on unconventional warfare.  Now, Army 
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SF are trained to be equally skilled in all three missions integral to winning the 
GWOT.337
(7) Only USSOCOM has the organizational ability to properly fight a long-term, 
global, and multi-front war that requires rapid deployment. SOF can be precisely tailored 
to fight a large-scale global war while still focusing on transformation on the local level.  
USSOCOM has pledged to fight a long-term war against terrorism, and has doctrinally 
tried to stop the use of ad hoc special operations, as it constantly tries to prepare for the 
future.  In ensuring that its interventions in the GWOT are meaningful, however, 
USSOCOM has insisted that it will no longer deploy “Any place, any time,” but that it 
will be poised with a “Presence for purpose…to be at the right place, at the right time, 
facing the right adversary.”338  SOF, in other words, will maintain a general focus on 
winning the war on terrorism globally with a more acute focus on making strategically 
imperative local environments un-permissive to terrorism.  
The nations SOF enters may not always be friendly ones; because “The battle 
may take place in an unfriendly foreign country, transporting a regular unit with the huge 
amount of support services it requires may simply not be politically possible.”339
Moreover, conventional nation-building has led to fighting a war that is limited to a 
purely local focus; after the experience in Iraq, the conventional military will not be able 
to fight many long-term battles to win hearts and minds.  That role will fall on SOF, and 
USSOCOM has planned for it.
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This role also calls for a rapidly deployable and adaptable force.  The 
conventional military can take months to prepare itself for a specific deployment.  Only 
USSOCOM has the ability to quickly extend its forces throughout the world.  Once those 
forces are extended, SOF have a unique ability to adapt their mission focus to meet local 
strategic requirements.  As SOF continue to be well-funded, the force will be able to 
innovate and adapt as quickly, if not quicker, than a constantly-morphing terrorist 
threat.340
(7) The GWOT will be a long war.  SOF are able to gird themselves for and 
undertake this long-term strategic necessity without public opinion opposing their long-
term, global deployment.  The American public knows how many soldiers are dying in 
Iraq; it is largely unaware of special operators risking their lives in the Philippines and 
Indonesia.
(8) As SOF offensively and globally engage the enemy on his own ground, 
special operations have the ability to deflect attacks carried out on American soil like 
they were on 11 September 2001.  The theory is simple.  If the enemy is engaged 
wherever it exists, it is much harder for him to attack our home while his “home” is under 
fire. 
(9) SOF are better at urban warfare than conventional forces.  The terrorist enemy 
has an advantage in fighting urban warfare against conventional forces and attempts to 
mitigate the technological advantage that American forces have by forcing them to fight 
door-to-door.  “Conventional forces are designed for battlefields not peacetime urban 
situations in which force must be applied with almost surgical care.”341
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(10) Increased bureaucratic autonomy has helped SOF to be congruently 
adaptable to the terrorist threat; the ferocity of the bureaucratic fight against this 
extension of power is somewhat quelled by the relatively high capacity for interagency 
operability that SOF possess.  SOF have received more leeway to carry out covert 
actions342; and it has been suggested by the 9/11 Commission Report that SOF take over 
paramilitary operations from the CIA.343  Finally, SOF have a growing role in collecting 
intelligence as they become deployed more globally.  The ease and rapidity with which 
SOF can take on these extra tasks is a testament to their small size and the championing 
of their cause by the Department of Defense.  Because SOF are so easily controlled, the 
Department of Defense can simply assign extra tasks to SOF, rather than going through 
the long and arduous process of making these changes doctrinal.
All of these reasons, taken together, seem to make a strong case for the utility of 
SOF in the GWOT.  For all the planning and talk the Department of Defense has 
undertaken surrounding the expanded strategic role of SOF, the long war in Iraq is a drain 
on the implementation of those plans.
The original war in Afghanistan shows the influential role that SOF can have in 
U.S. strategy by fighting alone the GWOT.  Within a month or so, about 300 American 
SOF were credited with taking out the Taliban regime344 and beginning to establish an 
environment in which terrorism could not emerge in the future.  It would seem that this 
sort of operation is indicative of what USSOCOM has prepared to do in leading the 
GWOT.
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The lengthy American intervention in Iraq, however, and to some extent that in 
Afghanistan, has forced USSOCOM to have both “short-term” and “long-term” goals.  
Because of the failure to plan for an insurgency, Iraq is now highly unstable.  
Consequently, “Instrumental in achieving [the short-term anti-terrorist objectives] is the 
creation of stability within Iraq and Afghanistan.”345
Thus, the “global” part of the “Global War on Terrorism” is relegated to a long-
term goal.  
On average in 2005, more than 85 percent of deployed SOF was in Central Command’s area of 
responsibility, leaving few special operators to pursue long-term operations in other areas such as 
the Philippines and the Trans Sahara region of Africa.  Ultimately we have to be victorious in 
Afghanistan and Iraq to defeat terrorism, but the Global War on Terrorism will not be won in just 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  Beyond these immediate conflicts lies the long-term fight.346
Beyond simply delaying the SOF-led GWOT, the failure in Iraq has allowed terrorist 
leaders to successfully engage in “brinksmanship” diplomacy, as the amount of collateral 
damage inflicted on Muslims in Iraq is growing daily, and the visibility of the force there 
is high.  This makes the job that SOF must do in the future even more difficult.
As of now, SOF are forced to primarily focus on the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, no matter what most the Department of Defense is planning for.  Despite 
this, SOF are successfully extending force against terrorism in several other nations, and 
are the only type of force spreading U.S. security strategy outside of Afghanistan and 
Iraq.  SOF have waged a successful unconventional warfare and direct action campaign 
in the Philippines against Islamist insurgents in that country.347  In addition to the fight 
there, SOF are recognized as having a presence in Senegal, Niger, Chad, Mali, 
345
 United States Special Operations Command, Posture Statement 2006, p. 3.
346 Ibid., p. 5.
347
 Robert Kaplan, “Imperial Grunts,” The Atlantic Monthly-Atlantic Online (October, 2005), 
<http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/print/200510/kaplan-us-special-forces>, pp. 1-5.
157
Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia, Indonesia, and Colombia,348 and no doubt have a presence 
as the sole military extension of U.S. security strategy elsewhere.
Conclusion: Problems, Answers, and Recommendations in the Present and Future 
The role of SOF in the GWOT, presently and as it is planned for, has caused some 
problems.  This conclusion will identify and answer three such problems.  The end of the 
section will offer a conclusion to the paper in assessing what the strategic role of SOF 
should be presently and into the future.
(1)  It has always been a concern that increased SOF funding will lead to a 
deterioration of funds to the military at-large.  This problem is really a misperception.  In 
the latest defense budget, only one conventional program (the widely criticized Army 
Crusader system) was eliminated.  Large conventional weapons systems like the F/A- 22 
Raptor program have not been cut, and do not appear to be threatened.349
As the funding for SOF grows, the defense budget more truly reflects the present 
security situation.  In a situation where only SOF have the ability to lead the GWOT, 
SOF should have more money.350
(2) The second issue is that expanding SOF personnel by 33% violates the SOF 
truth of “Quality over Quantity,” and will thereby lead to a deterioration of the capability.  
That is not true.  In the short-term, the military can gain effective soldiers by recruiting 
from a talent pool of seasoned combat veterans that have been fighting in Iraq and 
Afghanistan for five years.351  Additionally, in the long-term, a growth in the number of 
SOF officers will lead to a growth in the number of SOF personnel promoted to General 
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officer ranks, and thereby positions of influence in the military bureaucracy.  By ensuring 
more officers have a proper understanding of SOF, the present expansion of their 
personnel serves to strengthen the role that special operations can play in future U.S. 
security strategies.
(3) The final and most important problem with the current state of SOF deals with 
the repercussions of the Department of Defense rapidly expanding and changing the 
special operations capability.  This is a two-level problem.  First, an expanded SOF role 
could compromise the bureaucracies it infringes upon.  More importantly, there is a 
significant chance that meshing four things—the ease and hastiness with which the 
executive can now deploy SOF; the rapidly increased strategic importance that SOF 
maintain; the vagueness of covert action laws; and the clandestine capability of SOF—
provides an environment permissive to a special operation that could significantly harm 
U.S. foreign policy.352
Regarding the less important problem, the resistance of SOF entering specifically 
the intelligence community is indicative of the trend of intelligence agencies in general 
not wishing to give up any bureaucratic power.  As the events of 11 September showed, 
the intelligence bureaucracy must be reformed; questioning the proper inculcation of SOF 
into that bureaucracy is part of the growing pains of intelligence reform.
The more important problem certainly is a grave one and is manifest by current 
policy options being discussed surrounding a nuclear Iran.  A covert, PSYOP mission to 
discourage Iranians of the worth of a nuclear weapon is not the scary possibility, and may 
352
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even be a useful tool in coercive diplomacy with Iran.353  The unfortunate incident would 
be a Bay of Pigs-like debacle where Americans use SOF in a raid on Iranian nuclear 
facilities.  Historically, the U.S. has not used SOF to stop proliferation.  In the recent 
Quadrennial Defense Review, SOF have been tasked with “Locating and ‘rendering safe’ 
WMD.”354  SOF may be effective in this role in combating nuclear terrorism, but a raid 
against a nation like Iran would offer no deniability for the United States; and, although it 
could be quite easily launched, would be a strategic disaster in the Middle East.
The situation begs the question: why are SOF being discussed as a tool of nuclear 
deterrence?  The answer is that, presently, the United States is strategically mixed up.  
The conventional military is left fighting a war that would be better left to SOF; because 
they are bogged down by nation-building and counterinsurgency in Iraq, the large-scale 
military is left without being able to offer a credible threat to Iran.  So SOF need to be 
discussed as a possible method of nuclear deterrence, rather than focus on the GWOT—a 
war that only SOF have the military capability to win.
The large-scale security environment is relatively easy to project.  Just as it is 
hard for the United States military to undergo an overnight change, it is difficult for a 
major threat to emerge quickly.  It will be no surprise when, in 10 or 20 years, we may 
need a standing military capable of deterring China, Iran, and/or North Korea.  The 
conventional military should focus on offering a deterrent to slowly-emergent, large-scale 
threats, rather than scrambling to focus on small-scale wars that it is not fit to win.
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At this point, especially as the future for SOF promises that more of its officers 
will be promoted to important positions that are able to effectively understand the 
capability, special operations will always play an important role in U.S. security strategy.  
It is impossible to predict what, exactly, that role will be.  Relative to major 
geopolitical threats, low-level threats are extremely difficult to project.  Looking back 
from 1942 to the present, this unpredictability is tantamount to the role of special 
operations in U.S. strategy.   Once SOF were properly understood, the adaptability of 
these precise warriors has allowed them to be carefully and quickly tailored to meet the 
needs of specific and important policy objectives, especially when dealing with quickly-
emergent, rapidly changing low-level threats.  As these low-level adversaries have 
continued to evolve and become increasingly dangerous, SOF will be most effectively 
utilized by continuing to innovate congruently with these types of threats, maintaining a 
standing proactive ability to counter them, and thus remaining an imperative piece of 
U.S. security strategy.
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